









The Dissertation Committee for Samori Sekou Camara certifies 
that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
“There are Some Bad Brothers and Sisters in New Orleans:”  









Juliet E. K. Walker 
________________________
H. W. Brands  
________________________




“There are Some Bad Brothers and Sisters in New Orleans:” 














Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
 
 











First, I would like to thank the Creator, Asase Yaa (Mother Earth), my 
ancestors, and those yet unborn for the continued support during good and bad 
times in this process. I owe my deepest gratitude to family, especially my 
mother, Roberta Lewis, and sister, Virginia Lewis, for always being supportive 
and proud of their only son and brother. Thanks to both, Donald Hamilton and 
Brian Clark. I continue to honor you. 
I owe a debt of gratitude to the people at the University of Texas at 
Austin. I am grateful to my advisor, Leonard Moore, who saw in me a student, 
brother, and mentee worth having. Thanks for all your words of encouragement, 
inspiration, and battles along the way. They have made me a better man in ways 
you would not believe. I would also like to thank the rest of my committee: Juliet 
E. K. Walker, H. W. Brands, Louis Harrison, and Troy Allen. Dr. Walker was a 
sincere support and inspiring symbol of a scholar in my days in Austin. Dr. 
Brands helped me became a better writer and historian. Dr. Harrison taught me 
much about the connection between race and sport. Dr. Allen, what can a say? 
You were a great basketball buddy and professor. I am forever grateful to for 
giving me that book list of all those Black classics, which helped shape my 
consciousness and worldview. Also, I would like to thank Merilyn Lehman in the 
 v 
History department. Thanks for always answering my questions and helping me 
navigate this process. 
When I first stepped onto campus, the Center for African and African 
American Studies became my second-home and nurtured my soul in a new 
environment. I want to thank all of the staff and all of the friends I met in that 
sacred place, especially Mrs. Brenda Burt. In addition to the center, several 
friends at the University of Texas made graduate school a memorable experience: 
Adam “Zulu Sauve” Williams, Sade “Soul Sistah” Jones, Jeremy Anato-Mensah, 
Monique Ribeiro, and Amari Johnson. I give special thanks to Amari and Adam 
who always pushed me to be a better Afrikan man and scholar. Thanks for being 
there when I needed to vent, talk, laugh, or strategize. 
I am indebted to all my warrior scholars and warrior teachers, Mama 
Abena and Mama Kendra, at Kamali Academy in New Orleans. Thank you guys 
for keeping me grounded and motivated to walk in the way of our ancestors. 
You are the reason I rise in the morning and the reason I stay up at night. I love 
every one of you.  
Again, I thank all of those who have believed in me, inspired me, and 
supported me.  Without all of you, I would not be where I am and go where I am 
going. If I am strong, it is because you strengthen me. If I am wise, it is because 







“There are Some Bad Brothers and Sisters in New Orleans:” 
The Black Power Movement in the Crescent City from 1964-1977 
 
Samori Sekou Camara, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011 
 
Supervisor: Leonard N. Moore 
 
This is a study of the manifestations and permutations of the Black Power 
era   principles and ideologies in New Orleans from the mid-1960s to the late 
1970s. By highlighting little-known and often neglected groups along with 
popular organizations, this work illuminates how these groups shaped and 
rethought the their objectives and tactics in the contested terrain of post-Civil 
Rights New Orleans.  
Making extensive use of archival resources, newspaper articles, memoirs, 
interviews, and secondary literature, “There are Some Bad Brothers and Sisters in 
New Orleans” focuses on the ways in which disparate organizations, groups, 
and individuals, wrestling with the highly fluid idea of Black Power, attempted 
to refashion the political and cultural landscape of the Crescent City. This 
 vii 
dissertation contributes a more nuanced analysis of this famous city and 
continues the recent surge in Black Power Studies that emphasizes local 
examples of Black Power. This work tells the story of New Orleans; of shootouts 
and showdowns; liberation theater and war helicopters; schools and southern 
political rules.  
The central objective of this study is to provide a more complete and in-
depth look at the major themes (Cultural Nationalism, Revolutionary 
Nationalism, Black Arts, student movements, political power, and independent 
education) of the Black Power era by calling attention to its distinctive but 
informative examples nurtured in the incomparable city of New Orleans.  This 
dissertation argues that the roots of Black Power in New Orleans were shattered, 
disparate, and ad-hoc in nature. As such, its thrust failed to bear the social, 
cultural, economic, and political fruit hoped for by its advocates. 
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 This is a study of the manifestations and permutations of the Black Power era 
principles and ideologies in New Orleans from 1964 to 1977. By highlighting little-
known and often neglected groups along with popular organizations, this work 
illuminates how these groups shaped and rethought their objectives and tactics in the 
contested terrain of post-Civil Rights New Orleans. The study focuses on the ways in 
which disparate organizations, groups, and individuals, wrestling with the highly fluid 
idea of Black Power, attempted to refashion the political and cultural landscape of the 
Crescent City. The image of New Orleans cultivated by the economic elite presents a 
seemingly happy place. The city’s nickname, “Big Easy,” conjures images of Mardi Gras, 
delicious food, and a non-stop party atmosphere. This image, however, describes only 
half the story. This dissertation contributes a more nuanced analysis of this famous city. 
This work tells the story of shootouts and showdowns; liberation theater and war 
helicopters; schools and southern political rules. The central objective of this study is to 
provide a more complete and in-depth look at the major themes (Cultural Nationalism, 
Revolutionary Nationalism, Black Arts, student movements, political power, and 
independent education) of the Black Power era by calling attention to its distinctive but 
informative examples nurtured in the incomparable city of New Orleans.   
New Orleans is not only important because it is the oldest Black urban 
community in the country, but because it is neither explicitly southern nor northern. It is 
New Orleans, the most unique and, arguably, the most African city in the country. 
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Adding the topic of Black Power to the city’s deeply rooted class and color dynamics 
ensures a compelling story brimming with conflict and intrigue.  
The title of this dissertation is borrowed from the cult-classic film, The Spook 
Who Sat by the Door, which was written and directed by Sam Greenlee in 1973. As the 
main character, Dan Freeman, strategizes to organize Blacks outside of Chicago for 
revolution, he mentions New Orleans to which another character responds, “There are 
some bad brothers in New Orleans.” This quote is used to highlight the attitude towards 
New Orleans during the Black Power era and as play on the word “bad.” Bad, in the 
context of the film, meant ready to fight for the liberation of all African-descended 
people in America. In this dissertation, it certainly carries that meaning, but is expanded 
to include those who were “bad” in the sense that they used the fervor around Black 
Power for their own benefit and neglected the masses. In addition, “sisters” was added to 
reflect the reality that Black women played a prominent role in the fight for Black Power 
in New Orleans. To leave them out would do a grave disservice to those women who 
fought, studied, and lived for the liberation of their communities. The title speaks to the 
courage of the activists in New Orleans and encompasses the eclectic political and 
ideological motivations that animated the movement participants. While groups and 
individuals did not carry homogeneous objectives or strategies, they all were “bad” in 
their own ways as they endeavored to bring into existence their brand of Black Power.1 
French and Spanish Origins of New Orleans 
                                                
1 Sam Greenlee, director, The Spook Who Sat by the Door, 1973. The movie and novel of 
the same name continues to inspire political consciousness. 
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 Endeavoring to control the mouth of the Mississippi River and keep it out of the 
hands of the British, France colonized Louisiana as a strategic colony. New Orleans was 
founded in 1718. In its chaotic beginnings, Louisiana quickly became a penal colony 
under Louis XIV sending prisoners who were condemned to die in France to Louisiana to 
work for three years. Thereafter the prisoners received land to be “cleared and 
cultivated.” Eventually, the practice expanded to include vagabonds, murders, drunkards, 
and beggars. Families even attempted to deport troublesome family members to 
Louisiana. The Natchez Indians; however, slowed the immigration of the French when 
they revolted against the French invaders in 1729. In the end, they killed one-tenth of the 
white population.2 
 The first Africans brought on slave ships to Louisiana arrived in 1719 along with 
barrels of rice seed—a crop familiar to the enslaved Africans. And unlike the English 
colonies, which imported enslaved Africans from plantations and “seasoning” camps in 
the West Indies, the first Africans in Louisiana came directly from the continent of 
Africa. In fact, most were from the Senegambia region of West Africa. This circumstance 
laid the foundation for Louisiana being one of the most Africanized places in the 
diaspora.3 
 Though the direct connection to Africa made it easier to preserve African culture 
in a new environment, the journey to the port of New Orleans held challenges that 
affected the black population growth early on. First, the long transatlantic crossing that 
                                                
2 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-
Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 
1992), 2-10. 
3 Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana, 2-10. 
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began the Maafa or great disaster took a terrible toll on the bodies and minds of the 
enslaved Africans. Then, many perished on the docks of New Orleans from starvation 
and exposure without proper provisions and shelter. Historian Ira Berlin writes about the 
voyage of a slave ship called Venus. This particular ship embarked from the coast of 
West Africa in April of 1729 with 450 stolen Africans on-board, but only 363 reached the 
Mississippi River. Forty-three died before disembarking in New Orleans. Moreover, the 
rest were in such bad shape that two-thirds died soon after being sold at auction. Still, 
Africans “survived better than either Europeans or Native Americans in eighteenth-
century Louisiana.”4 
 In the urban environment of New Orleans, enslaved Africans were employed in a 
variety of sectors outside the plantation. Enslaved Africans in New Orleans built and 
shored up levees, dug ditches and canals, constructed docks, cut down trees, built French 
fortifications, worked as domestics, and much more. With the skills they brought with 
them from Africa, many enslaved Africans became skilled craftsmen in the so-called 
New World. In fact, to produce more profit, the Company of the Indies “apprenticed 
slaves to blacksmiths, wheelwrights, saddlers, masons, and carpenters.” Though the 
Company of the Indies developed a plantation on the West Bank of the Mississippi River 
across from New Orleans, plantations were largely outside New Orleans along the 
Mississippi. According to Berlin, New Orleans was a society with slaves as opposed to a 
slave society. In parts of Louisiana, cotton was grown, but it was never “King Cotton” as 
                                                
4 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North 
America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 82-83. 
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in other regions of the south. Rice was a stable food crop that was largely consumed 
locally. Tobacco and Indigo; however, were the major export crops.5 
 As the plantation system grew across Louisiana, many enslaved Africans fled to 
New Orleans or to the swamps and forests around the city. Forming maroon communities 
much larger than “existed in the Chesapeake piedmont or the South Carolina lowlands,” 
runaways built permanent interracial, African and Native American, settlements in the 
tangled terrain. In an intricate web of connections, enslaved Africans on plantations 
provided maroons with food and necessary supplies in exchange for “game, pelts, and 
assurances of a home-away-from-home.”6 
 The Haitian Revolution, the successful African insurrection of 1794-1803, and its 
aftermath created a population boom in Louisiana and its maroon communities as over 
ten thousand people sought refuge in New Orleans and doubled its population. Historian 
Adam Fairclough reports that “about a third were slaves and another third gens de 
couleur libre (free people of color).” The free people of color or mulattoes, Blacks, and 
whites lived in a racial order, which was more complex than the black/white system of 
the United States. The mulattoes served as a buffer between the whites and Blacks in the 
racial hierarchy and came to “acquire an exceptional degree of wealth, education, and 
freedom” in antebellum Louisiana. Creoles, as the mulattoes were called, largely lost 
their distinctiveness within the social order after the Reconstruction period. In the late 
                                                
5 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 84; Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana, 10. 
6 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 88. 
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nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Louisiana, in general, and New Orleans, 
specifically, tossed the old caste system for a more rigid Black/white arrangement.7 
 After the Civil War, Black Creoles, virtually all free born before the war, came to 
hold important political positions. Louisiana, along with South Carolina, were the only 
states to have Black majorities in the state political conventions. In 1872, P. B. S. 
Pinchback became the first Black governor when he succeeded Henry C. Warmoth while 
he was suspended during his Louisiana impeachment proceedings.  That same year, 
Louisiana elected three Black politicians to Congress.  This trend continued across the 
South and a record eight Blacks were elected to Congress. Violence, however, always 
lurked around the corner. In 1873, the White League, a Ku Klux Klan-type organization, 
murdered almost a hundred Black men, most after they had already surrendered, in the 
Colfax massacre. The massacre is known as the “bloodiest single instance of racial 
carnage in the Reconstruction era.”8 
 The end of Reconstruction in 1877 dramatically quieted Black political influence 
in the South. Disenfranchisement and more violence followed. Dozens of striking sugar 
plantation workers were brutally killed in 1887 in Thibodaux, Louisiana. Lynchings took 
place frequently. One study reports that 355 African Americans were lynched in 
Louisiana between 1882 and 1952. These numbers only encompass the reported 
incidents.9 
                                                
7 Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-
1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 5. 
8 Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990), 
189. 
9 Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 8. 
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Robert Charles 
As an avid advocate for African emigration back to Africa and a “quiet nigger,” 
according to whites who knew him, Robert Charles burst into the nation’s consciousness 
when he shot twenty-four whites, including four policemen, in the latter days of July 
1900 in New Orleans. Charles, an ardent reader, read of the lynching death of Sam Hose 
in Newnan, Georgia, and was incensed. Hose “was slowly tortured and then burned alive, 
before a huge crowd which included women and young boys,” one newspaper reported. 
“Indeed, special trains had been run from Atlanta that Sunday so more people could 
witness the event. Afterward, his half-consumed body was pulled from the fire, he was 
cut open, and slices of his heart and liver were sold as souvenirs.” Charles vowed that he 
would not die in that manner and reportedly said, “it was the duty of every negro to buy a 
rifle and keep it ready against the time they might be called upon to act in unison.” He 
would soon use his rifle in the defense of himself.10 
On the night of July 23, Robert Charles and an acquaintance sat on steps that led 
to the front door of 2815 Dryades, the home of a white family, and waited for two female 
friends. Someone alerted police that two “suspicious looking negroes” were sitting on a 
white family’s doorstep. Three police officers approached Charles and his friend. They 
demanded to know what the two were up to. After a short answer, it is reported that 
Robert Charles got up and moved to leave. One of the officers grabbed him and beat 
Charles with his billet as he struggled. But Charles jerked away and ran. Mora, the police 
officer who grabbed him, pulled his pistol and Charles did the same. Both fired several 
                                                
10 William Hair. Carnival of Fury: Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race Riot of 
1900, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 107-108. 
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shots. Mora was shot in the shoulder and Charles in the leg. Nevertheless, Charles’s 
wound did not prevent him from retrieving his .38 caliber breech-loading lever-action 
Winchester rifle from his home on Fourth Street. Police quickly found his residence and 
came to arrest him, but before they could, Charles opened the door, leveled his rifle and 
shot the police captain through the heart. The others ran for safety with one being killed 
as he retreated.11 White mobs harassed and beat innocent African Americans when they 
heard that a Black man had killed the police captain and a policeman. For the next three 
days, thousands of whites gathered in the streets of New Orleans to administer their own 
brand of justice while Charles eluded police capture by hiding in the house of a Black 
family at 1208 Saratoga Street. Even the Mayor of nearby Kenner, S. M. Cowen, joined 
the unruly crowd. “I am from Kenner, gentlemen, and I have come down to New Orleans 
tonight to assist you in teaching the blacks a lesson. I have killed a negro before, and … I 
am willing to kill again,” he yelled from a soapbox. “The only way you can teach these 
niggers a lesson and put them in their place is to go out and lynch a few of them as an 
object lesson…that is the only thing to do—kill them, string them up, lynch them. I will 
lead you if you will follow.”12  
On the morning of Friday, the twenty-seventh, the superintendent of police 
received a tip from a Black informant that Robert Charles took refuge with the Jackson 
family on Saratoga Street. Police officers followed the lead. Two were shot dead by 
Robert Charles as they attempted to search the Jackson home. This announced his 
presence to New Orleans. Word of his hiding place traveled fast, close to twenty 
                                                
11 Ibid., 118-120, 123, 125. 
12 Ibid., 151. 
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thousand whites crowded around the block, an estimated thousand with firearms of some 
sort. As the whites gathered, Charles barricaded himself on the second floor of the 
structure and prepared for a showdown. Various “volunteer guns” poured bullets into the 
house, but Charles continued to shoot. He possessed great marksmanship. He fired fifty 
shots between 3:20 and 5 p.m. and hit human flesh twenty-four times.13 
In order to force Charles in the street, the Julia Street Fire captain started a 
smoldering fire on the bottom floor of the two-story structure on Saratoga Street. Once 
the smoke became too much to handle about 5 p.m., Charles dashed down the stairs, ran 
outside into the rear of the building. There he was shot several times. Others continued to 
fire at his body. His body was then dragged to the front yard where the crowd pumped 
more bullets into his already lifeless corpse. Those without guns took turns kicking and 
stomping Robert Charles. The police stood by and refused to halt the shooting and 
kicking, but prevented the crowd from burning Charles’s body. The autopsy revealed that 
Charles suffered thirty-four bullets to the chest alone and numerous wounds throughout 
his limbs. They placed Charles’s body into the police wagon and thousands in the mob 
followed the wagon and continued to beat the corpse about the head. Two other Black 
men would lose their life to the bloodthirsty mob that afternoon.14  
For many Blacks in New Orleans and across the country, Robert Charles became 
a folk hero. The ‘Robert Charles Song’ praised him and would occasionally be played at 
all-Black gatherings. Also, Fred Clark, the Black police informant who revealed Robert 
Charles’s hiding position, was killed by an admirer of Charles on September 2, 1900. 
                                                
13 Ibid., 155, 168-169, 171. 
14 Ibid., 173-176, 180. 
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Even some whites marveled at his courage. One newspaper called Robert Charles “the 
boldest, most desperate and dangerous negro ever known in Louisiana.”15 
Black Creoles chose to respond to the new racial dynamics of post-Reconstruction 
New Orleans in several ways. One response was “passing” as white. One writer claims 
that from 1875 and 1890s between 100 and 500 Blacks became white each year. The 
Louisiana legislature passed a bill in 1890 that segregated passenger cars on trains. 
Homer Plessy, a Black Creole, challenged the law all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court in 1896. The famous Plessy v. Ferguson case upheld Louisiana’s law of 
racial segregation in private businesses and ordered that facilities be “separate but equal.”  
Another response to post-reconstruction politics was to migrate out of the South to places 
in the north and west. Between 1910 and 1940, some 1.6 million African Americans 
moved to “promised lands” seeking refuge from Jim Crow. Big cities like Chicago, 
Cleveland, New York City, and Detroit received a high percentage of migrants.16  
Not everyone left or passed for white, however. In the atmosphere of racial hatred 
and violent repression of Black rights, Louisiana, more than any other state, embraced the 
philosophies, opinions, and Pan-Africanism of Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro 
Improvement Association. The state’s seventy-four branches were by far the most 
chapters of any state in America. Virginia came in second with forty-eight branches 
throughout the state. Garvey’s message of economic, political, cultural, and social self-
improvement—buttressed by an era of lynching, Jim Crow, and race riots—resonated 
                                                
15 Ibid., 178-179, 184. 
16 Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 6; Kim Lacy Rogers, Righteous Lives: 
Narratives of the New Orleans Civil Rights Movement (New York: New York University 
Press, 1993), 5. 
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throughout Black communities across the country and muted the calls from integrationist 
organizations. While developing the largest Black organization in the race’s history, 
Garvey came under unprecedented government surveillance and was “convicted on mail 
fraud charges connected to the Black Star Line.” Nonetheless, his influence continued as 
the UNIA boasted of over nine hundred branches and six million members across the 
world in 1923. Garvey began his five-year sentence in February of 1925 when appeal 
attempts failed. After two years in jail, his sentence was commuted in November 1927, 
but with the stipulation that he be deported to Jamaica. Garvey was put on a train to New 
Orleans, but he actually thought he was headed to New York. According to Garvey 
historian, Tony Martin, five thousand of Marcus Mosiah Garvey’s faithful followers 
listened to his farewell address at the port of New Orleans. It is fitting that the Garveyites 
and radicals of New Orleans were able to see and be inspired by their leader one more 
time before he left American soil, never to return.17 
As Garvey made his mark and was forced out, Black artists, especially musicians 
and writers, took part in a resurgence of culture and arts known as the Harlem 
Renaissance. Beside James Weldon Johnson, Zora Neal Hurston, Langston Hughes, 
Claude McKay, and Jean Toomer, stood jazz greats like Louis Armstrong and Jelly Roll 
Morton both hailing from New Orleans. 
In 1909, the N.A.A.C.P. (National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People) was founded by an interracial group committed to the fight for racial justice. A 
                                                
17 Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus 
Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association, (Dover: The Majority Press, 
1976), 14-20; Louisiana Weekly, December 3, 1927. 
 12 
branch was established in New Orleans in 1915. It allowed Creoles, whites, and Blacks to 
bring the battle against racial discrimination to New Orleans. Early in the chapter’s 
history, divisions between light-skinned Blacks (Creoles) and dark-skinned Blacks 
hampered unity within the organization. Creole members were accused of not being 
militant enough. The New Orleans N.A.A.C.P., however, found some early victories by 
influencing the United States Supreme to strike down the city ordinance, which 
established segregated residential areas. In addition, in 1930, it hired a lawyer who helped 
to prosecute the first white man to be sentenced to death for the murder of a Black 
person.18  
Between World War I and World War II, the New Orleans N.A.A.C.P. engaged in 
protest on the issues of police brutality, truancy, overcrowding in schools, and dilapidated 
structures. These were not “hot-button” issues at the time. “Whatever benefits we got, we 
got…by supplication rather than by demanding,” said A.P. Tureaud, a Creole lawyer and 
stalwart activist in the Louisiana Civil Rights struggle. During the Depression years, the 
local N.A.A.C.P.’s saw its activites and “reform efforts decline” measurably. However, 
Tureaud would come to play an increasingly prominent role as the years progressed.19 
Born on February 26, 1899 in the Creole Seventh Ward of New Orleans, 
Alexander Pierre (A.P.) Tureaud, Sr. was educated in Chicago, New York, and 
Washington, D.C. where he received his law degree from Howard University in 1925. 
After practicing law in Washington, D.C. for a year, he returned home and opened a law 
                                                
18 Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 17-19. 
19 Arnold Hirsch and Joseph Logsdon, Creole New Orleans: Race and Americanization 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 268-70. 
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office in 1926. Tureaud joined the legal team of the N.A.A.C.P. (Legal Defense Fund) in 
1927 and would continue to fight for equal rights through numerous court cases 
throughout Louisiana and Mississippi. Called “Mr. NAACP,” Tureaud’s name appeared 
on the majority of lawsuits filed by the N.A.A.C.P. because for many years, he was the 
only Black lawyer in the state of Louisiana.  
In the post-World War II years, the local N.A.A.C.P. and other Black leaders 
contended with the paternalism of local white leaders. Outside of the N.A.A.C.P. legal 
challenges, Black leaders appealed to the “good nature” of white authority to get things 
done for Blacks in the city. In the face of the N.A.A.C.P.’s continued effort to change the 
racial dynamics of New Orleans and Louisiana, at large, membership in the White 
Citizens’ Council exploded. Indeed, New Orleans “provided over half the state’s total 
membership.” In the aftermath of the Brown decision the Louisiana Supreme Court 
outlawed N.A.A.C.P. branches from holding meetings or conducting regular business. In 
short, the state attempted to silence the agitation of the group. To insure that the directive 
was followed, the local police in New Orleans raided the N.A.A.C.P. headquarters. In 
response, the national secretary, Roy Wilkins, suspended operations in Louisiana. It 
would not be until the early 1960s that the legislation would be overturned by the 
persistence of A.P. Tureaud. By that time, however, other groups began to exert influence 
on the local scene in New Orleans.20  
Though largely absent from the popular historical narrative of Civil Rights, New 
Orleans was a major player in the black freedom struggle. After the bus desegregation 
                                                
20 Hirsch and Logsdon, Creole New Orleans, 279-282. 
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victory in Montgomery, Alabama, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other leaders met in 
New Orleans in 1957 to discuss the next phases of their movement. At this meeting, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (S.C.L.C.) was born. This organization 
expanded the movement’s focus to battling all forms of segregation. SCLC went on to 
fight Jim Crow and segregation in Albany, Georgia, Birmingham, Alabama, St. 
Augustine, Florida, and headed the famous March on Washington for Jobs and Justice in 
August of 1963.21  
While the N.A.A.C.P. languished under state repression and the SCLC focused its 
energy in other areas of the South, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) filled the activist void in New 
Orleans. James Farmer and others founded CORE in Chicago in 1941. Its philosophical 
foundation of this white-dominated, integrated organization was nonviolent civil 
disobedience in the face of virulent racial segregation throughout America. CORE made 
its way to the South in 1957. Outside of the South, CORE focused on job discrimination 
and housing issues in the urban North, and within the South CORE headed direct action 
movement against discrimination and protested voting rights. The New Orleans chapter 
of CORE found its legs during the protests of Dryades Street and Canal Street stores 
within the city. Local activists like Jerome Smith, Oretha Castle, Doris Jean Castle, Matt 
Suarez, Rudy Lombard, and others incorporated the Greensboro example into their local 
movement. In September of 1960, seven CORE members sat-in at F.W. Woolworth 
                                                
21 For more information: See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King 
Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988); Burwell Ware, Director, A 
House Divided. Videotape. 1987; New Orleans, LA: Xavier University, 1987, Interview 
with Oretha Castle Harley about the Dryades Street protest. 
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stores on Canal and Rampart Streets. All of them, “five blacks and two whites” were 
arrested. After Black churches raised bail, the activists were released that night. They 
would continue their sit-ins over the next couple of weeks despite a ban on picketing and 
sit-ins by Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison. The New Orleans chapter, however, suffered as 
CORE’s national office organized the Freedom Rides in 1961, which challenged 
discrimination on interstate carriers. Many of the local activists dared to be apart of the 
dangerous journey through Alabama and Mississippi. The students who left for 
Mississippi and the Freedom Rides represented the core of the student movement in New 
Orleans, which never was as extensive as other southern cities because of conservative 
administrators at the historically black Xavier University and Dillard University who 
suspended or expelled students who demonstrated against Jim Crow.22 
 The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) failed to have a strong 
present in New Orleans, because it was largely a “CORE” city. Nevertheless, SNCC 
affected the activists in New Orleans, especially as the movement moved from 
nonviolence to Black Power. In 1962, CORE expelled its white members. According to 
Oretha Castle, white CORE members were partying too much and wanting to dominate 
the decision-making within the chapter. “We decided that as far as we were concerned, 
that wasn’t what the struggle was all about,” Castle said. “So what it amounted to, we put 
every last one of the white people out. Every last one of them.” SNCC had a similar 
struggle within the organization and shifted into a more Black Nationalist posture. 
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Stokely Carmichael, later Kwame Ture, chairman of SNCC in the mid-1960s, coined the 
phrase “Black Power” at a rally along the route of James Meredith’s “March Against 
Fear” in 1966. Meredith initially began the march across Mississippi on his own; 
however, on the second day of his trek, he was ambushed by several whites, shot, and 
hospitalized. Carmichael representing SNCC and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
representing SCLC, vowed to continue the march on the Meredith’s behalf.23  
 Willie Ricks, a SNCC member, introduced the crowds along the route to the 
phrase, but on that fateful night with emotions running high, Carmichael provided a 
slogan that struck a chord with many Blacks inside and outside of the movement. This 
expression propelled Carmichael in the national spotlight—a great departure from his 
time as a faceless grassroots organizer in the Mississippi Delta. With the cameras 
watching, the slogan of Black Power encapsulated the feeling and energy that dwelled 
within the bosoms of millions of Africans in America suffering at the hands of white 
supremacists on a daily basis. Chanting and shouting in the call-and-response nature, 
which is native to African people on the continent and Diaspora, many in the crowd 
found the idea that would lead them and the movement in a more militant direction.  
 That militancy led SNCC organizers to re-evaluate the role of European 
Americans in the struggle for Black equality and liberation. SNCC workers felt that just 
the mere presence of the whites would cause local people to lose their confidence and 
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concede the leadership roles to the whites. Jim Crow race relations did not disappear 
because SNCC came to town. Blacks in the lower South would not be willing to truly 
express themselves when whites were around. In addition, some SNCC organizers 
believed that whites should go into their own community and organize there and leave the 
Black communities to the Black organizers.  
Black Power began flowering in New Orleans as the city’s early history of rather 
unique race relations continued its evolution. By the mid-1960s, whites fled New Orleans 
for the burgeoning suburbs on the outskirts of the city, which were made possible by a 
new technology called the Wood Pump. Invented in 1917, it effectively drained the 
swampy areas around the city and fostered the move toward more residential segregation. 
During the period of chattel slavery, Blacks lived in close proximity to their enslavers. 
The richest whites lived on St. Charles, Napoleon, and Jefferson—main boulevards—
while those enslaved by them lived in the blocks behind the mansions. The residential 
configuration was called the “superblock:” a section of city blocks with whites on the 
perimeter and Blacks and poor whites at its core. This “salt-and-pepper” arrangement 
persisted until the Housing Authority of New Orleans, created in 1937, built two white 
and three Black projects or housing developments by 1941. When the Desire Projects 
opened in 1956, New Orleans had already begun to morph into a more pronounced 
racially stratified city. These changes in segregation and the second great migration 
provide the environment from which grew a consistent, though ad-hoc, drive for 
economic, political, social, and cultural changes in New Orleans.24  
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To further highlight the point of white flight, from 1950 to 1980, New Orleans’ 
white population dropped from 387,814 to 236,967—a thirty-eight percent decrease. The 
white populations of two surrounding parishes—Jefferson and St. Bernard—skyrocketed 
in the same period. Jefferson Parish’s white population increased by 434 percent, while 
the white population grew by 643 percent in St. Bernard Parish. As whites retreated, the 
Black population of New Orleans grew from 181,775 to 308,136—a forty-one percent 
increase. A similar population trend occurred in Atlanta, Georgia. With the federal 
mandate for school integration, increased Black political possibility, and general urban 
unrest, New Orleans became a “Chocolate City.”25 
The school crisis of 1960 in New Orleans shattered the myth that Black and white 
New Orleans residents had harmonious race relations. The Ninth Ward Civic and 
Improvement League began in the late 1940s to push for equal school facilities for 
Blacks. Essentially, the league wanted the school board to honor the Plessy v. Ferguson 
decision of “separate but equal.” The group continued to meet and petition the school 
board, but their grievances fell upon deaf ears. Eventually, the League solicited the help 
of the NAACP and its chief legal council in the local New Orleans chapter, A. P. 
Tureaud, who, in turn, filed Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board on September 5, 1952. 
This case argued for the unconstitutionality of segregation and if that did not work for the 
school board to act on “separate but equal.” Of course, in the meantime, the national 
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NAACP compiled similar cases from Washington D.C., Delaware, Kansas, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, which eventually led to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
in 1954.26  
After Brown II, which decreed that the desegregation of schools should proceed 
with “all deliberate speed,” passed in 1955, the white community of New Orleans, the 
same community who supposedly had harmonious race relations with the Black residents 
of the city, made every effort possible to keep the public schools in New Orleans 
segregated. In February 1956, Judge Skelly Wight ruled that Louisiana’s segregation 
laws were invalid and ordered the Orleans Parish School Board to submit a school 
integration plan. Leander Perez, the district attorney of neighboring Plaquemine Parish, 
and Gerald Rault, special legal council to the school board, appealed the decision all the 
way up the Supreme Court while the state of Louisiana continued to pass anti-integration 
laws. Perez was a fierce segregationist who thought integration as a ploy of communist 
design. He was also the leading force behind the White Citizens’ Council of Greater New 
Orleans—a segregationist organization. Originating in Homer, Louisiana, Claiborne 
Parish, the White Citizens’ Council was created by Willie Rainach, a segregationist 
similar to and friends of Leander Perez. This group of middle-class whites did not use 
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violence like the Ku Klux Klan, but fought vigorously against desegregation with 
political and economic reprisals. 
On July 15, 1959, Judge Wright ordered the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) 
to submit a desegregation plan by no later than March 1, 1960. Later in the year, 
however, Judge Wright met with NAACP attorney A. P. Tureud and Rault, which 
resulted in the deadline being pushed back to May 16. The OPSB failed to meet the 
deadline. This prompted Judge Wright to order on its behalf that the schools be 
desegregated in September 1960 starting with first grade students attending school closest 
to their homes. The white community expressed outrage at the developments. Alan 
Wieder says,  
With approximately 7,000 Negro and 4,000 white first graders affected by the 
plan, white parents were acutely aware of the almost two-one situation their 
children faced if school officials freely and fairly carried out Judge Wright's 
order. School maps indicated just how thorough the mixing of these 11,000 
children could be. Twenty-eight of the city's forty-eight white elementary schools 
had Negroes living closer to them than to the nearest Negro school, and nearly 
two-thirds of the city's white elementary schools had Negroes living close enough 
to warrant their admission under Judge Wright's plan.
27
 
Recognizing the potential of this arrangement, white parents urged the school board to 
come up with a “sensible” plan. To appease the residents and ease the transition into 
“token” integration, the board and Judge Wright agreed to delay the order until 
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November 14, 1960. White parents and the school board figured that once the school-
year started most parents would not want to move their children from one school to 
another.28  
Ruby Bridges and four other girls desegregated the McDonough 19 and William 
Frantz elementary schools in New Orleans, after threats to close all of the schools, a 
declared state-wide school holiday by Shelby Jackson, State Superintendent of Schools, 
and episodes of racial violence throughout the city of New Orleans. John McDonough 
was the namesake for McDonough 19. McDonough, a millionaire slaveholder, 
bequeathed half of his estate in 1838 “for the education of white and free black youth in 
New Orleans.” The money he bequeathed was not allocated until after the Civil War. 
Gender played an important role in the unfolding of the school crisis. No Black boys 
desegregated the schools for a while. Though only girls crossed the thresholds of 
formerly all-white schools, the whites boycotted the schools, leaving McDonough 19 
with not a single white student at the end of the year and only two white families kept 
their students in William Frantz by year’s end. 29 
 The school crisis certainly marked a change in race relations in the city of New 
Orleans and in the minds of many Blacks. Public transportation and the public library 
were desegregated without confrontations and violence in the years before 1960; it 
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simply happened and people moved on, but the integration of schools brought out a 
different attitude in the residents. Dynamics changed and new lines were drawn, 
especially in the Ninth Ward where the William Frantz School and the Desire Project 
were located.  
In the aftermath of a fierce desegregation fight and before students at the 
majority-white Fortier clamored for a school more responsive to their needs, the students, 
parents, and community around Lawless High School fought for a school capable of 
meeting the needs of the community at-large. Lawless High School became a 
community-school for the Ninth-ward residents of New Orleans.  
Other parents and the N.A.A.C.P. petitioned the Orleans Parish School Board to 
make provisions, such as bus transportation, that would lessen overcrowding and stop the 
platooning of students in Black schools. Platooning means that some students took 
classes in the morning, while others attended classes in the afternoon to relieve 
overcrowding. Platooned students did not receive a full day of schooling at the 
petitioning schools. Parents argued that the limited number of classroom hours hurt Black 
children academically. In a 1961 petition, the N.A.A.C.P. noted that no white students in 
the city attended school on a platoon basis. In addition, N.A.A.C.P. petitions exposed the 
rampant overcrowding in Black schools around the city. The Jones School had 39 classes 
over the maximum for state approval, the Helen S. Edwards School had 1726 children in 
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a school constructed to accommodate 900, and many teachers taught in classrooms with 
thirty-eight or more students.30  
The fight involved Black teachers as well. By 1968, 400 teachers had lost their 
positions as more than 12,000 Black students entered previously white schools. Whereas 
white teachers and administrators found their way into Black schools, Black teachers 
were simply not allowed to follow Black students into their new environments.31 
 
Demographics 
 The deplorable economic, employment and housing situation many Blacks in 
New Orleans—particularly the Desire Projects—found themselves experiencing, points 
to why many residents embraced radical ideals. In 1960, Black residents numbered 
233,514, which represented 37.2% of the New Orleans’s population. By 1970, however, 
the population had grown to forty-five percent with projections of a Black majority 
around the corner. The ninth ward alone housed 134,912 Black residents in a city of only 
593,471. One of the reasons for this small influx was that for many Blacks in the region 
New Orleans represented a place of progress, a place where one’s life could be better. 
Rural residents of surrounding parishes consistently poured into New Orleans in search of 
better jobs, housing, and education. This phenomenon was part of the larger migration—
called the Second Great Migration—which occurred across the country as many Blacks 
moved to the “promised land” of northern and western cities during and after World War 
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II.  In fact, one historian claims that is was migrant families from Louisiana that produced 
most of the activists who represented the base of radicalism in the Bay Area in California. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes were the same in the North and West as they were in New 
Orleans. As Blacks moved to new cities, they found housing deplorable, schools 
overcrowded, and jobs not as abundant as advertised. Even with the projections of a 
Black majority in New Orleans in 1970, the “economic conditions failed to improve over 
the 1960 level. Forty-four percent of the city’s Blacks earned incomes below the poverty 
level, compared to ten percent of whites,” says Daphne Spain in her 1979 article on race 
relations and residential segregation in New Orleans. Spain continues, 
Blacks below the poverty level made up fully 20 percent of the New Orleans 
population in 1970, and the housing projects showed the highest overlap of 
percent Black and four poverty indicators: highest percentage of families below 
the poverty level; lowest median family income; highest percentage receiving 
public assistance; highest unemployment. Approximately 70 percent of the 
housing in New Orleans was over twenty-one years old in 1970, and it is 
estimated that 25 percent of the housing was substandard at that date. 32 
 
The majority of Blacks in New Orleans lived in areas plagued by inadequate schools, 
public transportation, health facilities, police protection, and street lighting. In addition, 
the infant mortality rates from these areas consistently doubled the rates of the rest of the 
city. To make matters worst, one-half of the residents of these areas had less than an 
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eighth grade education, while only one-third of the rest of New Orleans had less than an 
eighth grade education.33 
 
Black Power Studies 
In the field of Black Power Studies, changes are afoot as scholars wrestle with the 
local dynamics of the national and international movement and grapple with a new 
periodization of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements. Scholars like Peniel 
Joseph and others have effectively argued for understanding these two movements as 
connected in ways heretofore unseen. They argue that the origins of Black Power 
“rhetoric, ideology, and militancy are to be found by taking a fresh look at domestic and 
international events” during the Civil Rights Movement. This is a far cry from the 
standard periodization that championed the Civil Rights Movement as glorious and Black 
Power as an unfortunate decline, as disparate animals roaming drastically modified 
terrain. This new trend successfully wields these two movements together. Timothy 
Tyson contends that both movements sprang from the same soil. As it pertains to New 
Orleans, whereas the seeds of radical thought and action always existed, the Crescent 
City remained a staunchly Civil Rights city until the late 1960s. A change was coming.34  
The Black Power that the cauldron of New Orleans produced in the mid-to-late 
1960s embodied the major strands of Black Power sweeping the nation. The trends of 
cultural nationalism, revolutionary nationalism, Black political power, the Black arts 
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movement, Black self-defense, and Black power on campus all had expression in New 
Orleans. Whereas the divisions between the different elements of Black Power are, in 
many ways, overblown, there remain some distinctive ingredients in each ideology. 
Cultural nationalists believed that African Americans had to go back to Africa mentally, 
spiritually, and culturally in order to free themselves from the shackles of oppression. 
Wearing one’s hair natural, changing one’s name, and wearing African grab were 
hallmarks of the cultural nationalist iteration of Black Power, but they were not opposed 
to self-defense. Nationally, the US Organization led by Maulana Ron Karenga 
represented cultural nationalism. Locally, Ahidiana embodied the movement with its 
school, commitment to an African and holistic lifestyle, and by sponsoring cultural events 
like Kwanzaa celebrations in the city. In addition, as creative and artistic cultural 
nationalists developed their crafts of poetry, playwriting, and music, the Black Arts 
Movement (BAM) formed. Black arts took the concepts of cultural nationalism and 
brought them to mediums that inspired, educated, entertained, and raised consciousness, 
pride, and unity within the Black race. Their goal was to develop a Black aesthetic that 
emphasized the beauty and value of Black culture with its distinct myths, lifestyles, and 
metaphors. Participants in what became BAM, knew they could not do art for art’s sake. 
Instead, art represented the “spiritual sister” of Black Power. As such, its role was to 
bring about a revolution of the mind through “edutainment” (education + entertainment). 
In New Orleans, the Free Southern Theater produced plays and writing workshops that 
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challenged norms and inspired many in the Black community to move toward their 
African selves.35  
The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was the more famous or infamous 
proponent of revolutionary nationalism in America in the 1960s and 70s. Revolutionary 
nationalists saw capitalism as the main problem of the world and endeavored to tear it 
down and replace it with a socialist society. Often armed with a Marxist philosophy, class 
struggle rhetoric became characteristic of revolutionary ideology, but race was not totally 
discarded. In order to achieve its goal of revolution, revolutionary nationalists were 
willing to engage in revolutionary violence against the system. The Panthers of New 
Orleans engaged the police on two separate occasions during their short stay in the city 
and Mark Essex, a one-man army, attacked the city and system through the barrel of his 
.44 Magmum Carbine.36  
The revolutionary fervor of the day also spilled over on to college campuses 
across the nation. To be sure, college students or graduates played a pivotal role 
throughout the Black Power Movement. For them, education was not a value-neutral 
enterprise aimed to educate. Instead, they saw educational institutions as factories for the 
indoctrination of American ideals and sensibilities. On campus, whether predominately 
white or historically Black, Black students fought against those ideals and ventured to 
make their education more relevant to their needs. These students desired Black Studies 
classes and degrees, Black Student Unions, and a pedagogical style based on Black 
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culture. They were not content with the status quo upon the university campus and moved 
to occupy buildings, hold sit-ins, picket, and rally around their issues. Fortier High 
School and Southern University of New Orleans were the sites of unrest that are 
highlighted in this work. It is representative of the larger movement, which not only 
struggled for a voice, but control on college campuses.37  
After the protest marches, boycotts, and sit-ins of the Civil Rights Movement, 
many activists helped the movement transform from protest to politics. The rise of Black 
political power throughout the country brought with it great hopes and dreams for many 
Black people. With the election of Black mayors in Cleveland, Gary, Indiana, Detroit, 
Newark and other places, Black communities thought they would finally get the 
recognition from local government they spent decades clamoring for. Some simply 
wanted a “Black face in a high place,” while others wanted total, constructive change. As 
the system opened and accepted Black politicians, revolutionary changes became passé 
and reform ruled the day. The political landscape in New Orleans changed as Blacks 
gained new positions of power within local government. However, as is popularly 
known, when the first Black mayors were elected, they usually took over dying cities. 
This work highlights how the different strands of Black Power coalesced in the 
bosom of New Orleans. In order to do that effectively, we must place this work within the 
context of the burgeoning literature on the Black Power movement. The upcoming 
review serves as the foundation upon which this examination is built. 
                                                
37 Joy Ann Williamson, Black Power on Campus: The University of Illinois, 1965-1975 
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Stefan M. Bradley, Harlem vs. 
Columbia University: Black Student Power in the Late 1960s (Champaign: University of 
Illinois Press, 2009).   
 29 
Black Power and Historiography 
When many hear the phrase Black Power Movement, images of young, brash 
radicals dressed in black from head to toe with their fist clenched high in the sky, as if to 
threaten the very universe, while talking “bad” to the power structure, come to mind. 
Chants of revolution and rifles; riots and gunfire replay in the mind’s eye because this 
embodied the image the media portrayed of a serious, albeit angry, movement, which 
combined intellectualism, radicalism, grassroots organizing, Black arts, Black 
Nationalism, internationalism, anti-colonialism and more. 
 The phrase Black Power emanated from the struggles faced by Africans in 
America during the 1960s and before. Stokely Carmichael, later Kwame Ture, then 
chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), coined the 
phrase at a rally along the route of James Meredith’s “March Against Fear” in 1966. 
Meredith initially began the march across Mississippi on his own; however, on the 
second day of his trek, he was ambushed by several whites and hospitalized. Carmichael, 
with SNCC, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., with SCLC, vowed to continue the march 
on Meredith’s behalf.38  
 Willie Ricks, a SNCC member, introduced the crowds along the route to the 
phrase, but on that fateful night with emotions running high, Carmichael provided a 
slogan that struck a cord with many Blacks inside and outside of the movement. This 
expression propelled Carmichael in the national spotlight—a great departure from his 
time as a faceless grassroots organizer in the Mississippi Delta. With the cameras 
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watching, the slogan of Black Power encapsulated the feeling and energy that dwelled 
within the bosoms of millions of Africans in America suffering at the hands of white 
supremacy. Chanting and shouting in the call-and-response nature, which is native to 
African people on the continent and Diaspora, many in the crowd found the idea that 
would lead them and the movement in a more militant direction, even though other 
organizations throughout the period engaged in actions (not of a non-violent nature) 
which would later characterize aspects of the Black Power movement. This aspect—the 
re-periodization of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements—must be taken into 
account by new scholars of the Black Power movement.39  
 Malcolm X (El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz) occupies the space of patron saint of the 
Black Power movement. Minister Malcolm articulated a program, in the form of the 
Organization of African American Unity (OAAU), of self-defense, the seed for Cultural 
Nationalism, Black Nationalism, internationalism, and anti-colonialism from which many 
organizations that sprung from the revolutionary ground of the 1960s claimed lineage. 
Speaking in a militant, yet plain tone for the masses of Black people, Minister Malcolm 
gave Black people another choice outside of the non-violent rhetoric of Dr. King. He 
captured and inspired the spirit of young Black women and men, who declared to 
continue his legacy in the struggle for African liberation. Thus is born the modern Black 
Power movement. 
 Journalists attempted to make sense of the rising Black militancy as early as 
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1967.40 Kwame Ture and Charles V. Hamilton’s Black Power: The Politics of Liberation 
and Toni Cade Bambara’s 1970 edited volume, The Black Woman: An Anthology are 
examples of texts produced by the movement and in some ways represent primary source 
material that outlined the social and political context within which Black Power 
advocates responded. On the one hand, Hamilton and Ture posit that American society is 
inherently flawed and that if Blacks wanted to achieve any measure of freedom, they 
must look for alternatives outside the existing white party political system. As evidence 
for how Blacks could organize, the authors cite the success of the Lowndes County 
Freedom Organization of Alabama, the original Black Panther Party. On the other hand, 
Bambara’s anthology illuminates powerful female voices who document such issues as 
the Black woman’s place in revolution, sexism within the burgeoning movement, and 
abortion and reproductive rights. This book remains an impressive documentary source 
for students interested in the problems and questions faced by Black activists in the late 
1960s.41 
With the rise of Black Power, many writers developed a keen interest in the 
history and philosophy of Black Nationalism and produced works that followed the 
trajectory of Black Nationalism from the nineteenth-century to the 1960s and 1970s.42 
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Black Nationalism in America is a documentary anthology that traces Black Nationalism 
starting in the 1790s until the 1960s. The authors actually disagreed in their definitions of 
Black Nationalism. Meier and Rudwick contend that black nationalism in the United 
States represents nationalist tendencies exhibited by diverse ethnic groups in modern 
nation-states, while Bracey (a Black nationalist) declares that Black America exists in a 
colonial state. In this way, his assessment of the Black position in American society 
echoes the argument of Robert Allen in Black Awakening in Capitalist America. Bracey 
also declares that the Black Nationalist pulse has developed slowly from 1787 to the 
seventies.  
The early 1970s saw a rise in books by participants or those sympathetic to the 
movement. Autobiographies and memoirs filled the former category and those attempting 
to ascertain the potential of the movement filled the latter.43 Assata’s work is more than 
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emblematic of this genre. As a scholar, freedom fighter, political prisoner, and radical 
activist, Assata Shakur wrote more than an autobiography, more than a memoir, but a 
political manifesto, a revolutionary manual. For Assata, the personal is political, and by 
telling her story she gave the world an in-depth look into the oppressive conditions of 
America, which transformed her from a high school runaway into a modern 
revolutionary. Though some view the genre of autobiography with indignation, speaking 
about the problematic nature of memory, Assata stands out not only as a personal story, 
but as a literary piece meant to further the cause of African liberation. The way in which 
Assata Shakur weaves political topics into her narrative strengthens the book in numerous 
ways. Her commentary is often funny and timely. Speaking from a position of 
experience, Shakur deals directly with the monster that is the prison industrial complex.  
Assata offers the poignant insight that could only be offered by a victim of the prison 
industrial complex.  
Komozi Woodard’s A Nation Within a Nation: Amiri Baraka and Black Power 
Politics, hails as a political biography of Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones) and a history of the 
Modern Black Convention Movement. In addition to recounting how Amiri Baraka rose 
to national and international acclaim, Woodard sets out to “show that the chief sources of 
contemporary Black nationality formation are urban."44 By focusing on Newark, New 
Jersey, Woodard demonstrates how the Black Power energy crossed over into the realm 
of electoral politics rather well, at the risk of making New Jersey seem like the center of 
the Black political movement of the time. Woodard's argument that Black nationality 
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formation was accelerated by the urban environment rings true. One can see how urban 
oppression—close living quarters and all—can galvanize a group and foster an 
underlying Black consciousness. And, as Woodard shows, Amiri Baraka’s passion for the 
oppressed Black masses helped to turn that force into Black political power. 
 In Woodard’s work, the reader witnesses Baraka’s transformation from simply a 
poet, playwright, and novelist to a powerful Black political leader who influenced 
generations of writers and activists. Woodard seems to endeavor to place the Black 
Power movement and Modern Black Convention movement into a context that highlight 
the groups’ effectiveness. Woodard states, in the conclusion which shows that his 
scholarly interest spills far beyond simple pages of research, that,  
The critical question cannot be whether or not Baraka's Modern Black Convention 
Movement liberated Black people; the more relevant issue is whether or not these 
movements accelerated the processes of nationality formation and Black 
liberation, whether or not those organizations and institutions hastened the death 
of racial oppression and internal colonialism.45  
With this perspective, A Nation Within a Nation attempts to reveal that the Black Power 
movement had a chance to effect more changes than thought by those scholars who 
contend that the Black Power movement came and went without any substantiate change 
to American society. Woodard, also, uses this book to help today's generation find 
examples of experiments which purposes were to better the Black community. This is 
scholar activism. Woodard employs his book as a canvas to, not only, paint the history of 
                                                
45 Ibid., 260. 
 35 
Amiri Baraka and the Modern Black Convention Movement, but also to help generations 
to come in their fight for liberation. 
Recent works, however, are going deeper into the meanings of Black Power, 
illuminating issues and bringing forth little known histories of organizations long 
neglected.46 In addition, movement overviews came into vogue. New Day in Babylon: 
The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975, by William L. Van 
Deburg, analyzes the Black Power movement on a macro level and uses Malcolm X, 
Maulana Karenga, the Black Panther Party, SNCC, the Republic of New Africa and 
several others as cases to illustrate the different strains of Black Power. Malcolm X 
commands the attention of Van DeBurg in the introduction of the manuscript. For Van 
DeBurg, Malcolm X was the ideological father, “the archetype, reference point, and 
spiritual adviser in absentia”47 of the Black Power movement and uses a quote by 
Malcolm as his foundation. Malcolm said, “We must recapture our heritage and our 
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identity if we are ever to liberate ourselves from the bonds of white supremacy. We must 
launch a cultural revolution to unbrainwash an entire people.”48 Van DeBurg employs 
this quote to essentially argue, "Black Power is best understood as a broad, adaptive, 
cultural term serving to connect and illuminate the differing ideological orientations of 
the movement's supporters."49  
With this thesis, Van DeBurg largely dismisses Black Power advocates and 
Malcolm X’s real political struggles to liberate Black people—especially Malcolm X 
political program with the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU). Certainly, 
Van Deburg stands on solid ground when he gives the cultural aspects of the movement a 
prominent function, but to totally discount the political aspects is to appear narrow-
sighted. Nevertheless, New Day in Babylon presents the reader with a great overall 
analysis of the movement. 
The structure highlights the different facets of the Black Power movement 
participants. It starts with the question, What is Black Power? Then the book moves into 
what were the precursors and preconditions that caused the radical upraising of Black 
people. DeBurg outlines who the militants were in their different capacities: in sports, on 
campus, labor unions and "total institutions." Later, Van DeBurg explains the differences 
and similarities of pluralism and nationalism. Van DeBurg’s definitions of pluralism and 
revolutionary, territorial, and cultural nationalisms provide young scholars with clarity on 
these vague terms. Then, Van DeBurg delves into the most crucial section of his book: 
Black Power in Afro-American culture. In this section, the author speaks of the cultural 
                                                
48 Ibid., 5. 
49 Ibid., 10. 
 37 
manifestations of Black Power: soul style, music, talk, tales, and theology and 
demonstrates how different Black Power ideologies manifested themselves in cultural 
retentions that are still in Black and American culture today. Van DeBurg contends that, 
“viewing the movement through the window of culture allows us to see that language, 
folk culture, religion, and the literary and performing arts served to spread the militants’ 
philosophy much farther than did mimeographed political broadsides.”50 Lastly, Van 
DeBurg demonstrates how literary and performing arts were used to promote Black 
consciousness and Black Power. He concludes by explaining the movement's decline, 
yet, also citing its contributions and lasting influence. 
 Van Deburg endeavors to present an opposing viewpoint on the effectiveness of 
the Black Power movement. Certainly many books written about the movement and 
public opinion, alike, wrongly believe that the Black Power movement was but a bunch 
of radicals causing trouble and carrying guns. Van DeBurg debunks this myth and 
situates the movement as a powerful one with far-reaching implications, although he 
classifies those implications as cultural and not political. 
In The Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, James 
Edward Smethurst starts his well-researched work by calling for today's scholars to pay 
appropriate homage to the Black Power and Black Arts Movements of the 1960s and 
1970s. It is because of those movements, Smethurst explains, that they may owe their job 
in academia even though Henry Louis Gates, Jr. called the Black Arts movement the 
‘shortest and least successful’ movement in Black history. 
                                                
50 Ibid.,  10. 
 38 
Smethurst goes on to argue that the BPM and BAM never truly disappeared from 
the American cultural landscape. Citing the influx of memoirs and biographies of former 
Panthers which were widely read by a non-academic public, Smethurst demonstrates that 
the Panthers never faded from the popular imagination. The BAM's influence can be in 
writers like Alice Walker who in her writings reacted against the sexism and homophobia 
of the movements.
51
  In addition, one can see that through conscious hip-hop, poetry 
readings and poetry slams, the spirit of the BAM lives, but, Smethurst observes, little 
sustained academic work has been done on the movement. 
Smethurst also analyzes what effects the Cold War climate and the decolonization 
efforts of African countries wielded upon the landscape of the BAM. With this attention 
to the global climate of the era, Smethurst dodges a pitfall into which many scholars fall 
when they do not explore—completely—the precursors to such movements as the BPM 
and BAM. 
As scholarly interest into the black power movement increase, scholars began to 
study specific groups, ideas, and political activities to illuminate the movement’s 
significance. Scot Brown’s Fighting For US: Maulana Karenga, The US Organization, 
and Black Cultural Nationalism—a case study of a Black Power organization—delves 
into the often misunderstood matrix of Maulana Karenga, the US organization’s influence 
on the movement as a whole, and the controversy that surrounded the US organization 
and their relations with the Black Panther Party in California. Since Black Power 
literature has largely focused on the Black Panther Party, Brown brings an obscure figure 
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to the fore in the person of Maulana Karenga. Brown essentially argues that “internal 
organizational matters, such as the cult of personality, authoritarianism, alternative 
lifestyles, gender stratification and vanguard self-perceptions”52 fueled the organization, 
but eventually led to its demise with the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO)—the greatest enemy of the Black Power 
movement. 
 The book starts with the story of Ron Everett and his transformation into Maulana 
Karenga, a powerful leader and founder of the cultural nationalist organization US. It 
takes the reader on a journey with Karenga as he found a new African consciousness. The 
third chapter highlights the organizational structure US took on—one mired in patriarchy. 
Chapter four recalls how US started the alternative holiday Kwanzaa, which has come to 
enjoy some mainstream success, the ideological conflict with the Black Panthers and the 
effectively used operational unity to achieve goals in the Los Angeles area and East 
Coast. Chapter five engages in a discussion of the sectarian discourses between the Black 
Nationalists and the Black Cultural Nationalists. Brown points out that many Panthers 
and other Revolutionary Nationalists misunderstood and distorted US’s ideology as 
nonpolitical and only cultural. Quoting Minister of Defense Huey Newton, Brown 
demonstrates the Panther’s view: “culture itself will not liberate us. We’re going to need 
some stronger stuff.”53 Through US’s local political action in Los Angeles and its 
influence on the Committee for a Unified Newark (CFUN) and the Congress of African 
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People (CAP) led by Amiri Baraka across the country in Newark, New Jersey, Brown 
proves that US was not apolitical. They wore dashikis and engaged the political questions 
of their time. Chapters six and seven highlight the influence cultural nationalism had on 
the arts—music, dance, and literature. In chapter six, Brown expresses Karenga’s ideas 
about the role art should play in the movement to capture the hearts and minds of Black 
people. Brown quotes Karenga from the Quotable Karenga, “…if all our writers would 
speak as warriors our battle would be won. Literature conditions the mind, and the battle 
for the mind is the first half of struggle.”54 
 Before this manuscript, no scholarly work has adequately covered or conveyed 
the complex history and ideology of the US organization. Since its history has been 
misinterpreted by biased accounts from rival factions, Brown attempts—successfully—to 
give Maulana Karenga and his organization a balanced treatment. Because the 
organization’s criticisms seem to be well-known, Brown does not engage them on a 
systematic level, for example, the UCLA shootings and Karenga’s 1971 trial. However, 
Brown does a tremendous job of situating Maulana Karenga more firmly into the 
conversation about Black Power. 
In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s by Clayborne Carson 
examines the origins, ideological transformation and eventual demise of the Student Non-
Violence Coordinating Committee (SNCC). When one inspects the origins of SNCC, one 
finds that its genesis came from the battles in the South in connection with the Civil 
Rights Movement led by Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Though the organization began 
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its existence fighting for civil rights, SNCC, according to many scholars on the era, came 
to be known, as stated earlier, as the first organization to explicitly call for Black Power. 
Carson recounts that SNCC started as a non-violent, grassroots movement with Ella 
Baker, the traveling “organic” intellect, as the ideological mother. Baker, says Carson, 
inculcated in the group the idea that “leaders are made; not born.” 
Giving the reader a clear idea of what the book is about before reading one word, 
the structure tells the story. Written in chronological fashion, Carson divides the book 
into three sections: (1) Coming Together, (2) Looking Inward, and (3) Falling Apart. 
After reading the section titles, one can already decipher Carson’s idea of SNCC’s 
evolution. First, the students came together. Second, they started to critique their role and 
organization. Third, ideological differences contributed to the destruction of SNCC. The 
structure is perfect for the purposes of Carson's thesis. Showing the good, the in-between, 
and the ugly with the structure of the book, Carson illustrates SNCC's history. 
Carson basically contends that SNCC was a great grassroots organizing group that 
was torn asunder by ideological divisions and inner conflicts. It is the story of SNCC’s 
radicalism and how it changed over time and the consequences of those changes. At the 
heart of Carson’s book is his contention that "as SNCC workers sought to increase Black 
awareness of the range of available political and cultural alternatives, they failed to 
sustain local Black movements and became embroiled in bitter factional battles."
55
 Along 
with COINTELPRO, SNCC disintegrated because "rather than encouraging local leaders 
to develop their own ideas, SNCC [became] merely one of many organizations seeking to 
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speak on behalf of Black communities."
56
 Instead of the grassroots movements of the 
South led by SNCC, the organization, in the North, “talked bad” on television, but did not 
achieve, as Carson says, any measure of success.  
Throughout the book the reader can sense that Carson writes with the 
disappointment that the SNCC members did not continue to adhere to the ideological 
framework promulgated by Ella Baker at Shaw University in 1960. At the end of 
Carson’s monograph, SNCC simply becomes a "band of sisters and brothers" who were, 
for a brief historical moment, at the center of a major social movement.
57
 
Later, a literature arose in the Civil Rights historiography that painted Black 
Power as an ill-fated turn away from Civil Rights that effectively doomed the movement. 
These works painted the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements as two separate and 
distinct movements when in fact, to borrow Tim Tyson, they grew from the same ground. 
However, Tyson and Woodard challenge this notion and calls for a reperiodization of the 
Black Freedom movement became popular. 
In Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power, Timothy 
B. Tyson pens a well-researched political biography of Robert F. Williams and introduces 
some complexity into the normal periodization of and assumptions about the Civil Rights 
and Black Power Movements. Tyson demonstrates the overlap between the two 
movements as he traces Williams’ life after World War II and the sit-ins performed by 
college activists. In relaying the story of Robert F. Williams and his self-defense 
program, even from his position as president of the Monroe, North Carolina, NAACP in 
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the 1950s, Tyson presents another viewpoint not usually seen when one recalls the 
conventional narrative of the Civil Rights Movement. Williams championed self-defense 
in the middle of a movement that was supposedly built upon non-violence. Now, young 
scholars must do more research since Tyson has forever changed the historical landscape 
in terms of the relationship linking the CRM or BPM. There is no clear dichotomy 
between the CRM and the BPM, because characteristics normally attributed to the BPM 
were present during the CRM.  
Radio Free Dixie covers the activist legacies left to Williams by his ancestors, the 
famous kissing case, Williams’ sojourn to Cuba and across seas to China in the midst of 
the Cold War, and Williams’ fade from the militant spotlight upon his return the United 
States in 1969—a time when the young militants he inspired, perhaps, needed him most.   
Tyson demonstrates how the Cold War tensions, World War II veterans’ great 
expectations, and white violence against Blacks produced a climax ripe for militant 
struggle. In showing this, Tyson illustrates that “the Civil Rights Movement and the 
Black Power movement emerged from the same soil, confronted the same predicaments, 
and reflected the same quest for African American freedom.”58  
Since Monroe, North Carolina—the city where much of the “action” takes 
place—and its racial climate plays a major role in the story of Robert F. Williams, 
Tyson’s work marks a shift in Black Power scholarship to a focus on the movements in 
local cities. Scholarship on these movements furnishes students of Black Power with a 
wide range of ways Black Power manifested itself across the country. In recounting this 
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story, readers can analyze whether or not different levers pulled towns or cities into the 
movement; they could also find that the movement may have had large overarching 
similarities, but on the ground, geographical area and particular political issues moved or 
stalled the movement.  
The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era edited 
by Peniel E. Joseph continues a trend in this field of study. A collection of essays, which 
gives new insights to the BPM from the silenced voices of the movement to the obscured 
organizations that wielded influence, this title is very much similar to The Black Panther 
Party [Reconsidered] edited by Charles E. Jones and Liberation, Imagination, and the 
Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and their Legacy by Kathleen Cleaver 
and George Katsiaficas. The main difference lies in the fact that the latter two titles focus 
on the Panthers, while the volume edited by Joseph takes a broader approach. 
In the introduction, Peniel Joseph offers a historiographic essay, which explains 
the permutations of what he calls "Black Power Studies." Attacking the line that has been 
drawn between the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements, Joseph through the benefit 
of recent research and newly opened archives of information of the period shows that the 
Civil Rights and Black Power Movements "share[d] roots in the same historical family 
tree." In other words, as Timothy Tyson argues in Radio Free Dixie, the Civil Rights and 
Black Power Movements are erroneously studied as two distinctly different movements 
with the clear dividing line being the Watts rebellion of 1965 and Carmichael and Rick's 
call for Black Power in 1966. Instead, the two movements shared the same soil and 
produced similar seeds that flowered at different times. 
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The Black Power Movement gives the reader a different perspective on the 
movement. Contributors to the volume find the real reasons for the Watts uprising; shows 
how Amiri Baraka fused cultural nationalism and political power in Newark; how Black 
women in Baltimore, Maryland used the rhetoric of Black power to fight for community 
education, public housing and welfare rights;
59
 how Black feminists influenced the 
movement for Black power; how some women were equally wedded to feminism and the 
BPM; and it illuminates the complex role of the Deacons for Defense in the “non-violent” 
Civil Rights Movement among other issues and topics. 
In conclusion, this historiographic essay does not intend to be an exhaustive look 
at the literature on the Black Power movement. Instead, it is a brief survey of a small 
faction of the works available on the subject. However, the scope of this essay should 
allow the reader to ascertain that the Black Power movement was not monolithic by any 
stretch of imagination and scholars have been diverse in the ways in which they tackled 
the subject matter. Nevertheless, the Black Power movement remains an open field of 
research as the historiography remains thin compared to the surge of works on the Black 
Panthers. This dissertation attempts to analyze, trace, and bring into the historical record 
the experiences of a southern rendition of the Black Power movement—a subject 
heretofore untouched. 
Chapter Review 
Chapter 1, “To Wake Up the People,” examines the history of the Free Southern 
Theater (FST), and how it attempted to use theater as a vehicle to help change the 
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consciousness of Black people, and places this southern formation within the beginning 
iterations of Black Arts. Established during the Civil Rights Movement as an integrated 
outfit, the FST eventually shed their white members and their commitment to white 
theatrical material as they found it more and more difficult to change the essential nature 
of white material and make it Black. Moving to New Orleans in 1964, the FST continued 
as a repertory theater, but it also established themselves in the community by hosting 
writing workshops and bringing theater to the people. The community theater 
commitment in New Orleans and the New York theater scene pulled the FST players in 
disparate directions. 
In the same way that the FST moved away from integrationist notions of freedom 
and produced Black theater for Black people, Black students around the country began 
searching for themselves in high school and college curriculums. “A Relevant School that 
Meets the Needs of Black People,” chapter 2, surveys how the students of Fortier High 
School and Southern University of New Orleans used the energy of the national 
movement to call into question traditional ideas about education and struggled to make 
their education relevant to the plight of Black Americans. Through the vehicles of Black 
Student Unions and Black Studies, students attempted to gain a measure of power over 
the direction of their learning at both the high school and college level.  
While students protested the Euro-centric education they received and the FST 
brought liberation theater to inner-city New Orleans, the Black Panthers used free 
breakfast, rhetoric, and guns to make their point. Chapter 3, “Among the People like Fish 
in the Sea,” looks at the brief history of the Black Panthers of New Orleans. The Panthers 
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burst onto the scene, battled the police in two shootouts, and survived to tell about it. 
Armed with the Black Panther Ten-Point Platform, particularly point number seven: “We 
want an end to police brutality,” and a youthful revolutionary energy, the emerging 
Panthers injected into the community of the Ninth Ward community programs that met 
the basic needs and knowledge that sparked intellectual growth. New Orleans 
Superintendent of Police Clarence Giarrusso became the arch-nemesis of the Panthers. 
He used several tactics to insure that the Panthers would not establish a firm base in the 
city. Some residents hailed him as a great champion of decency and justice, while others 
found his techniques excessive and oppressive. Though the Panthers lasted less than a 
year in New Orleans, they left an indelible mark on the city. Indeed, several members 
continue to find ways to disrupt the status quo of New Orleans long after the rhetoric has 
faded into the oblivion of a forgotten yesterday.  
Various organizations during the Black Power Movement were inspired by the 
example of Malcolm X (El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz). “By the Grace of Malcolm, I am a 
New African,” is the title of chapter 4, recalls how Mark Essex battled for his manhood 
through the barrel of his gun and his response to the local and national phenomenon of 
police brutality. When Ossie Davis, in his eulogy for Malcolm X, called him “our Black 
shining prince…and manhood,” thousands of Black men across the country echoed those 
sentiments. Like Malcolm, Essex refused to be denied his “natural rights to be a human 
being, to be respected as a human being, to be given the rights of a human being in this 
society, on this earth.” And as Malcolm X eloquently stated it, he would bring it “into 
existence by any means necessary." Essex, the young sailor, chose as his means a 44. 
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Magnum Carbine Rifle. In truth, America and New Orleans stopped and listened to the 
Black rage of a young Black man tired of racism, discrimination, and police brutality. 
The Essex story demonstrates what extreme alienation coupled with a willingness to die 
for a cause can produce. On the heels of the Panther showdowns with the police in 1972, 
then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Louis Sirgo, warned residents of New Orleans of 
the dire consequences of continuing to treat the Blacks in the city as second-class citizens 
and hiding them in federally subsidized housing. His words would go unheeded and he 
would meet Mark Essex only months later. Essex did not spark the revolution he hoped 
would happen, but for some, he remains a virulent symbol of Black Power. 
Chapter 5, “To Build an Alternative Institution” examines the history, cultural 
principles, and educational philosophy of Ahidiana, a Pan-African organization 
established in 1971. Ahidiana took the educational struggle to the next level by 
establishing its own independent school. No longer were they interested in fighting their 
way into white institutions that clearly did not desire their presence. This group created a 
school, indeed a lifestyle, which was geared towards meeting the educational, social, 
cultural, and political needs of Black people in New Orleans. Like The East organization 
in New York, Ahidiana shined as the African cultural beacon in the Crescent City. Along 
with educating Black youth, Ahidiana also brought Kwanzaa into the city. Ahidiana, 
however, could not survive the transformation of the freedom struggle from one with a 
focus on liberation to one focused on incorporation into the political system. 
As the national climate changed from protest to politics, insular political 
organizations formed in New Orleans to corral the Black vote and deliver it to worthy 
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politicians. “Traitors to your Women and Children,” chapter 6, examines the rise of Black 
political power in New Orleans and the organizations that help fashioned the new 
political landscape. In the aftermath of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 
and 1965, respectively, Black leaders found themselves in an advantageous position. 
Since the hands that once “picked cotton could now pick public officials,” as one political 
poster boasted, white politicians groped for the Black vote and looked for someone to 
deliver it to the polls. S.O.U.L. (Southern Organization for Unified Leadership), C.O.U.P. 
(Community Organization of Urban Politics), and B.O.L.D. (Black Organization for 
Leadership Development) appeared on the landscape to control this newly realized 
power. For a time, these organizations wielded considerable influence in local politics 
and their organizational capacity eventually helped Ernest “Dutch” Morial become the 
first Black mayor of New Orleans. With Black faces in high places, the Black residents 
who expected significant change would be disappointed as the political system refused to 
change, but changed the men who entered its realm. Salvation did not come at the ballot 





“To Wake the People Up:” 
The Free Southern Theater and the Origins of the Black Arts Movement 
 
Introduction 
 As the 110 degree heat suffocated the air in the newly built Freedom School in 
Indianola, Mississippi, a place made famous as the birthplace of Civil Rights Activist 
Fannie Lou Hamer, the Free Southern Theater (FST) played to a packed house, but not 
everyone watched for entertainment. Twenty-five White Citizens’ Council members sat 
stoically in the audience with forty-two patrolmen in riot gear to protect them. The 
majority Black crowd watched the FST perform, the Council members, and the 
patrolmen. Yet, they were still joyous, if a little scared as well.1  
 Though the FST grew out of the soil of the Civil Rights movement in 1963, the 
whites in Mississippi understood that Black art and culture could be revolutionary—more 
revolutionary than integration. The founding members felt as Larry Neal did that, “a 
revolutionary theatre should force change: it should be change…”2 So they created a 
theatre that would help liberate the masses of African American people in the South. 
They went to the people. They wanted to “turn the people on, to wake people up, make 
them conscious of themselves and their environment and hopefully push everybody to the 
stage where their very lives are poetry.”3 Plays and poetry were performed in places like 
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churches, halls, fields and barns, but the stages did not matter; the educational and 
cultural aspects of the theater penetrated Mississippi’s dirt and brought new life—brought 
awareness to issues in a manner that political action and protest could not. The founding 
members understood that the movement and the Black freedom struggle must be present 
in all areas of the people’s lives.4 
 The FST officially died in 1981 after the movement’s energy flowed into 
corporate offices and poverty programs. To be sure, the Free Southern Theater survived 
several years after the demise of the Black Arts and Black Power Movements, but 
essentially the demise of the Free Southern Theater was spawned by the collapse and co-
optation of the Black Power and Black Arts Movements of which it was part and parcel.   
Origins 
 Gilbert Moses, John O’Neal, and Doris Derby founded the Free Southern Theater 
(FST) in 1963. At the time, Moses worked as a photographer for the Mississippi Free 
Press, a local newspaper, O’Neal worked as an organizer as a member Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and Derby was a young painter from New 
York and a SNCC organizer as well. Students from the North working in the South were 
typical at that moment in history—the early 1960s. Sparked by a group of North Carolina 
A&T college students in 1960, John O’Neal, who grew up in southern Illinois, said that 
“the South was the happenin’ place… and the movement was the most important thing 
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going on in the world at that time.” The movement attracted all types of students to the 
South in droves including artists, actors, singers and all-around performers.5 
 Later, O’Neal recalled their initial meeting and meetings in an article entitled, 
“Motion in the Ocean: Some Political Dimensions of the Free Southern Theatre.” He 
said, 
Each of us had come to the South with the naïve thought that it would take a few 
years to do what we had come to do there, before going on with our lives. Each of 
us came to realize after a short time that it was not a matter of a few years' work 
by a few people. We would have spent lifetimes in the faith that a few keys might 
be found if enough people worked long enough and hard enough.6 
 
These meetings sometimes lasted into the early morning with heated arguments and  idea 
sharing ever present. These meetings demonstrated the transient nature of the movement 
in the South. Many students felt that giving their energy for a couple of summers held the 
power to change the racial climate of the hostile Mississippi terrain. Optimism ran high, 
but O’Neal, like Moses and Derby, understood that Mississippi was not a summer 
vacation. One night, in a room filled with smoke, as Gil Moses and John O’Neal puffed 
away at cigarette after cigarette, nervous as they tried to find their place, their instrument 
to play in the music of the movement, Doris Derby struck a beautiful chord by saying, "If 
theatre means anything anywhere, it certainly ought to mean something here!" With those 
words, the painter from New York, Moses with his skills as a director and O’Neal with 
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his skills as an aspiring playwright began a liberation theatre called the Free Southern 
Theater and the year was 1963. 7 
 The trio chose to use Free in the title to pay homage to the freedom movement 
fighting for equality in the Jim Crow South. Freedom, or its equivalent, ubiquitously 
appeared in the titles of many Black institutions at that time in the south: Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), Liberty House, Freedom Labor Union, Freedom 
Schools and then the Free Southern Theater.8 In addition, free did not simply mean that 
the theater would be free of charge to all who wanted to enjoy the plays, poetry and 
workshops; it also meant a freedom from white standards and aesthetics—old ideas and 
techniques.9 "The movie behind the Black aesthetic is the destruction of the white thing, 
the destruction of white ideas, and white ways of looking at the world,” says Larry Neal. 
“The new aesthetic is mostly predicated on an Ethics which asks the question: whose 
vision of the world is finally more meaningful, ours or the white oppressors?"10 
 Even though the FST spoke of creating a Black “thing,” from the start it was 
plagued with an internal contradiction. As a part of the Civil Rights movement, the FST 
established itself as an interracial company. They wanted to integrate everything. “A 
large part of the excitement generated by the idea for the theater was centered around the 
fact that it would be integration operating in the deep South, and integration operating in 
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the mainly unintegrated American theater.”11 Dr. King’s idea that racial harmony springs 
from Black and white interaction permeated the minds of the founders. John O’Neal said 
that at the time it just made sense to him that the Black community move on a non-
violent, integration platform. Therein lies a major contradiction. How does one create a 
theater for Black audiences; one that speaks to Black issues and attempts to develop a 
Black style of theater within an integrated setting? The FST grappled with these 
challenges that proffered no easy answers in its early years. Yet, the answers were found 
later.12 
 The FST found its stage legs in August of 1964 on a carport at a McComb, 
Mississippi, Freedom House. On that first tour which traveled to sixteen cities including 
small towns in Mississippi and New Orleans, the FST had eight members in the 
company—five Blacks and three whites—and performed “In White America” by Martin 
Duberman. “In White America” reads as a documentary play about the Black experience 
in America. It shows how Black history and white history are one and the same. 
However, everyone in the FST did not share the same sentiments about the play and its 
white author. Richard Schechner, who would become very instrumental in the workings 
of the FST had these words about the play.13 
“In White America” capsuled this appealing but soft-hearted approach to racism 
in America, and signified the idealism of the early Freedom Movement. It also 
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represented exactly what the FST was when it started. We shall overcome. Love 
is stronger than hate. Moral weapons are superior to military or economic 
weapons.14 
 
Gil Moses, who would later advocate for a Black theater in every aspect, had this to say 
about “In White America.” 
It was a funny choice. We picked it because its theme essentially stated that the 
Negro revolt was like the American Revolution. And it shows the Negro a history, 
his history here from the beginning to now. It doesn't show Negroes as maids or 
shoe-shine boys or as people with white faces; it shows people brutally treated, 
still brutally treated, who have suffered for recognition for three hundred years, 
still seeking recognition, who have never lost their humanity.15 
Eventually, however, a sector of FST members tired of the struggle of changing “white-
oriented material” to suit Black audiences and refused to perform white material 
completely.16 
Move to New Orleans 
The Free Southern Theater moved to New Orleans in 1964. Afraid that the 
movement occupied too much of the members’ time in Jackson, Mississippi, FST decided 
on New Orleans because New Orleans did not have a Movement to distract them from 
the work of developing a repertory theater company. In this city, the members thought, 
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they could simply concentrate on their art. Later, the FST would find that New Orleans 
did have a conscious element luring in the background. This group lived outside the 
Black middle-class community that the FST wanted to tap into as a financial base for the 
theater’s operations. Some members expressed concerns that the move to New Orleans 
would alienate them from the Movement and the people they desired to help; some called 
it a cop-out. Yet, one of the pluses in the equation was that Richard Schechner, professor 
at Tulane University in New Orleans and Editor of The Drama Review, was available 
full-time to be a part of the theater now that the company was based in New Orleans. 
However, the New Orleans community did not embrace the FST with open arms. 
Opposition did not take the form of overt actions against the theater; the community 
simply ignored the theater and its ideas and relegated it to a passing phase. Yet, many of 
theater members remained enthusiastic and optimistic about the theater’s ability to touch 
the lives of the Black community.17 Gil Moses, in a 1965 article expressed this sentiment,  
The community doesn't need the FST, very few of them know anything about 
theatre. The need must be shown. We're grafting an idea onto a community. The 
graft will heal and slowly the FST will become one with the community. Finally 
the community will change and create its own type of theatre.18 
 
This statement demonstrates that Moses held out hope that the community would 
eventually become one with the theater and “create its own type.” In his language, one 
can pick up the essence of the great Ella Baker’s philosophy upon which SNCC was built 
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at the founding conference in Raleigh, North Carolina at Shaw University in April of 
1960 after student sit-ins. Baker’s philosophy was to cultivate local leadership and 
develop people who are interested not in being leaders as much as in developing 
leadership among other people.19 On the other end of the spectrum, some members held 
negative viewpoints on the move to New Orleans. One member named Robert Costley, 
nicknamed, “Big Daddy” said, 
We have had more dam trouble (nothing major) with these, quote, beautiful Black 
deprived children in four months, than in the whole 3 or 4 years existence of FST. 
I honestly do believe that they could give less then a dam if they never saw a play 
there, but the building is one more avenue of escape and a place to go to raise hell 
and meet the opposite sex.20 
 
Certainly this is a cynical view of the circumstances surrounding the FST’s initial 
experience in New Orleans, but it was by no means the majority sentiment. Like many 
other fledging companies, the FST went through its own fair share of growing pains. 
Such was the on-going struggle of the people’s theater, which was not strapped for ideas 
but was always strapped for cash to run the basic operations of the theater.  
Progenitor of the Black Arts Movement? 
 The Black Arts Movement is known as the sister of the Black Power Movement. 
In fact, it was an equal collaborator that married the political with the cultural and artistic. 
Historian James Smethurst argues, “one could just as easily say that Black Power was the 
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political wing of the Black Arts movement.” Both inspired and was inspired by the other. 
“The Black Arts movement was the only American literary movement to advance ‘social 
engagement’ as a sine qua non of its aesthetic,” said New Orleans native, Kalamu ya 
Salaam. In addition, Salaam characterized the movement as a conglomeration of local 
initiatives throughout the country that all worked from their own similar vision of Black 
Arts, while being influenced by the national movement. The overall goals of the Black 
Arts Movement according to historian William Van DeBurg was to create an aesthetic 
that “(1) emphasized the distinctiveness of African-American culture—along with its 
unique symbols, myths, and metaphors; (2) extolled the virtues of black life-styles and 
values, and (3) promoted race consciousness, pride, and unity.” These values were 
homogenous with the philosophies of Maulana Ron Karenga, the creator of Kwanzaa. For 
Karenga, however, the social and political nature of the creative work came first and the 
aesthetic came second. “We do not need pictures of oranges in a bowl or trees standing 
innocently in the midst of a wasteland,” said Karenga. “If we must paint oranges and 
trees, let our guerrillas be eating those oranges for strength and using those trees for 
cover.” To be sure, some conceived of Black Arts as battle hymns and symbols used to 
inspire and grow the Black liberation movement of the 1960s.21 
The flowering of the Black Arts Movement as written about by several scholars 
has revolved around the social and political transformations undergone by Amiri Baraka 
(Leroi Jones) in the mid-1960s. Baraka has been called the progenitor of the Black Arts 
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Movement and was certainly one of its most famous proponents. He actually coined the 
term Black Arts. His visibility was bolstered by his acclaim as a publisher, poet, 
playwright, and music critic. Yet, it must be made clear that the attention given to Baraka 
and the east coast and west coast Black Arts Movements of the 1960s and 1970s reeks of 
geographical chauvinism which does not value the contributions of the Southern 
movement in the propagation of the Black arts as a viable revolutionary tool. Moreover, 
Baraka, then Leroi Jones, did not create the Black Arts Repertory Theater and Schools 
(BARTS) until 1965 in the weeks after the assassination of Malcolm X; whereas, the FST 
began its work in 1963. Nevertheless, BARTS and the New York movement sprang from 
groups like the Umbra Poets workshop, which began in 1962. In this group, which was a 
collective of lower-Manhattan Black writers, were persons like Tom Dent, Askia Touré, 
Brenda Walcott, Al Haynes and many more. Of course Tom Dent, a New Orleans native, 
came to be very prominent in the FST and helped shape its ideas and direction. Dent 
directly infused the energy of New York into the veins of the Big Easy’s already 
developing arts movement.22 
 The official line of thought on the Black Arts Movement contends that the 
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a group which both Larry Neal and Askia 
Muhammad Toure belonged to, Maulana Karenga’s US Organization, and the Nation of 
Islam were the propelling forces behind the ideology of the Black Arts Movement. No 
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one can deny that these organizations wielded great influence in their geographical areas, 
California for Karenga, Chicago for Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, and New 
York City for RAM, but the FST exerted influence on those who could not make it to 
these places to be immersed in the culture.23  
 Perhaps it is better to say that the Black Arts Movement that oozed out of the 
streets of New York City into the cracks and crevices of other cities can be largely 
considered a literary movement, whereas the FST started more as a grassroots 
organization particularly concerned with and intimately connected to the lives of the 
people they performed for and less as a literary production company even though they 
produced a great deal of material. Though the FST did not use the phrase “Black Arts” in 
its early days, the theater was already grappling with its meaning and practice.  
Financial Problems? 
 Financial issues constantly plagued the Black theater in Jackson, Mississippi, and 
as they made their home in New Orleans in 1964. The poor Black community in New 
Orleans could not support the theater, but grew to love its presence; the Black middle-
class found “better” things to do with their money and foundations were sporadic with 
their funding of the Black theater geared toward Black liberation. In fact, the FST 
suspended operations of the theater in June of 1965—only retaining eleven members. The 
chief reason cited was a lack of money. In a letter to Al Lowenstein, David Rothenberg, 
Ethel Grossman and others who were apart of the New York Committee for the FST, 
John O’Neal explained the dire situation of the young theater. 
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Rehearsal schedules, touring schedules, administrative programs, training 
programs, all depend on our economic capacity to bring these programs off. Since 
the beginning about two years ago, we have been behind ourselves and have never 
been able to relax into the development of the plans that we set down on paper. 
This is simply to assert that we need money to carry on a program…We found 
ourselves drifting artistically, forcing work out in a rather hackneyed fashion, 
coming up with clichés rather than clarity, surface slickness rather than depth, not 
being able to meet our repertory needs under the pressure of disrupted schedules, 
and even considered, for a time, trying to make paying performances.24 
 
Lack of funding support not only shackled the logistical aspects of the theater, but also 
stifled the theater’s creativity energy as O’Neal posits. Many members, including the 
founders, wanted only to be artists, not business people and fund-raisers. James 
Cromwell, an actor who would go on to have considerable success in Hollywood, was 
one of the causalities of the financial crisis.  
 It would be five months before the theater would resume operations: developing 
plays, touring, conducting workshops, and building in the community. The five-month 
lull, however, allowed members of the FST to re-evaluate their role and the role of the 
FST in the movement. Financial restraints brought to the surface issues that lay dormant 
as the FST toured through the heart of the South and produced plays that bought the 
world of theater to small towns. For example, with ample time to think and the overall 
climate of the Black freedom struggle in late 1965, Gil Moses expressed shame about the 
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direction of the FST. “[FST’s] standards do not address themselves to our audience, nor 
to our times,” Gil said, “but to some academic and white standard which we should not 
concern ourselves with.”25 Gilbert’s concern marked a major turning point in the FST’s 
evolution. 
 In a 1967 letter to the theater’s board of directors, Tom Dent expressed frustration 
about the theater’s main funding source.  
The white financial establishment seems to love to fund a craft and techniques 
program, they love that more than they can possibly accept the critical and 
militant work the professional theater should be doing; not the description of our 
program in the Rockefeller Foundation Quarterly Report for the 4th quarter of 
1966: $26,000 for free performances, dramatic workshops in “culturally deprived 
districts of the South”…It’s saying ‘we give these people some money to hold 
workshops so they won’t go out and riot and generally make trouble.26 
Dent understood that the white establishment would not fund Black liberation and their 
dependence upon this source bothered him. Yet, the Black community of New Orleans 
proved unable to keep the theater financially afloat. Dent succeeded in recruiting 
neighborhood youth to work with the Free Southern Theater on an unpaid basis in 1968 
as funds disappeared and the Black middle class kept its distance.27 
No More White Folk 
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 Like all organizations with conscious individuals and strong attitudes, the FST 
had its share of internal conflicts. One of the main issues of conflict came in late 1965 
and early 1966 when Gilbert Moses expressed a desire that the FST be a Black theater. 
Moses put it this way in a letter to John O’Neal, 
The pride from the FST will issue from the fact that it creates new plays, that it 
makes Black audiences laugh and cry, and that it is predominantly Black run. 
That is a theater for the Black people established by Black people—and not a 
white liberal idea established for the good of the Black people… I am not 
demanding a Black theater, only a theater that is run with "Black consciousness," 
and you can't have that theater unless you have Black people...28  
 
Moses’ sentiment mirrored the sentiment of the whole movement at the time, which 
began moving away from white ideas and white people. 
 As the FST addressed the issue of white participation, they stepped in unfamiliar 
terrain. The “unpleasant realities of race in America”29 rushed on stage and demanded to 
be heard. Confrontation between the races in FST was something totally new. Never 
before were the white members challenged in such way—a way that forced them to 
justify their existence in the movement. Murray Levy, a white actor from the North and 
the first member of the FST in New Orleans, struggled with his new status as an outsider 
in the movement. 
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Movement people don’t seem to have anything to say to me anymore. Before, 
when I first came down, the Movement had created certain definitions, they were 
the good guys (Movement) and the bad guys (crackers) (liberals) (whites who 
didn’t do anything) (Blacks who sold out). Now it seems that definitions are 
changing. Suddenly I am from the enemy—only to be looked at with mistrust—to 
be excluded. No one seems interested in the fact that I’m ready to give my life 
too. I’m not bitter, my friends, just hurt—but I’ll get over it.30 
 
Murray Levy communicated a reaction that many whites involved in the Movement 
articulated. Many movement artists, coming from a Marxist perspective, could not 
understand why the movement endeavored to move forward without them. For some, 
being in the South gave them a site to satisfy their need to help humanity; for others, the 
movement allowed them to exercise their white guilt. Nonetheless, every Black member 
of the FST did not agree with Moses—particularly John O’Neal.  
 O’Neal posited that “Black and white are dysfunctional categories” that would 
lead the organization into a Black Nationalist stance which represented a “blind alley.”31 
To simply analyze that the solution to African American problems lay in magnifying 
everything Black signified a narrow position according to O’Neal at the time. O’Neal, 
forced into exile by the government, fumed in New York, 
                                                
30 “Letter to John and Mary O’Neal from Murray Levy on July 24, 1966,” in Dent and 
Moses, ed. Free Southern Theater by The Free Southern Theater, 134. 
31 “Letter to Gilbert Moses, Richard Schechner and others on the board from John O’Neal 
on February 15, 1966,” in Dent and Moses, ed. Free Southern Theater by The Free 
Southern Theater, 99. 
 65 
If it seems that the decision to be made is whether to have a Black Theater or no 
theater at all then I would have to submit the following proposal: Let all the debts 
of the Free Southern theater be liquidated…and turn over the current balance of 
funds to Gilbert, Denise, and Roscoe to make whatever kind of theater they think 
is necessary. The only condition being that they not be permitted to use the 
name.32 
 
As a student and participant in the Civil Rights movement, but more importantly as a 
professed Marxist in his college years, John O’Neal held fast to the ideal that an 
integrated movement would bring about a new world. John believed whites should play 
an integral part in the movement, while Gil Moses believed that whites’ role, if they had 
any role at all, should be a non-speaking, background role. Herein lies another of the 
FST’s conflicts—the different between marxist or revolutionary nationalism and cultural 
nationalism.  
 According to O’Neal, this conflict threatened to tear the group apart and it almost 
did. Moses continued to push for a theater that would not only produce plays that spoke 
in the voice of the Black people, but also employed people of the community. “There is a 
culture existing in the Black community which ignores white people,” Moses believed, 
“and this is the culture the FST should tap and put on stage.” In Gil’s mind, there was no 
need for a professional theater. The only theater needed would put community members 
on the stage and raise their consciousness about the issues in society. White actors and 
actresses should be used only when necessary—when the play requires their 
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participation, not simply doing a play with white actors and actresses because they are a 
part of the theater. White participation was unhealthy for Black people in the community, 
who already valued everything white as a byproduct of the psychological damage 
inflicted upon their minds from every Eurocentric form of media bombarding their 
existence twenty-four hours a day.33 
 Tom Dent also held distinct ideas about the purpose and function of a Black 
theater. In his estimation, a Black theater should “(a) work toward a positive 
consciousness of our culture; (b) reinvigorate and celebrate the rituals and life-style of 
our people; (c) provide for our people a forum for debate, discussion, and help us define 
the terms of our existence, which involves a knowledge of history and an analysis of 
where the oppressor is at, and how we must counteract this oppression; (d) provide love 
for our people in a realistic…sense…based on our self-acceptance, our history, [and] 
vision of the future.” Both Dent and Moses fought to have the African American 
experience at the very core of FST. In truth, both felt that the clay of their art lay in 
excavating the deeply rooted themes, issues, and triumphs in the Black community and 
bringing it to the stage in a style and with people born in the unique environment of New 
Orleans. In short, they endeavored to develop a theater that was of the community and by 
the community. Dent and Moses’ nationalism mirrored Amiri Baraka’s idea that a Black 
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Theater “took its references from black life and traditions and attempted to present 
presentations that, in themselves, were acts of liberation.”34 
 Moses also went on to question one of the basic cornerstones of the FST—the 
idea of a free theater. For Moses, charging no admission was patronizing to their intended 
audience and also put them at the mercy of whites for their funding, who would not fund 
the revolutionary theater he envisioned. He felt the theater should be supported by the 
people of the community, the people who came to the play. Like other organizations of 
the period, Moses expressed the realistic concern that those who funded the theater would 
leverage the power to direct its path. In addition to desiring a Black, self-sufficient 
theater, Moses also wanted to change the theater’s name to Third World Theater. The use 
of the term Third World symbolized the support Black organizations gave the worldwide 
struggle for freedom by other oppressed nations.35  
 Reverend Milton Upton, a pastor active with the FST, articulated some of the 
same concerns about FST’s “free” policy. The nature of New Orleans’s Black middle-
class is explained in this way by Reverend Upton: 
People felt, “well, it’s free, they get their money from someplace else, they don’t 
need my money anyway.” So people didn’t give too much. We tried to have a 
party here sponsored by the Friends of FST. We got very little money. One way I 
can think of to get money from middle-class New Orleans Black people is to hand 
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them something on a silver platter, give them something special, tell them they 
are something special, treat them special, and they will respond. Otherwise, they 
couldn’t care less what happens. They would much rather give their money to the 
opera or to the repertory theater, or invest it in the Mardi Gras Ball.36 
 
Understanding that they could not get money from the people within their own 
community, the FST depended heavily upon donations from friends of the FST who lived 
in the North.  
 Though the FST never dropped “free” from its name, Moses achieved a victory of 
sorts on the question of creating a Black theater. In the fall of 1965, John O’Neal came to 
New Orleans for a couple of days to write an agreement drawn-up by himself and Tom 
Dent which stated that Richard Schechner would resign from his position as chairman of 
the board, to be replaced by Tom Dent. Moses would now be the artistic director with the 
power to hire and fire. In addition, the FST would find space at their building for a library 
and information center on African Americans. The group agreed to move toward a Black 
theater even though Murray Levy and Eric Lewis, two white members, remained. That 
fall, as FST developed writing workshops and started to perform Gil Moses’ play Roots, 
Moses disappeared and never came back to FST physically. He only sent occasional 
letters to the group.37  
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The details surrounding his disappearance remain sketchy, but according to John 
O’Neal, Gil Moses lived a hard life and was always moving.38 In retrospect, Schechner 
describes O’Neal and Moses as antithetical to each other. “John is a slow-talker, a man 
who develops his thoughts almost painfully, replete with great pauses…philosophical and 
religious references,” Schechner says. “Gil is more explosive, moving hurriedly around a 
space, shooting out remarks, breaking into songs or epithets. John seems peaceful, and 
Gil constantly at war.” Outside of the internal conflicts surrounding the issues of whether 
or not to have a Black theater, changing the theater’s name and changing the theater’s 
direction, the number one issue still stagnating the develop of the FST was plain and 
simply: funding. 39  
Ghetto of Desire and other FST Productions 
 The FST found a building near the Desire Project, which was known as one of the 
most dangerous housing developments in the city of New Orleans. The building was an 
old supermarket that was severely damaged during Hurricane Betsy which hit New 
Orleans in 1965.40 A year later, in 1966, the FST agreed to take part in a CBS show 
called “Look Up and Live”—a documentary look at eight regional theaters. The FST 
produced a play called Ghetto of Desire, which was written by Tom Dent. While 
highlighting the “gross inequalities people living in the Desire projects faced on a daily 
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basis,”41 the play also illuminated the specific issue of movement. The Desire Projects 
were surrounded on all sides by railroads or a canal. This was certainly a political tactic 
so that the Black people who lived in the housing development could be easily contained 
in a time of urban upheaval. The play opens with a young Black boy lying on the ground 
bleeding while a crowd has gathered. It is insinuated that the police have been called for, 
but have not responded. Thus the boy dies like so many others because of the 
combination of violence and systemic negligence.42 Calling attention to the dark side of 
the “Big Easy,” Ghetto of Desire communicated to millions around the country that while 
New Orleans acts as a playground for some; it is hell on earth for others. 
 When the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) got wind that the program 
would be aired nationally, they were not pleased. It is believed that an employee for the 
CBS affiliate in New Orleans leaked the script to Victor H. Schiro, mayor of New 
Orleans at the time and the police chief, Clarence Giarrusso. Shortly thereafter on July 1, 
1966, Allen Dowling wrote a letter to Tom Dent and the FST broad of directors charging 
that the play “concentrates…on a grossly exaggerated description of the project 
and…engenders racial disharmony.”43 Dowling expressed shock at the “unfair” image of 
New Orleans the play displayed to eyes across the United States. At the end of his letter, 
Dowling called for a meeting with the FST and explained its purpose. “Our purpose in 
meeting with you and the other members of your Board is to present an earnest, and we 
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believe highly justified request that the proposed presentation of the “Ghetto of Desire” 
by CBS be canceled.”44 
 The FST did not feel that a meeting with HANO would be productive, so they 
refused, but the Housing Authority—not at all amused by FST’s refusal to meet—sent 
representatives to New York to persuade CBS not to air the show. Their agitation did not 
work entirely. “Look Up and Live” aired across the country but was blacked out in New 
Orleans.45 
 Even though much of the city did not see “Ghetto of Desire,” it stands as an 
example of the kind of theater the FST set out to make; it spoke to the issues that Black 
people faced and did it in an uncompromising manner. Viewers, white and Black, from 
across the country wrote to the FST expressing their enthusiasm about the play. One 
Black woman from South Norwalk, Connecticut, expressed this sentiment, “You said a 
lot of things that are not heard often enough. Rather than abstractions and generalizations 
you offered personal feelings. The words…moved me to want to take an active part in 
making equality a real thing in this country.”46 Her reaction directly mirrored the reaction 
the FST endeavored to pull from their audiences across the South—a willingness to 
struggle for the liberation of Black people in America. Another viewer from Dallas, 
Texas, had this to say, “I was completely absorbed by the program; by the Negro mood 
and spirit. Being white, I have not had as much opportunity to know the Negro soul, 
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through literature and song, as I would like. Your program strengthened my desire to 
know more.”47 The FST, through the play Ghetto of Desire, demonstrated that theater 
could have an impact on the lives of individuals and eventually lead the society in a better 
direction, if people left their performances and engaged in meaningful action. 
 Ghetto of Desire represented the kind of theater the FST wanted to produce and 
led the group in a different direction from 1968 onwards. From 1968 to the early 
seventies, Kalamu ya Salaam (Val Fredinand) and Tom Dent produced most of the work 
performed by the group. Salaam’s works included The Pill, The Picket, Black Libration 
Army, Black Love Song, The Destruction of the American Stage, Happy Birthday Jesus, 
Cop Killer, Turn of the Century, The Quest, Homecoming, and Song of Survival, which 
was in collaboration with Tom Dent.48 
 Salaam’s plays dealt with several themes prevalent in the last 1960s and early 
1970s. He characters grappled with the integrationist ideas of the NAACP, class 
relationships, and generational chasms caused by a move from Civil Rights to Black 
Power. His most famous play in the early 1970s, Homecoming, was a one-act play gives 
the audience a glimpse into the mind of a Black Vietnam veteran home from the war. Ray 
Junior, as the main character is called, represents the quintessential Black war vet 
disillusioned with America and how it uses Black bodies to fight its wars, yet fail to 
provide them with the essentials of American democracy. Dent called the play’s 
production an “excellent success” as a Times-Picayune story reported that the play 
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“offended some people.” Homecoming marries anti-war protest with Black Power 
sentiments, while showing the anger of a war hero uncertain of his place in society. 
Wounded and bitter Ray Junior lashes out at “honkies,” family and friends and finds 
himself drunk and without hope. Ray Senior, his father, attempts to help the young 
veteran find his bearings. “Now you remember that and don’t you ever be bending down 
low less you sho you can stand back up straight again. You remember that. A man can 
make hisself low all different kinds of ways,” he said. “It’s easy to go low, but it’s hard to 
stand tall. And getting up is always hard…” With that, the father welcomes home the son 
in a play that mirrors circumstances that Blacks could easily find themselves mired.49  
Plays like Homecoming and later Slave Ship demonstrate the FST’s commitment 
to Black theater from a Black perspective. During this period, we witness an earnest 
attempt by the group to offer a new Black aesthetic which highlighted the Black voice, 
Black culture, Black rhythm and sound, and Black ideas. The departure of Tom Dent and 
Salaam from the theater marked the end of the theater most radical period. 
In the next and final phase on the FST, the theater largely came under the control 
of John O’Neal. “We don’t think of our theater as simple entertainment, but as a means of 
jogging the consciousness of the audience and stimulating mind development,” O’Neal 
said. Under his direction, the FST continued to jog the consciousness of its audience and 
members, but that consciousness was Marxist in nature. Along with Marxist study groups 
and “soul-searching sessions,” FST became a more pronounced community theater. It 
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trained community members and used them in productions. The theater did not, however, 
tour on a regular basis as it did with more professional actors.50  
The first play the FST produced under O’Neal’s leadership was Ron Milner’s The 
Warning—A Theme for Linda. The play chronicles a seventeen-year-old girl’s rites of 
passage into adulthood. She is searching for a positive male image—as she is raised a 
female-headed household—and dealing with strong sexual feelings. By the end of the 
play, Linda becomes a strong woman who is able to meet the needs of her mate. The play 
garnered mixed reviews. William Raidy, writing for the Long Island Press, called the 
play’s portrayal of family life, “raw and real,” but claimed its major weakness was “its 
length and slowness.” The Vieux Carre Courier glowingly recalled, “there is black 
theatre here—theatre for, by and about blacks—that is truly alive. But more than that, it is 
honest and beautiful and meaningful for a larger community. I say this because I saw it—
from my white perspective—as some of the finest theatre I have seen in years.” Criticism 
and praise aside, The Warning was a major play for the struggling theater.51  
Later productions included, but were not limited to Kalamu ya Salaam’s The 
Picket, Roger Furman’s To Kill a Devil, J. J. Jones’ Minstrel Quintet, John O’Neal’s 
Hurricane Season, Junebug Jabbo Jones, and Where is the Blood of Your Fathers?, 
O’Modelle Ra’s Fight the Power or Culture for Liberation, and Kenneth Odom’s The 
Curing Melon. All of the plays by the FST proffered messages that entertained and 
informed. Through poetry, song, dance, polemic, and melodrama, the FST produced 
works that challenged the Black bourgeoisie to be more that armchair revolutionaries, 
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brought audiences from New Orleans—the most African city in the nation—to villages in 
West Africa, shed new light on the dusty memories of Reconstruction, and much more. 
The FST’s stage reality depicted bygone yesterdays and hopeful tomorrows. Audiences 
sometime left angry or happy, ready for action or deeper conversations. Either way, the 
Free Southern Theater had done its job. 
 
The Demise of the FST 
 The eventual death of the Free Southern Theater followed the same pattern as the 
eventual demise of the national Movement. Officially, the FST died in 1981, when John 
O’Neal bankrupted the theater, which was $30,000 in debt at the time and started 
Junebug Productions. The official funeral took place in 1985 in New Orleans.52 For the 
FST, operations suffered because the movement suffered. While on tour through the 
South, the FST found lodging with members of the movement, who fed and protected 
them. Publicity was handled by movement resources. The FST had only to call a 
movement office in a given town and say they would be there on a certain day, and the 
local office would make sure the word got out to the community that the FST was 
coming. While the movement thrived, hundreds of college students from the North 
poured into the South and many were actors, actresses, singers, poets and artists of some 
kind. A flyer on the table at a movement office furnished many volunteers and potential 
stars for the FST. The company could focus on theater and not logistics.53 
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 Yet, some of the individuals who joined the FST truly wanted to work with the 
community before they were infected with what John O’Neal calls, “Apple Fever.” 
“Apple Fever,” according to O’Neal, is when actors and actresses become fascinated with 
New York—believing the old saying: if one can make in New York, one can make it 
anywhere. “Apple Fever” represented a constant conflict within the hearts of many of the 
talented artists who give their energy to the movement. Which one would it be: the glitz 
and glamour of New York or the “dullness” and struggle of segregated South and New 
Orleans? Many choose New York. For some, the FST was a “temporary, though deeply-
felt commitment.”54 
 Family obligations also drove several players in the FST to the sidelines of the 
movement. One simply could not survive on their weekly stipend of thirty-five dollars. 
College students dominated the ranks of the FST. They came as young, energetic, and 
single activists willing to help make a difference. As the years wore on, individuals who 
connected ideologically and romantically began to have children and settle down. In this 
way, the FST failed to develop a paradigm that allowed for members to support 
themselves financially while continuing the work of the theater. The lack of capital 
forced members to search for work within a system they wrote, sang, and performed 
against.   
 To be sure, there were other elements, which contributed to the demise of the Free 
Southern Theater. For example, many foundations had “sort of a gentleman's agreement, 
or unstated principle, that if your theatre had an ideological bite, if the play or 
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performance had a sting, you were not going to get funded.”55 Essentially, the 
foundations deemed it unimportant to continue to fund a movement that would only 
highlight the differences in American society, which was outdated since we had already 
“overcome.” They were saying, "We can't continue to support your theatre. You have to 
support yourself through your constituents." But Tom Dent said, “they don't say that to 
the symphony or to the opera or to ballet companies."56 To stop funding the arts for Black 
people was definitely a political move by the foundations. The Harlem Renaissance 
movement and the Black Arts movement both crumbled when whites pulled their support 
because of the depression during the Harlem Renaissance movement and the post-Civil 
Rights backlash for the Black Arts movement. "I see the death of the FST as a part of the 
national backlash against black cultural activity which took a separatist, Black Pride 
direction and identified strongly with black political and economic gains," Tom Dent 
argued.57 
 Before the official funeral of the FST in 1985, John O’Neal, after sharing a New 
Orleans city cab with a friend, was asked by the driver if he was apart of the FST. O’Neal 
answered that he had. The cab driver had been a member of the New Orleans Police 
Department (NOPD) in the 1970s, but left the force after being wounded in action. He 
told John O’Neal that he knew of no less than seven agent provocateurs in the FST in the 
1970s. The ex-police officer confessed that the NOPD feared that the FST existed as the 
center of the Black militant struggle in New Orleans. However, since the FST worked as 
                                                
55 Tom Dent, “After the Free Southern Theater: A Dialog,” The Drama Review, Vol. 31, 
No. 3 (Autumn, 1987), 121. 
56 Ibid., 121. 
57 Ibid., 120. 
 78 
a theater, the agents could not provoke irrational and illegal actions in the group. If 
individuals wanted militant action, the FST sent them to other organizations in the city. 
FST’s weapon of choice remained art and culture.58  
Some movement activists simply became disenchanted with the movement’s 
ideals, strategies and concepts. In 1981, John O’Neal in an article in Callaloo entitled, 
“As a Weapon is to Warfare,” asked the question, “what has changed…since 1964?” 
Then, O’Neal goes on to say from his Marxist frame of reference, 
The dreadful truth of the matter is that the sixties Movement was critically flawed 
in its basic conception. The dominant idea was that the USA was capable, even 
desirous, of purging itself of racism and solving the remaining problems through 
basic reforms…Oppression and exploitation are not coincidental but are 
inevitable and essential components of a social order that protects and serves the 





 The Free Southern Theater started as an idealistic, integration-minded group in 
Jackson, Mississippi. The struggles they faced while touring through the South, the 
struggles to keep the FST financially afloat, and the struggles to make Black theater 
accessible and valuable to the Black community of New Orleans are struggles that 
constantly faced the FST throughout its tenure, but it still managed to exist longer then 
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most Black cultural institutions established during the 1960s. In fact, the FST was the 
only explicitly cultural organization to emanate from a Civil Rights foundation. Its 
transformation from a Civil Rights group to a Black Arts group demonstrates the 
flexibility of its members and the influence of the larger movement on those doing the 
work on a grassroots level.  
With the FST and the Black Arts movement of the 1960s and 1970s, Black art 
was used as a tool of liberation—a tool used to raise the consciousness of the audience 
and inspire audience members to join the movement for Black equality and liberation. 
Now, one can argue that African American art is purposely being used as a tool of 
continuing oppression by multimedia conglomerates. John O’Neal articulates the 
understanding Black artists, in his estimation, should have when analyzing the role of art 
in our continuing struggle for liberation. 
In the struggle for the liberation and independence of the Afro-American nation, 
[artists] will be used—for us or against us. If our art and culture are to serve and 
support our struggle, then our artists must make a conscious effort to understand 
the nature of our oppression… If we fail to do these things, then the Imperialist 
ruling class will continue to co-opt our art and our leaders. Those we look to for 
guidance and leadership will be used as weapons against us in our struggle.60 
The Free Southern Theater and the Black Arts movement worked to change the 
consciousness of their audiences and artists because they deemed culture and art as a vital 
weapon in their arsenal against racism and the anti-Afrikanism of the United States. 
                                                
60 Ibid., 69. 
 80 
Through the art of theater, the FST attempt to battle the psychological oppression or self-
hate engendered by this society. Indeed, the FST teaches the power of Black art in 
penetrating and awakening the minds of the people. Its legacy will live on wherever there 
is community theater speaking to and speaking the language of the people they serve.61   
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“A Relevant School that Meets the Needs of Black People:” 
New Orleans, The Student Movement, and the Battle for Black Studies 
 
Introduction 
In the late 1960s, thousands of Black students marched, held rallies, occupied 
buildings, walked out, and boycotted classes as Black Power radicalism invaded 
campuses far and wide. Black Power extended its foray into the realm of education as 
activists grappled with how Black Power connected with education for liberation as 
opposed to the education for servitude proffered at Black and white institutions. Despite 
moderate progress in school and college integration, which transported scores of Black 
students to predominately white campuses, many new students on the block endeavored 
to reshape their educational environments in new, radical, and African-centered ways. As 
a testament to their zeal for change, a survey found that Black students participated in 
fifty-one percent of all protest activities in the first six months of 1969. Noticing the 
disproportionate impact of Black students during this period, historians have successfully 
outlined and analyzed the rise and outcomes of the movement; however, they have 
relegated the New Orleans student movement to footnotes in their larger works detailing 
the actions and motivations of students fighting for Black Studies and for more culturally 
responsive campuses. Despite this academic silence, New Orleans offers a compelling 
case study about student movements. Black students, on the high school and college level 
in New Orleans, challenged conservative administrators to provide them with an 
education that treaded beyond the narrow contours of the Eurocentric education they 
received at integrating and historically Black institutions; nonetheless, unlike other 
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campuses, their efforts rarely produced the desired results as those in control limited the 
change the vocal students demanded.1 
No Peace and Tranquility 
Alcee Fortier High School was a passionate site to battle for Black Studies. 
Named for a renowned Romance Languages Professor at Tulane University, Fortier made 
news in the late 1940s when several students reported that a substitute teacher expressed 
communist opinions in class. Then, Orleans Parish Superintendent of Schools, Lionel J. 
Bourgeois quickly surveyed students and ordered teachers to reframe from mentioning 
“Communism, Socialism, or other foreign ‘isms.’” Bourgeois’ response to a perceived 
“Communist threat” at an all-white school foreshadowed the reaction that other 
challenges to the status quo would receive in New Orleans Public Schools.2 
By 1969, fourteen years after the Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, decision and eight years after the New Orleans school crisis of 1960, New 
Orleans could finally say that its public schools were “completely” integrated. The 1962-
1963 school year demonstrated the slow pace of school integration in New Orleans. In 
1962, only 107 Blacks students attended formerly all-white schools; the number 
increased to 392 the next year. Judge Frank B. Ellis decided to accelerate the process by 
ordering the desegregation of two-grades-per-year until integration was complete. The 
Orleans Parish School Board agreed and by 1969, some twelfth grades were 
desegregated. Across the district; however, integration remained minimal. White students 
simply did not attend former Black schools and Black students represented “only 17.5 
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percent of the student populations of the five largest former with secondary schools” and 
“only 29 percent of the student populations of the five largest former white elementary 
schools.”3 
Fortier’s enrollment of approximately 1,500 students, with roughly 500 African 
American, set the stage for the unequal treatment the Black students attempted to 
alleviate. The thirty-three percent Black population at Fortier represented an anomaly in 
the public education system in New Orleans and its surrounding area. In the tri-parish 
area, Orleans Parish, Jefferson Parish, and St. Bernard Parish, forty-six percent of white 
students attended school outside the public school system. In Orleans Parish, Black 
students represented seventy percent of the enrollment population while whites 
represented thirty percent. This fact hampered the effort to integrate schools. As schools 
became seventy percent Black, white transfers from the school increased dramatically. 
Once the Black enrollment reached ninety percent at a given school, the school board 
would “just throw in the towel and grant these last few white children their transfers to 
another school.” Nevertheless, they vowed to “keep even one Negro child in a white 
school if we can.”4  
In the almost extinct majority white environment of Fortier High School, the 
protesting students felt that white teachers favored white students and disciplined Black 
students unfairly, which led them to protest. In fact, Black students passed out flyers in 
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the school saying there would be “no peace or tranquility” until Fortier allowed them to 
form a Black Student Union indicating their commitment to their cause and their 
willingness to disturb the status quo to meet their ends. By choosing to boycott classes, 
the Fortier activists employed a familiar tactic. Students across the country, during the 
1960s and early 1970s, deemed disruption of the educational process as the number one 
way to publicize their grievances.5 
Orleans Parish School Board president Lloyd J. Rittner, however, made sure the 
students knew the consequences of their actions before they hoisted picket signs. Rittner 
issued a pointed warning over the weekend before the Monday protest. In the statement, 
he outlined the school board’s policies on student demonstrations.  
If any student demonstrates within the school building, he will be ordered to 
leave. If he does not leave, the police will be called and he will be evicted… Any 
student who is evicted or misses classes when it can be proven that he misses 
classes for unauthorized reasons will be suspended for an indefinite period or 
maybe expelled… If any student disrupts the educational process during class 
time, or participates in any violence, or takes any action which lends to incite to 
riot, the school authorities will ask police to arrest such students.6 
In spite of the threat, Black students saw themselves as educational activists and would 
not quietly enter these new environments without working for change. Black students at 
Alcee Fortier High School made their voices heard on Monday, January 20, 1969, by 
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protesting inside and outside the school grounds. Boycotting students walked through the 
halls chanting, “don’t be a tom, John.” With this chant, the protesting students attempted 
to pressure other Black students to join the cause. Later, as the students picketed outside 
the school, police arrested fifty-four of them while they chanted, “We ain’t going. Hell 
no!” Students filled the windows of the school to see what was going on, which disrupted 
classes for the morning.  
As expected the police arrested the students quickly and without second thought. 
In addition to charging twenty-four with disturbing the peace, the police turned over to 
their parents the other thirty students, all ages sixteen and under.7 Even though the New 
Orleans Police Department reported no violence or injuries, several students reported 
“excessive abusiveness.” Sergeant Fred O’Sullivan, NOPD deputy commander of 
intelligence, admitted that one officer used “poor judgment.” The officer sprayed tear gas 
on the students as they reportedly “attempted to block police efforts to close the door of 
the patrol wagon in which the group was confined.” As the patrol wagon transported 
students downtown, approximately sixty protesters, seventeen Fortier students and some 
from Tulane, marched in “sympathy for the protesting Fortier students.” Tulane 
University is located only one block from Fortier’s campus.8 
The Fortier unrest represented a local manifestation of a growing national 
phenomenon—Black students challenging the adult authority, which governed their 
education. Black high school students from all over the country issued demands, 
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circulated manifestos, raised picket signs, raised their fists, and raised hell in schools to 
secure Black studies, Black teachers and administrators, community and student input in 
school decisions, and other concessions from school districts hostile to Black 
assertiveness. They would not accept the education they were given unless it represented 
their interests. Though a clear minority within their schools, these activists, imbued with 
the spirit of protest, engaged in political actions in hopes of changing the system. As they 
demonstrated courage, however, the spines of other Black students stiffened and they 
joined in organized marches, walk-outs, sit-ins, and boycotts at individual schools. In 
some instances, students organized not simply on their own campuses but expanded 
throughout the city. For example, in 1968, Black students in Chicago coordinated three 
citywide demonstrations that highlighted their grievances dramatically. On Monday, 
October 14, 1968, “between 27,000 and 35,000 students boycotted Chicago’s high 
schools and held rallies in various parts of the city.” They, too, were fighting for, among 
other things, more representation in the system’s curriculum.9  
The Fortier demonstration came after school officials refused to respond 
positively to the students’ petition signed by approximately 300 students. The students 
sought “courses in Black history, revision of disciplinary measures which discriminate[d] 
against black students and permission to form a Black Student Union.” By seeking Black 
history courses and a Black Student Union, the students expressed their desire for an 
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education that centered on their experiences and a place where Black students could feel 
comfortable even though they matriculated in a largely white school setting.  
Fortier’s principal, Joseph Schwertz, simultaneously held a strong line and offered 
concessions to the protesting students. In a demonstration of strength, Principal Schwertz 
refused to negotiate with students boycotting classes and added that the students involved 
are indefinitely suspended “and must be reinstated before he will meet with them.” Then, 
Schwertz made statements that displayed his sympathy for some of the students’ 
demands. Schwertz agreed to support the call for a Black History and Culture Club, 
which would meet after school. He also said that the “school system is developing 
materials related to the role of the Negro in history and literature for inclusion into the 
regular curriculum.” On the surface Schwertz’s statement could appear to be just words 
aimed at pacifying angry students; however, only a month later the Orleans Parish School 
Board approved a pilot program which would incorporate African-American authors into 
the eleventh grade English classes at Fortier and two other schools, Marian Abramson 
and Walter L. Cohen, immediately and at all high schools the following fall. 
Superintendent Dolce said, “This move is an attempt to integrate formally into the study 
of American Literature works of Negro American authors who have never before been 
represented.” A bi-racial committee developed the program and prepared a bibliography 
in the summer of 1968, but the program languished unknown until the Fortier students 
helped the implementation process along. This concession did not, however, please the 
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students. The students wanted classes taught from a Black perspective not just the 
inclusion of Black authors.10  
As the school board officials and school administrators weighed-in on the 
confrontation, Black leaders took the side of the students, but did not agree with every 
demand. Arthur J. Chapital, executive secretary of the NAACP, supported the Black 
students at Fortier in their efforts to obtain Black history courses, but did not support the 
formation of a Black Student Union. Chapital had a long history of civil rights work in 
New Orleans and was a staunch integrationist. He served as a local NAACP president 
from 1951 to 1962, where he wielded considerable influence on the Civil Rights 
Movement in New Orleans. Under his stead, the NAACP took on many battles. For 
example, he helped integrate the city’s public libraries in 1955, even though the 
restrooms within remained segregated.  
When it came to the Black Student Union, Chapital stated that the NAACP “does 
not support any program which fosters segregation based upon race.” Chapital also called 
for the school to ring bells at the end of classes and five minutes later to signal the 
beginning of classes. At the time, the bell only rang to end classes. This plan, Chapital 
felt, addressed the fact that Black students received harsher penalties for tardiness. 
Additionally, Mack Spears, the only Black school board member at the time, shared 
Chapital’s sentiments about the Black Student Union. In fact, Dr. Mack Spears was the 
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first Black person elected to serve on the public school board in New Orleans since 
Reconstruction. He went on to be elected president seven times during his eighteen years 
on the board. Spears, born in Wilson, Louisiana, attended elementary and secondary 
public schools in New Orleans. After receiving his Bachelor’s degree from Dillard and a 
Master’s degree from Xavier University, Spears pursued and completed his Doctorate in 
Education from Harvard University.  
Spears expressed a similar attitude about Black Student Unions. “I’ve spent half 
my life fighting for human dignity, a oneness of society…I’ve fought for school 
desegregation,” said Spears. “I cannot reverse myself and support a Black Student 
Union.” He recommended that “Negro accomplishments” be added throughout the 
curriculum and thought courses on Black History and culture should be offered as 
electives. In contrast to Chapital and Spears’s support of Black History courses, the 
Executive Director of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins, told students fighting for formal 
recognition in the curriculum that “the familiar ‘reading course’ should not be disdained: 
after all, my generation had no ‘black-studies’ curriculum—but we found ways to learn 
about ourselves and our past.”11  
With their stance in this matter, the NAACP and Mack Spears demonstrated their 
distance from many of the Black youth in New Orleans. Chapital and Spears continued to 
articulate an integrationist philosophy, which simply demanded the inclusion of Blacks, 
but left control of the institutions in the hands of whites. The students, on the other hand, 
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desired the power that came from organizing their own Black Student Union group 
separate from whites. In the eyes of the school’s vice-principal, the Black Student Union 
meant “violence, and that violence had already stretched all the way from California to 
New Orleans.” Furthermore, by the mid-1960s, a large segment of the African-American 
community deemed the civil rights movement’s focus on integration and non-violence 
outmoded, out-of-date, and obsolete. Moreover, the students’ righteous rage against the 
educational system, in particular, and the American system, in general, indicated their 
membership in a militant culture, which sought “self-definition and power.”12 
The school board meeting following the demonstration became the site of a battle 
between parents, administrators, and concerned citizens. Two hundred people, mostly 
parents and students, filled the auditorium at Rabouin High School to express their anger 
about the treatment of the protesting students. Some parents focused their attention 
toward Mack Spears and demanded a statement, while others yelled, “We want action” 
towards the school board members. Mrs. Veronica B. Hill, president of the American 
Federation of Teachers, Local 527, supported the students and stated that they have been 
calling for many of the same things the students demanded. Armed with a prepared 
statement, Hill took aim and posited that the students exposed a “festering wound that has 
lingered all too long in our school system. These students should not be penalized. In 
fact, they should be rewarded for calling the community’s attention to a situation which 
should have been acted upon in the first days of integration.” Hill’s comments 
doubtlessly echoed the sentiments of many Black parents across the city, but of course, 
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the school board could not simply allow the students to walk back into the school. 
Instead, the OPSB called for the protesting students to take part in individual hearings 
with administrators, an idea given to them by the Human Relations Committee (HRC).  
After the city council created the Human Relations Committee in 1967 in an 
effort to improve race relations, Mayor Vic Schiro initially appointed members on April 
4, 1968, the day Martin Luther King, Jr. was killed. Eventually the committee would be 
popularly elected, with “blacks and whites each choosing half the members.” In 1969, the 
members of the Human Relations Committee included Archbishop Philip M. Hannan, 
Monsignor A. T. Screen, Dr. Leonard Burns, Thomas Godchaux, Arthur Chapital, Sr., 
and John Thompson.13  
The HRC suggested that the suspended students be admitted back to classes with 
the hearings to follow and that the school board “guarantee that these parent conferences 
will not be used for reprisals against student leaders simply because they have organized 
to express legitimate grievances.” Superintendent Dolce said the conferences would 
determine the “disciplinary action and possible readmission on the merits of each 
individual case,” the outcomes of which ranged from “immediate readmission on a 
probationary basis to expulsion from all public schools.” Consequently, the power of the 
students’ educational futures lay in the hands of the school board members and 
administrators, but the representatives of the students contended that school board should 
not subject students to individual meetings when they acted as a group and attempted to 
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change policies that affected them as a group. The school board, however, stuck to its 
plan that would effectively remove the troublemakers.14 
As the suspended students returned to school, OPSB established an all-male five-
member committee to explore the grievances levied by the students. The members of the 
committee were Clarence L. Barney, Executive Director, Urban League of New Orleans, 
Joseph Murphy, Regional Director, National Conference of Christians and Jews, Dr. 
Thomas W. Payzant, Administrative Assistant to the Superintendent, Dr. Leonard 
Reissman, Chairman, Department of Sociology, Tulane University, and Daniel P. 
Vincent, Chairman, Special Sub-Committee, Human Relations Committee. 
Superintendent Dolce charged the committee to investigate the alleged racial 
discrimination at Fortier High School and to “hear any complaints or grievances from 
parents and/or students…and to report concerning their validity.” The committee agreed, 
yet held an inherent bias. Many members of the school board and school staff believed 
the students acted under outside influences and concluded that it was inconceivable that 
high school students “could formulate and develop such techniques.” Principal Joseph 
Schwertz published a school-funded pamphlet called, “Student Unrest at Fortier.” Within 
the pamphlet, Schwertz places the full blame on Students for a Democratic Society at 
Tulane University. This common opinion spoke to the fact that many white 
administrators deemed Black students not intelligent enough to observe a problem, 
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develop a strategy, and execute a plan. Teachers certainly imbibed these attitudes and 
brought them into their classrooms.15 
The individual meetings with the students ended as several students refused to 
surrender their rights to object to what they considered discrimination. The Orleans 
Parish School Board and Fortier suspended eight students involved in the protest for the 
rest of the school year. The suspensions came as the students failed to acknowledge that 
their protest and demonstration disturbed the learning process. Students also, in a refusal 
to capitulate to the status quo, indicated that they would engage in that kind of disruptive 
activity again if the situation presented itself. In direct opposition to the students’ 
position, Dolce held that no person has the right to disturb the learning activities of 
students.  
In an instant, the student movement at Fortier collapsed and the committee 
released its thirteen-page report on the racial climate at Fortier. While the students 
succeeded in raising important issues on their high school campus, they failed to have 
their demands met by the administration. To top it off, the committee set-up by Dolce 
found “no clear instance of overt and deliberate discrimination” at Fortier, but was 
nonetheless persuaded that “covert racial discrimination exists which lends credibility to 
some of the allegations that have been made.” This finding acknowledged the validity of 
students’ concerns; however, the committee deemed overt racism as more important than 
its, arguably more insidious covert variety. Nonetheless, like students across the country, 
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the Fortier protesters possessed the courage to raise their voices in an attempt to change a 
conservative educational system in the south, but ultimately, their movement faded into 
the background of the city’s consciousness as Black college students in New Orleans 
took center stage.16 
SUNO Students Organize 
 Only months before the school’s ten-year anniversary, students at the all-black 
Southern University of New Orleans (SUNO) began its attack on the institution and the 
Dean of SUNO, Dr. Emmett W. Bashful. In attacking Bashful, students at SUNO, like 
Black students across the country, attacked the elite Black bourgeoisie and their value 
system.  Dr. Felton G. Clark, president of Southern, sent Emmett Bashful to open the 
New Orleans campus in August of 1959. By 1969, Bashful had become vice-president of 
the Southern University system and eventually would become chancellor in 1977. 
Bashful had a tough job on his hands. SUNO was founded on a 17-acre site in the 
prominently Black neighborhood of Pontchartrain Park. When it opened its doors on 
September 21, 1959, SUNO welcomed 158 students, one building, and fifteen faculty 
members. Arthur Chapital, true to form, petitioned against the establishment of the 
university on the principle that segregated education was a symbol of unequal education. 
He had a point. By the fall of 1968, SUNO had just four buildings, served nearly two 
thousand students, and was, at times, called SUNO High School.17 
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In its first nine years of existence, SUNO grew and changed, but not enough for 
students who had come to expect more. Student demands ranged over a variety of 
institutional issues. The demonstrators called for, among other things, a department of 
Black Studies, which would grant a Bachelor’s degree in Black Studies; that the Black 
Studies Department chairman, faculty and staff—have the sole power to hire faculty and 
control and determine the destiny of the department; a non-credit course in Black 
Liberation to be taught by Brother Jimmie “Scrooge” Lazare, director of the New Orleans 
chapter of SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee); an immediate start of 
construction on the original building plan; a Black Draft Counseling Center immediately 
established on campus; an immediate removal of the recent temporary fifty-dollar hike in 
tuition; the addition of more books by Black authors added to the library; a complete 
revision of the university handbook; a full-fledged Department of Education to train 
elementary and secondary school teachers; and the  dissolution of the position of Dean of 
the University to “serve as Fuehrer and honky overseer of the campus.” These demands 
demonstrated the students’ thirst for a relevant education, better buildings and resources 
on campus, and a more responsive administration. 
SUNO students involved in the Afro-American Society registered their 
displeasure with the university by attacking an important American symbol on April 9, 
1969. The incident coincided with events surrounding the one-year anniversary of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. Disgruntled students replaced the American flag, 
which hung at half-staff in memory of the late former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
with the Black flag of liberation—the red, black, and green flag. Cheers greeted the 
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hoisting of the liberation flag while several hundred students gathered at flag pole, held 
picket signs attacking the tuition hike and distributed leaflets with their ten demands on 
the historically Black campus. Students chanted “TABU SUNO,” which meant “towards 
a Black university.” The Afro-American Society presented their demands to the SUNO 
administration and stipulated that until the demands were met they would strike. Lynn 
French, a sophomore and co-chairman of the Afro-American Society, said the students 
would begin a two-day student strike if the administration failed to act by Wednesday and 
continue the strike if they failed to act by Friday. French also claimed that seventy-five 
percent of SUNO students supported the strike and demands. This direct-action protest 
grew from a place of neglect. Louis Delair, president of Southern’s student body, said, 
“What happened Wednesday was the pot boiling over. For 10 years, students and faculty 
at Southern have stated their needs, pleaded, petitioned, passed resolutions and sent 
delegations and telegrams to everyone who would listen and some people who wouldn’t.” 
However, the flying of the Black liberation flag grabbed the attention of some important 
people. “SUNO is an impoverished orphan of the State Board of Education,” said Israel 
M. Augustine, Jr., who would become the first Black elected judge in New Orleans in 
1970. “This fundamental educational fact is at the heart of all the events that led up to the 
dramatic, but irrelevant confrontation.” Irrelevant is certainly not the word the students 
would use to describe their struggle. Their movement was of the utmost relevance in their 
minds because they were fighting to erase American racial inequalities, which spilled 
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over into colleges and universities and also to modernize their out-dated campus and 
curriculum.18  
 By hoisting the liberation flag, the students did two things. First, Afro-American 
Society students attempted a peaceful demonstration aimed to make their grievances 
known, but violence waited in the wings. At about 9:30 a.m., the melee began. After a 
brief conversation between a student and a police officer, the officer grabbed the student 
and attempted to drag him to the waiting police bus. Students began pelting the officers 
with rocks. Students threw a concrete bench seat into a library window. School officials 
said police hit at least two students with their clubs while the police maintained that they 
only used mace on a student who resisted arrest. In the end, police arrested twenty-seven 
students. Secondly, by using the flag to engage in a struggle against the educational 
system, the Afro-American Society engaged in what Kwame Ture and Charles V. 
Hamilton called, “Political modernization,” which included “questioning old values and 
institutions of the society, searching for new and different forms of political structure to 
solve political and economic problems, and broadening the base of political participation 
to include more people in the decision-making process.” In this demonstration, students 
attempted to insert their input in the daily working of the university.19  
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 Despite arrests however, the Afro-American Society desperately desired to reform 
their university. The students regarded their demands as non-negotiable because, in their 
eyes, the demands represented “the key in making SUNO a relevant school for the needs 
of Black people,” hence the chant, “TABU SUNO.” The issue of relevance permeated the 
demands of the activists. Their desire for a Black Studies department clearly 
demonstrated that they sought a university that met the needs of the community, instead 
of helping its students become better servants of those outside of their communities. For 
Black Studies embodied a threefold purpose: “corrective to counter distortions, 
misperceptions, and fallacies surrounding Black people; descriptive, to accurately depict 
the past and present events constituting the Black experience; and prescriptive, to educate 
Black students who would eventually uplift the race.”20 
The students’ strategy of tampering with the American flag greatly upset school 
and public authorities. Dr. Emmett W. Bashful and NOPD Superintendent of Police 
Joseph Giarrusso, and others viewed the flag removal as disrespectful. Bashful said he 
would not allow SUNO students to disrespect the American flag. “We will not tolerate 
further tampering with the American flag which flies over our campus daily,” Bashful 
commented. As an Army veteran who served during World War II for four years and 
served two more in Italy, Bashful said, “I could not allow any person or persons in our 
college family to interfere with our symbol as a nation.” Superintendent Giarrusso made 
it known that the color of the students did not matter. “They could be white, Black, pink 
or yellow, but they do not have the right to disrespect the flag of the United States of 
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America…There are legitimate ways for any individual or group to rectify real or 
imagined inequities.” In addition, after learning that the Afro-American Society planned 
to lower the flag again that next week, Giarrusso offered the students firm advice, “Don’t 
do it…Let no one mistake kindness and patience on the part of the police officers, for 
weakness.” Giarrusso also emphasized that Dean Bashful requested that no police action 
be taken. Lastly, Mayor Schiro echoed the comments of both Bashful and Giarrusso by 
saying that, “It is inconceivable to me that any American citizen would show this 
disrespect to his flag…Desecration of the flag is …a slap at Americans who died in its 
service.” Schiro failed to realize that the protesting students felt alienated not only on 
their campus, but in broader society as well. If they received the Black Studies 
department, students would surely learn that the Americans who died in the service of the 
American flag also died in the service of a nation who used the same flag to oppress 
millions of people around the globe at various times in its young existence.21 
 Even though Giarrusso publicized in the media that his police officers on the 
scene demonstrated kindness and patience, the police used excessive force to gain control 
of the tense campus at the flagpole. The case of Sandra Marcelin represents a prime 
example of abusiveness by police. Marcelin, a 20-year-old student at Delgado 
Community College at City Park, went to SUNO’s campus to support the student 
demonstration, but left with a head wound that required twenty-one stitches to close. 
After the police beat her with nightsticks, the police charged her with inciting a felony 
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and resisting arrest. Police released Marcelin on $750 recognizance bond after they held 
her for six hours. In the aftermath, Marcelin remembered how a Black police officer 
treated her as she bleed profusely on the police bus. Another Black student asked the 
police officer to stop at a hospital to get Marcelin help, the officer reply, “You 
troublemakers ought to be killed. Your teaspoons of psychology don’t mean a damn thing 
to me; you deserve this.” Police brutality ran rampant within the New Orleans Police 
Department, especially from Black officers, because they could not be considered 
racist.22  
Nonetheless, the prospect of police brutality failed to shake students as they 
continued their boycott of classes and discussions stalled with administrators.  The 
students hung the Black flag of liberation on the administration building and said it would 
fly until the administration met their demands. Larry Broom, sophomore and chairman of 
publications for the Afro American Society, said the flag was not the issue. “All we mean 
to do is to draw attention to the substandard conditions that exist on this campus.” The 
students refused to attend classes until the administration met their demands and the 
administration answered that it would take “a lot of time” to meet the students’ demands. 
Certainly, the administrators could not allocate the funds to start building new buildings 
on the campus and hire additional faculty immediately. Another group on campus called 
“Concerned Students” attempted to bring students back to reality by circulating literature 
that asked students to return to classes. They felt that sufficient progress was being made 
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and feared that the continued boycott of classes could result in SUNO losing its 
accreditation. Despite their urgings, student attendance remained poor.23  
The SUNO protests happened in a vortex of Black student struggle around the 
country. Another Black student group made national headlines more than two thousand 
miles away. These rifle and shotgun-carrying students ended their thirty-six hour seizure 
of the student union at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York as the SUNO students 
continued their boycott of classes. Further south, police arrested 300 students, who 
refused to disperse, outside the state capitol in Montgomery. The students demanded the 
resignation of the president of Alabama State College.24 
In this climate, the SUNO Afro-American Society students grew tired of dealing 
with the powerless administrators and sought help outside of their campus. They turned 
to Governor McKeithen, who in 1968, said that the Kerner Commission Report did not 
apply to his state. “Our colored people don’t have to demonstrate to get first-class 
citizenship.” The Kerner report detailed the inhumanity and danger of race relations in 
America, especially in urban areas with large Black populations living in abject poverty. 
When Governor McKeithen made his way to New Orleans for a meeting with clergymen 
at the Clergy House, 300 SUNO students pressed him to visit the campus. After some 
wrangling, McKeithen agreed to visit the campus and held a meeting with students in 
SUNO’s cafeteria. A week before, he released a statement saying he would not visit the 
campus until the students ended their boycott of classes. Now, the students had an 
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opportunity to talk solutions with a power broker in the state. However, the meeting did 
not begin well as McKeithen used the opportunity to paternalistically lecture the students. 
Students booed McKeithen because he refused to call them Black. “I’m going to call you 
Americans. Someone else can call you Blacks,” McKeithen intoned. With the emergence 
of the Black Power Movement of the 1960s, African-Americans around the country 
preferred the term Black in lieu of the pejorative Negro or American. The term Black 
symbolized a “particular ideology embodying political, cultural, aesthetic, and 
organizational components.” McKeithen disrespected the students with that language and 
then appealed directly to Val Ferdinand, co-chairman of the Afro-American Society, 
“You’re a young man with tremendous leadership potential, and I’m not trying to make 
you an Uncle Tom, because I know you’re not. But, you’ve made your point, and now 
you should exercise some of that leadership and get the people back in the classrooms.” 
Unfortunately, the students set out to do more than make a point; they wanted real and 
instantaneous change. In this way, Black student activists differed from white student 
activists.25 
While white students focused on the philosophical, Black students focused on and 
demanded more immediate amendments to the academic, social, and cultural 
environments on their campuses. “Blacks tend[ed] both to be more tactically militant and 
less concerned with abstract questions…than white” students. In short, Black students 
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proposed more tangible demands, which required, in many cases, “tangible and 
immediate responses.”26  
McKeithen, after a slow start to the large meeting, agreed to meet with a smaller 
group of student leaders in the publications room of the campus library and proceeded to 
pacify the activists. In the conference, Ferdinand read the student demands. McKeithen 
said he found the demands legitimate, but that on some he did not have the power to 
implement. In a show of good faith, Governor McKeithen said he would set up a meeting 
between the State Board of Education and SUNO representatives (faculty, students and 
parents) because the State Board would have the final decision on the student demands. 
Walking out of the meeting with only the promise of another meeting, Ferdinand declared 
that, “We’re back in classes. As far as I’m concerned, negotiations are under way.” When 
asked by the media if any good would come out of the meeting, Ferdinand said, 
“something good has already come, the governor.” For the moment, some students 
appeared content and confident that changes were soon to come, but Lynn French 
warned, “Don’t be tricked brothers and sisters, McKeithen is first of all a politician, and 
as you know politicians have been the enemies of Black people for years.” His words 
would prove right.27 
Time to Escalate  
Two weeks later, the students noticed that the governor’s rhetoric did not lead to 
observable action and decided to escalate their activities. The Afro-American Society at 
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SUNO, like the Afro-American Society at Cornell, daringly took over a campus building. 
Two hundred SUNO students began a six-hour occupation of the administration building 
at eleven a.m. on Monday, May 5 and declared themselves in charge. Ferdinand said the 
students took control because “the governor isn’t doing anything, the old administration 
wasn’t doing anything…We wondered if we could do a better job of running the school. 
So we called an assembly and went and took over the offices, and to our surprise, the 
school is still running.” Dean Bashful locked himself in his office during the takeover and 
did not come out until Superintendent Giarrusso, Director of Public Safety, David Wade, 
and Assistant District Attorney James Alcock arrived by helicopter. Assistant Professor 
Dr. George Hassan Haggar expressed his feeling about Bashful and the takeover in direct 
words. “After he blundered April 9, Dr. Bashful lost all rapport with the students. They 
felt he had sold out and had failed to stand up for them and for the university.” During the 
takeover, students assumed the roles of different administrative officers and ran the 
business of the university. Keith Medley acted as dean; Otis Davis acted as director of 
freshman studies; David Humble acted as business manager; Larry Broom acted as 
registrar; and Lawrence Terrell acted as assistant dean. Unlike their Cornell counterparts, 
the SUNO students did not smuggle in guns and brace for a standoff. Instead, the SUNO 
students’ action simply displayed their rejection of compromise and represented their 
willingness to intensify their struggle to meet their demands.28 
In response to the students’ bold action, Governor McKeithen ordered bolder 
action. From Baton Rouge, McKeithen called 500 National Guard troopers to the campus 
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and ordered another 750 on standby and exuded a no nonsense attitude. “They insisted on 
trouble and now they’ve got it. We’re not going to allow another Cornell.” Cornell 
represented a loss of control by the school’s administration and led to the appointment of 
James Turner as director of Black Studies and the resignation of the university’s 
president. McKeithen presented a strong stance against the students and would not relent 
as did the Cornell administration, but Ferdinand and the Afro-American Society 
continued to push. Two trains on a collision course.  
When told by a newsman that the guard might be on the way, Ferdinand, 
continuing to show strength, said, “If the pigs come on campus, this administration 
declares a state of emergency and asks all students to assemble in the science lecture 
hall,” but did not say what actions would be taken. But McKeithen did not vacillate on 
his plans. “We are going to take and hold that campus with whatever force is 
necessary…and return it to the administration,” McKeithen said.29  
Though armed with militant rhetoric, the governor called the students’ buff with 
his show of power. Upon hearing that the governor called in the National Guard, the 
students vacated the administration building. Though military veterans joined the Afro-
American Society, the organization was ill equipped for an armed confrontation. 
However, the students said their vacating the building had nothing to do with the prospect 
of the National Guard coming, but that they planned to work the regular administration 
hours of 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. Whatever their reasons for leaving, McKeithen’s threat 
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succeeded in removing the rebellious students from the occupied building, even though 
the guard never showed up on campus and never left its Jackson Barracks headquarters. 
After the students relinquished their control of the building, Dean Bashful held a press 
conference and said, “We will not let this happen again.” In response, the students 
chanted, “Down with the dean!” and speculated aloud that Bashful’s statement was 
written by Superintendent Giarrusso. Ferdinand, yelled from the crowd, “We won’t do 
this again. We’ll think of something else.”30 
In sympathy with the students’ demands, some faculty joined in. SUNO officials 
suspended Dr. George Hassan Haggar, Assistant Professor of Political Science and a 
native of Lebannon, for his alleged promotion of the student disruption. Haggar said he 
planned to fight the suspension through the American Association of University 
Professors and “expose the fraud at SUNO.” For Haggar, Bashful represented that fraud. 
Haggar wrote a letter to Dean Bashful asking for a public hearing of his case. In the 
letter, Haggar challenged Bashful’s blackness. “It is very sad indeed to see an alleged 
black man hold his fellow blacks in such contempt that he has to concoct a white man to 
identify him as the students’ source of inspiration, strategy and leadership.” By calling 
Bashful an “alleged black man,” Haggar employed a notion popularize in the Black 
Power era that “skinship did not equal kinship” and that a person could be visually Black, 
but act and think in ways which only benefitted whites. Haggar continued his attack, “…I 
am convinced that black students are capable of thinking for themselves and are much 
more intelligent and dedicated than their Negro dean and professors…You are proving 
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the students right…that you are no more than a honky overseer ever ready to serve his 
white racist masters.”31 
Members of the faculty also unified to condemn the actions of Dean Bashful. 
“We, the undersigned faculty members of SUNO, strongly feel that Dr. George Haggar of 
political science has been treated most unfairly and unjustly by Dean Bashful and the 
forces behind him,” read a carefully-worded faculty-circulated petition. SUNO faculty 
enlisted their support for Haggar for two reasons: (1) they sympathized with the students 
and doubted Dean Bashful’s leadership ability and (2) they knew that if Haggar’s firing 
went unchallenged, they could be next. The petition also read, “Not only has Dr. 
Haggar’s academic freedom and thus by clear implication ours, been utterly denied to 
him, but he has been summarily dismissed without any specific charges and without any 
kind of a hearing. We protest such unjust practices and we demand that Dr. Haggar be 
immediately and fully reinstated.”32  
All professors, however, did not view the firing of Haggar and the student protest 
in the same way. Professor Joseph Okeke, a native of Nigeria, for example, criticized the 
student demonstrators at SUNO. In response to his criticism, three Black men assaulted 
Okeke for his disparaging remarks about the militants on campus and repeatedly called 
him an “Uncle Tom.” He was hospitalized for his injuries.33 
Undaunted by the threat of suspension and expulsion, the Afro-American Society 
continued to fight. As a result of a meeting of the University Discipline Committee on 
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Friday, May 9, 1969, Dean Bashful placed six SUNO students on “strict probation” 
pending the completion of an investigation. Bashful threatened immediate expulsion for 
students who continued “disruptive activities.” Students ignored his warning. On Friday, 
May 16, 1969, Afro-American Society students lowered the American flag and re-hoisted 
it upside down. Lynn French led approximately one hundred students in the 
demonstration, which attracted one hundred police in riot gear. Students “flipped a vial of 
diluted acid and a potted plant at the window” of Dean Bashful’s office and one campus 
guard received minor burns from the splashing acid. Val Ferdinand did not participate, 
because the provisions of his suspension barred him from campus. Instead, Ferdinand 
addressed students from the golf course across the street from SUNO. The demonstration 
ironically came as SUNO announced that two positions asked for by students were filled: 
SUNO named M. M. Dyson Dean of Students and St. Elmo Johnson Draft and Veterans 
Affairs Counselor. To be sure, the courageous Afro-American Society students raised 
hell over the final two turbulent months of the semester, but the students left for summer 
with their demands largely unfilled as the SUNO administration and state government 
refused to bend to the students’ will.34 
The Fight Continues 
During the summer of 1969, a group called Concerned Citizens continued the 
students’ fight against educational neglect and an unresponsive administration. Dick 
Beverly, chairman of the organization, echoed the sentiments of the students when he 
posited that, “SUNO should be producing proud militant leaders with an education 
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relevant to the black community.” They held meetings at Notre Dame Seminary on the 
first Tuesday of every month with the usual theme of “an education merely to obtain a 
piece of paper is no education at all.” Afro-American Society and this group shared a 
similar idea about education and sought to make SUNO a community school. In addition, 
the Concerned Citizens called for a 100 percent boycott of SUNO registration in 
September of 1969 until the administration at SUNO met certain conditions. The 
conditions stipulated that all charges be dropped against SUNO students, that a State law 
regarding campus disorders be repealed because it subjected every student involved in 
peaceful protest to criminal charges, and that all suspended students be re-admitted and 
allowed to resume their education at SUNO. The Concerned Citizens challenged the 
administration to help solve the issues on campus and not create new problems. Mrs. C. 
Porter, mother of a SUNO student, said, “The only thing the administration accomplished 
throughout this whole affair was the institution of police state tactics on campus, large 
scale arrests, [and] criminal charges against students…”35 
With the boycott looming, ten students took their struggle into the courts. SUNO 
expelled and barred these ten students from taking their final exams during the spring. 
They sought reinstatement in federal court on the grounds of denial of due process and 
aimed at being allowed to take their final exams and having the suspensions or expulsions 
removed from their records. The students were Lynn D. French, David C. Humbles, III, 
Keith W. Medley, Vallery Ferdinand, Lawrence J. Terrel, Spencer Williams, Gary 
                                                
35 “Concerned Citizens Call For SUNO Boycott in Sept.” Louisiana Weekly, July 26, 
1969; “Concerned Parents Urge SUNO Boycott.” The Plain Truth, August 20, 1969. 
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Brown, Larry Jones, Blake Porter, and Edward Merricks. They named as the defendants 
the President of the Southern University System, Dr. G. Leon Netterville and Dr. Emmett 
W. Bashful, who was promoted to vice president in the Southern University system. The 
suspended students, after challenging the administration on the lack of relevant 
education, now sought re-entry into a school that did not intend to give them the kind of 
education they desired. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, especially those 
funded by the state, lacked the freedom and latitude granted to Predominately White 
Institutions to change policies and grant student demands, if only to quickly pacify and 
quiet the students. For example, in Louisiana, Southern University had to go to the State 
Board of Education for changes, whereas, Louisiana State University simply went to its 
Board of Directors. In a consistently conservative state like Louisiana, radical changes at 
Southern University campuses were not likely to happen.36  
Even though the SUNO administration failed to meet all the conditions and 
develop a Black Studies program like other universities, the Concerned Citizens group 
called off the boycott of SUNO registration. Meeting on September 2, they unanimously 
agreed to cancel the boycott for several reasons: (1) the acquittal of two Afro-American 
Society students, Blake Porter and Edward Merrick, (2) the development of rapport 
between the black community and the SUNO administration, (3) several new deans, (4) 
the establishment of the Department of Education, and (5) contracts for new facilities to 
meet the growing pains of SUNO. Though student protests and boycotts brought attention 
to the problems of SUNO, the Concerned Citizens felt that “proper solutions require the 
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involvement of the community, the faculty and the students, all working toward a 
common goal…making SUNO a first-rate state institution.” And though the students 
were not admitted back to school, the Concerned Citizens maintained that their re-
admittance was inevitable. To be sure, nevertheless, these concessions failed to 
essentially change the university. After a march against the war in Vietnam in mid-
November of 1969, the Afro-American Society and Concerned Citizens movement 
quietly subsided.37 
Conclusion 
Fortier and SUNO students, stimulated and motivated by the protest energy 
permeating the entire country, questioned the educational status quo proffered by their 
respective schools, but the administrations rebuffed their demands and refused to change 
the curriculum and campus environment in meaningful ways. The case study of Fortier 
High School and SUNO demonstrates that in order for Black people to receive an 
education that contributes to the overall liberation of the Black community, the education 
must be conceptualized and funded by a unified Black community with the common goal 
of mental independence and self-determination. As an African proverb states, “He who 
butters your bread has an effect on your stomach.” Meaning, if someone else funds the 
educational institution, then they wield a considerable influence over what happens in 
that institution. In both cases, the administration made certain allowances to the students, 
however, the concessions attained failed to provide the desired education and student 
power at Fortier and SUNO. In the end, did any good come from the student movement 
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in New Orleans? Those involved certainly pondered this question in the days, months, 
and years following their vocal resistance. To be sure, their sacrifices substantiate the 
cultural nationalist Black Power contention that in order for Black people to get what 
truly needed and wanted in America, they must create and maintain their own institutions 




“Among the People Like Fish in a Sea:” 





 On the breezy morning of November 19, 1970, some of the residents of the Desire 
Housing Project in New Orleans prepared for work, but most did not. Jobs were hard to 
come by for too many of the poverty-stricken residents and the high unemployment rate 
represented a simple fact of life. Yet, many residents at that moment were infused with a 
new sense of hope, a new sense of purpose, a new vision for the future. A chapter of 
Black Panthers Party (BPP) which was organized early in 1970 began doing its best to 
meet the desires and needs of their community through a free breakfast program, PE 
(Political Education) classes, neighborhood clean-ups, a liberation school, their 
challenges to white supremacy, and sickle-cell anemia screenings. The Panthers worked 
at gaining the confidence of the people and won it as the people of Desire allowed them 
to make their third chapter headquarters in an abandoned apartment at 3315 Desire. Of 
course, the city deemed the BPP criminal trespassers and vowed to remove them from 
their stronghold even though the state criminal trespass laws only carried a maximum 
penalty of a fifty-dollar fine.1 
 At eleven a.m. a caravan of police vehicles carrying 250 police offices led by a 
communications system and a tank called the “war wagon” moved into the Desire area to 
remove the Panthers. State police officers were on standby and three helicopters circled 
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in the sky above the Desire Projects. The police, armed with a no nonsense plan came to 
eliminate the fourteen “self-styled revolutionaries” thought to be occupying the Panther 
headquarters. They were better armed, better trained and thought it would be an easy 
morning task so that they could partake in afternoon beignets and coffee downtown. 
Little did they know, November 19, 1970, would be a day they would not soon forget.2 
 As soon as the police arrived, many of the Desire residents made their way 
outside to stand defiantly between the police and the Panther headquarters. Some were 
simply being “nosy” while others were seriously concerned about the well-being of the 
beloved BPP members. A crowd formed, eventually numbering 3,000 people armed with 
rocks, bottles and courage; a human shield attempting to protect respected members of 
their community from “fascist pigs;” a mass of individuals absolutely tired of the unfair 
treatment experienced by the Panthers and the community as a whole at the hands of the 
New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). A series of events led to this dramatic moment. 
 The Desire Projects housed over 10,000 people, with over 95% being African 
American. Four-fifths of the female residents of the area were employed in low-paying 
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs and sixty-one percent of all families earned less than 
$3,000 a year, which was well below the poverty level in 1970.3 Though poor, the Desire 
residents exhibited a courage heretofore relegated to Northern and Western ghettoes. 
 This chapter delves deeply into the circumstances that led to the rise of the BPP in 
New Orleans and gave the Desire residents the courage to stand heroically and essentially 
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unarmed in the face of the nervous and trigger-happy NOPD officers. Overall, this 
evidence will make obvious that even though New Orleans did not experience the riots 
that other urban Black centers experienced during the 1960s, the deplorable conditions, 
police repression, dramatic events and the overall political economy of New Orleans 
fostered a militancy in the hearts and minds of many black New Orleanians, which, in 
turn, led to much of the community sympathy and support for the Black Panthers in their 
short stay in the "Big Easy." 
Origins and Survival Programs 
Certainly, the majority of Black residents of New Orleans subsisted in an 
atmosphere of economic hardship and exploitation, but these issues pounded the Desire 
area especially hard. In this area in 1969 close to fifty-seven percent of the Black 
inhabitants lived below the federal poverty level of $2,525 and sixty-one percent made 
less than $3,000 per year.4 Robert Tucker’s report to Mayor ‘Moon’ Landrieu, the new 
mayor of New Orleans in 1970, on the Desire Housing Project reveals the neglect of the 
area by the administration of the city. Released on August 26, 1970, the report painted a 
vivid description of what it was like to live in the Desire. The study “tells of the project’s 
few acres being packed with 10,391 person—8,312 of whom [were] under 21.” Tucker 
also proposes an eleven-point program aimed at helping the mayor alleviate some of the 
conditions: (1) increased police patrols, (2) increased garbage collections, (3) HANO 
demolish burned out building and build a recreational center, (4) return bus service to the 
area after midnight, (5) Board of Health rigidly inspect the grocery store for health 
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hazards, (6) rushed construction of Sampson Pool, (7) vacant lots be cleared and 
abandoned automobiles be removed, (8) install metal doors and alarms on child 
development center, (9) HANO and the city sanitation department provide more jobs for 
residents, particularly ex-addicts; (10) replace damaged or stolen street signs; and (11) 
clean clogged sewers. This “to-do” list demonstrates the explosive environment in which 
the residents finally decided that enough was enough. Long ignored by the city, their 
voices would be heard.5 
 The dire circumstances outlined above produced the Panthers of New Orleans. 
Started by Huey P. Newton, who was born in Monroe, Louisiana, and Bobby Seale in 
1966 in Oakland, California, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense established itself 
quickly as a Black response to the rampant police brutality terrorizing Blacks in the Bay 
Area. Huey P. Newton, named after the infamous Louisiana Governor Huey P. Long, was 
a streetwise militant with an interest in law, teamed with Bobby Seale, a young student 
whose consciousness was greatly affected by Malcolm X. By 1969, police departments 
across the country targeted the young organization for harsh harassment. In fact, in 1969  
J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director, called the Black Panther Party “the greatest threat to 
the internal security of the country.” The fact that police killed at least twenty-eight 
Panthers by 1969 demonstrates the amount of repression the Panthers faced from law 
enforcement officials.6 On December 4, 1969, Fred Hampton, chairman of the Peoria, 
Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party, and Mark Clark, were brutally murdered by 
police in an early morning raid. This action was only a small window into the tactics used 
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by the FBI’s Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). Across the country, 
COINTELPRO used infiltration, falsified letters, invasive surveillance, and trumped-up 
charges to intimidate and destroy the Panther organization.  
Though the Panthers appeared in New Orleans four years after its inception in 
Oakland, the Panther ideology of do-for-self and self-defense remained relevant to the 
conditions many Black residents in New Orleans found themselves. Steve Breen came to 
New Orleans in January of 1970 armed with 200 Black Panther newspapers in which he 
used to organize the chapter. His arrival was pushed by Geronimo ji Jaga (Elmer Pratt), a 
native of Louisiana, who convinced the Central Committee in Oakland that Louisiana, 
with its history of armed resistance in Bogalusa with the Deacons for Defense, was a 
perfect place for the establishment of a new branch. In fact, Donna Jean Murch argues in 
Living for the City that migrants from the South, in particular Louisiana, represented the 
nucleus of the Black radicalism that burgeoned in the Bay Area during the 1960s. 
Furthermore, many of the families of the young radicals “hailed from central Louisiana 
where Garveyite and indigenous armed defense movements were strong.”7  
The first step to becoming a fully realized Black Panther Chapter was the creation 
of a group called the National Committee to Combat Fascism or N.C.C.F. This policy 
pertained to every chapter of the party around the country. Later, the New Orleans 
N.C.C.F. became the New Orleans chapter of the Black Panther Party. Within six 
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months, the NOPD pegged the Panthers as the “greatest concern” and the “most 
dangerous” of the organizations around the city.8 
To begin their community work, party members established the first office at 
2353 Saint Thomas Street near the St. Thomas Housing Project. At this headquarters, the 
Panthers established a free breakfast program which fed 300 children every morning 
except on Sundays, began a crime prevention program, screened area residents for  
sickle-cell anemia, and introduced residents to the fiery rhetoric of revolution and 
socialism through political education classes. Later, while continuing to meet the needs of 
the residents of the St. Thomas area, an eviction notice greeted the Panthers in June; not 
because of none payment of rent, but because of their radical attitude and scorching 
denouncement of the American system. Criminal District Court Judge Bernard J. Bagert 
owned the house where the Panthers made their office and would have more contact with 
the Panthers later in the year.9  
Nevertheless, the Panthers would not be deterred. They quickly recovered and 
relocated their second office at 3542 Piety Street across the street from the Desire 
Housing Project. According to former Panther Malik Rahim, then known as Donald 
Guyton, the Panthers, in a very short time turned the Desire Area, which was known in 
the state as the most dangerous community in the city, to the safest community in New 
Orleans. “We weren’t big, bad brothers. We just asked the dealers to make the Desire 
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area a safe zone, a place where their mothers and grandmothers could sit on the porch and 
not be scared of being harmed.” According to a local newspaper, the NOLA Express, the 
Panthers lived “among the people like fish in the sea.” Along with greatly reducing the 
crime rate in the Desire area, the Panthers also organized community clean-ups of the 
Desire Housing Project and offered pest-control services for the rodents that appeared 
frequently in the crowded apartments. The community took notice of the Panthers’ ability 
to make their lives better in small but sufficient ways, even if the majority of them did not 
share the Panther’s vision of a socialist state.10 
The Panthers also demonstrated the capacity to unite disparate individuals from 
different areas of the city. In the 1960s and 70s, if one lived in the Fischer Housing 
Projects, one did not venture into the Desire area; if one lived in the Magnolia Housing 
Projects, one did not roam near the St. Bernard Housing Projects. Relations between 
residents of the different housing developments of the city were usually hostile to say the 
least. Yet, the Panther members represented an eclectic mix of individuals from the 
Magnolia, Fischer, Desire, and Calliope Projects—all united in their quest for liberation. 
Whereas some Panther chapters like the branch in Seattle had a cadre filled with college 
educated African Americans and Black Student Union members, the Panthers in New 
Orleans held nothing higher than high school diplomas. To be sure, though the Black 
Panther Party claimed to be the vanguard of the lumpen proletariat, its founders and early 
members were community college students.11 
                                                
10 Malik Rahim, Author Interview, December 28, 2007; NOLA Express, September 1970. 
11 Jeffery Zane and Judson L. Jeffries, “A Panther Sighting in the Pacific Northwest: The 
Seattle Chapter of the Black Panther Party,” in On the Ground: The Black Panther Party 
 120 
Police Repression 
 In a very short time, the Panthers of New Orleans drew the attention of the state 
and local authorities who desired to quell their revolution by any means necessary. 
Giarrusso worried that too many residents were being indoctrinated with a “hatred toward 
law enforcement specifically and the establishment in general” because of the Panthers. 
In response to this concerns, members of the organization were arrested on petty charges, 
from selling papers on a street corner, refusing to put a lid on a gargabe (sic) can, to 
defacing public property (by pasting up posters).” These arrests began the repression, but 
more was coming. The noted segregationist Governor of Louisiana at the time, John 
McKeithen, appeared on television and said that the Panthers would not get a foothold in 
New Orleans or Louisiana. In fact, he said, “no revolutionaries, period, would be 
tolerated in Louisiana.” Certainly this represented no idle threat and the events in 
September of 1970 gave the authorities a very good reason to begin a systemic process to 
purge New Orleans of the Black Panthers just as many other cities around the country 
had prior to 1970. The N.C.C.F. responded to the threat in a news conference. “This 
conspiracy in which they call for an investigation and probing of Panther activities, we 
see as ground work being laid to murder, harass, trump up charges, and destroy the 
N.C.C.F. center, which is an organization bureau of the B.P.P. here in New Orleans.” 
They would not be far off in their prediction. The Panther representative ended the 
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conference with words reminiscent of Malcolm X, “We will protect ourselves and the 
people in the community in which we live, by whatever means necessary.”12 
The real trouble started as two young boys, who sold the Louisiana Weekly 
newspaper on Tulane and Broad, the corner where the Orleans Parish Jail sat and still 
sits, informed the Panthers that apparent Panthers, Melvin Howard and Israel Fields, were 
actually undercover cops. Their response would make or break the nascent organization 
in New Orleans. Similar circumstances faced other branches across the country, which 
the New Orleans branch could learn from. For example, in 1969, Bobby Seale, co-
founder of the BPP, Erika Huggins, and other members of the New Haven, Connecticut, 
chapter of the BPP, were charged with the torture and murder of suspected police 
informant, Alex Rackley.13  
Initially, the Panthers debated rigorously about whether or not to expose the agent 
provocateurs, but eventually reached the decision to keep the imposters at close range, 
because as Charles Scott, a 19-year-old Panther from New York, said, “No, we won’t 
expose them ‘cause then they going to send some more and it might take us too long to 
find out who they are…We’re going to feed them with a long-handled spoon and we’re 
going to use them up.” After a month and a half of pretending not to know of the 
undercover cops, however, the Panthers’ patience ran thin with cops as Malik Rahim 
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(Donald Guyton) punched Israel Fields in the mouth after he denied being a police 
officer. At that moment, Charles Scott again stepped in and advised Rahim not to be beat 
Fields, but to allow the people to deal with Howard and Fields. By this time, a crowd of 
residents from in and around the Desire Project had formed in front of the Panther 
Headquarters at 3542 Piety Street. When the Panthers released Howard and Fields, they 
ran through the crowd, who attempted to kick, punch, and kill them, towards Broussard’s 
store. Known as an exploitative enterprise in the Black community, Broussard’s store 
signified a safe haven for Howard and Fields, because they knew NOPD officers 
stationed on the roof of the store would provide cover and protect them from the angry 
crowd. On the premise that the Broussard store would be firebombed, four NOPD 
officers began guarding the store the day before. Once Howard and Fields made it safely 
inside the store, the officers on the roof opened fire and shot and killed a young man 
named Kenneth Borden.14 
Newspaper accounts claim that Borden was killed by police as he led a group 
towards Broussard grocery store.15 According to Malik Rahim, however, “They killed a 
young brother who just happened to be there. He didn’t even have a rock.”16 In reaction 
to the death of his son, Edward Borden, then, a security guard for the Federal government 
and resident of Desire, resigned from his appointment as a special police officer. He said, 
“I cannot see myself being part of a killer organization.” Kenneth Borden’s body lay in 
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the gutter for more than two hours before the police finally removed him from the scene, 
because of alleged sniper fire.17 
To be sure, the NOPD interpreted the beating of two police officers, whether 
perpetrated by the Panthers or not, as the perfect ammunition to rid New Orleans of those 
who they saw as “domestic terrorists.” Roy Reed, in an article in the New York Times on 
September 15, 1970 explained what happened next this way. 
The police came shortly after 8:30 a.m. just as the winds from nearby tropical 
storm Felice churned up a black cover of clouds that dumped a downpour of rain 
on the troubled Desire neighborhood. Several hundred New Orleans policemen 
and twenty or thirty state policemen descended on the organization’s headquarters 
in a large old frame building decorated with posters of Panther heroes.18 
 
Only fourteen Panthers occupied the headquarters at the time armed with nine shotguns, a 
couple of handguns and .357 revolvers, according to Malik Rahim. The Panthers, though 
out manned and out gunned, decided to fight it out. “Our position was that African 
Americans should no longer be lynched or beaten or attacked and have their rights taken 
away without any form of resistance,” said Malik Rahim. “You had a right to defend your 
community. You had a right to defend your family. And you had the right to defend your 
honor as a human being.”19 William Rouselle, deputy director of the Human Relations 
Committee, called the Panthers unwillingness to go underground and their propensity to 
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denounce the system freely to the press a “suicidal tendency.” The Panthers across the 
country termed this “revolutionary suicide,” a noble death for the people and freedom 
from fascism. 20  
The police set up quickly outside the headquarters and began firing into the 
building. For twenty minutes police bullets sang through the morning air with the melody 
of death and destruction. Bullets beat through the walls and windows of the Panther 
headquarters, ripping through sheet rock and revolutionary posters. The unbearable heat 
suffocated the air. The NOPD came to kill, came to maim. Justice was being served in 
their eyes as the poorly armed Panthers attempted to stay alive. Chances of the Panthers 
walking away with minimal casualties were certainly hoped for by the Panthers 
themselves and the community, but the probability was slim. 
Nevertheless, after the twenty-minute assault on the Panther headquarters, the 
NOPD abruptly ceased firing. Inside the hole-filled headquarters, Panthers crawled to 
check each room for the number of casualties. Each room reported no deaths. Amazingly, 
not a single person in the headquarters died as a result of so much police gunfire. After a 
brief discussion about the next move, the Panthers in the headquarters decided to 
surrender and take their fight to court. Malik Rahim recalls a small speech given by 
Charles Scott before they walked out of the house.  
He said, ‘We’re the Black Panther Party and we ain’t going to bow down and we 
ain’t going to allow anybody to degrade us or what we stand for. We’re going to 
let everybody know that we stand for our rights as human beings and we going to 
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take it to court. If they convict us, we going to let everybody know that in this 
country there’s two kinds of justice. There’s justice for the rich and powerful and 
there’s justice for the poor and the disenfranchised. When you walk out of that 
door, everybody raise their hand and holler Power to the People.21 
 
As the Panthers walked out, a large crowd of Black residents of the community cheered 
with clenched fists lifted in the sky as a sign of support for the Panthers and threw bottles 
and rocks at the NOPD to express their displeasure with the way the police, or “pigs” as 
some shouted, treated respected member of their community. Many years later, Tyrone 
Edwards, an eighteen-year-old Panther at the time of the shootout, expressed gratitude 
that he walked away from the barrage with his life. Edwards remembered, “I don’t know 
who put out that white flag, but I am so glad they did. I’ll never forget that day because I 
was so happy to be going to jail…”22 
The NOPD confiscated eleven shotguns, one M1 rifle, two revolvers, a training 
rifle, a bowie knife, and 887 live shotgun shells from the headquarters.23 In the end, seven 
people were injured and sixteen were arrested. Judge Bernard J. Bagert, judge of 
Magistrate Court and former Panther landlord, set bond for each Panther at $100,000. 
The NOPD charged the arrested Panthers with attempted murder which normally 
averaged a maximum bond in Louisiana of $5,000, ninety-five thousand dollars less than 
the bond set by Judge Bagert. Other charges levied against the Panthers included criminal 
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anarchy, which carried a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment at hard labor. 
Criminal anarchy in Louisiana is described in legal terms as the "advocating or teaching, 
in any manner, in public or private, of the subversion, opposition or destruction of the 
government of the United States or the State of Louisiana by violence or other unlawful 
means."24 
  Judge Bagert recued himself from the case a day later while denying that he 
harbored prejudice against the Panthers. Panther attorney, Ernest Jones, levied this 
allegation because of the exorbitant bond set by Judge Bagert. Maybe Jones had a point, 
because when asked what he thought of the Panthers, Bagert said, “If they stand for what 
I saw in the news media…I could have no regard for them. They are certainly anarchistic 
and revolutionary.” On October 8, 1970, Judge Israel Augustine, Jr., an African-
American, set new bonds at $25,00 for Charles Scott, $20,000 for Ronald Ailsworth, 
$15,000 for the seven other men, and $12,500 for each of the three women. Augustine, 
before becoming a criminal court judge, represented the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference as a New Orleans attorney. Even with new bonds, the justice system did not 
stand blind for the Panthers. Instead it stood eyes wide open and ready to deliver a guilty 
verdict before pre-trials motions began. Yet, some members of the community threatened 
to take the law into their own hands. One person called and threatened to blow up the 
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police station if the Panthers experienced injury. Another simply said the prisoners would 
be freed. 25  
In the days after the shootout, Superintendent of Police, Giarrusso, employed the 
same rhetoric used by officials across the country when he constantly remarked that his 
use of force against the Panthers was in best interest of the Black community. According 
to Giarrusso, outside agitators filled the ranks of the Panthers and came into the city to 
stir-up trouble. In truth, the majority of the Panthers were homegrown and from various 
housing developments in the city. Even the rock-and-bottle throwing crowd which met 
him and his officers after arresting several Panther members represented a few 
professional agitators, because “a majority of the people in the Desire Street area did not 
accept the Panthers’ brand of militancy.”26 Whereas he might, in reality, have been 
correct in that the majority of the residents did not accept wholeheartedly the Panther 
ideology, the majority certainly cared about the Panthers and felt they added positive 
elements to their community. Winnifred Mcgee, a resident of the Desire in 1970, recalls 
in an interview that “the Panthers were adored by most of the community, especially the 
young people. We had seen the police use excessive force on our people on a daily basis 
and the Panthers represented a direct stand against that kind of injustice.”27 Other 
testimonies support this sentiment. "I think the overall feeling about the Panthers in the 
Desire community was not resentment. There is a well stream of psychological reasons 
for that,” William Rouselle, then twenty-four years of age, said. “The Panthers represent 
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a radical view of society—one in which people are oppressed by conditions they can't 
control. And the police are the symbols of authority, the status quo." Robert Tucker, 
however, special assistant to Mayor Landrieu, believed that the Desire residents wanted 
approved authorities like himself and others to deal with their outstanding grievances and 
complaints before going the confrontational route of the Panthers to solve their 
problems.28  
While others interpreted the shootout as a way to decimate the Panther ranks, 
Mayor Landrieu simply saw the matter in legal terms. For him, the incident was not a 
“civil rights uprising” or a “racial incident.” His words perturbed many Black leaders as 
Landrieu expressed the opinion that the police only performed a forced eviction. There 
was an individual owner to the particular piece of property who desired the removal of 
persons who wrongfully occupied the residence. After obtaining court orders to have the 
occupants move, the Panthers rebuffed the owner with the constant refrain that he did not 
own the property. Indeed, it belonged to the “people” and the people granted the Panthers 
access. Mayor Landrieu likened the action the NOPD took to the actions of President 
Eisenhower during the crisis surrounding Governor Faubus of Arkansas and the 
integration of the Little Rock Nine. In order words, the NOPD obeyed the written law 
and acted to preserve its integrity. “The law is the law until such time as some people or 
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the courts, or someone who constituted authority…said that’s no longer the law,” said 
Landrieu. Outlaws, “talking bad” about the system were not to be tolerated.29  
Back at police headquarters, Giarrusso praised Melvin Howard, 20, and Israel 
Fields, 21, for their work as spies within the Panther organization and called them “two 
of the bravest men he has known.” When asked why he took the assignment, Fields said, 
“it was a challenge and I like challenges.”30 A bigger and nobler challenge or mission, in 
the view of the Panthers, would be to relieve the people of the yoke of oppression that 
plagued them in the United States and the world. Whether or not the young officers felt 
they were doing a service to their community, residents, in general, looked upon Black 
officers as “uncle Toms” and traitors. In fact, the Panthers circulated a flyer deriding one 
Black police officer. Raymond Reed, they said, “has taken an oath to serve the pigs who 
are in power whole heartedly. [Patrolling] the black community with a night stick and a 
gun, Raymond Reed actually thinks that he is a super nigger-pig…It should be made 
clear that Raymond Reed is a traitor, a bootlicker and nigger pig, and the penalty for 
treason is death.”31  
Nevertheless, according to Giarrusso, Fields and Howard gained valuable 
intelligence about the Panthers. “Both officers managed to gain the confidence of some of 
the Panther leaders,” Giarrusso proclaimed at a press conference, “… and assisted in 
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many of the projects, invented by this group of revolutionaries that were designed to 
deceive citizens of our Black community into supporting their activities. These officers 
observed as the Panthers use school children as pawns to further their own violent aims." 
Of course Giarrusso did not go into details about the projects the Panthers used to 
“deceive” the residents and how the children were used as pawns. On the one hand, he 
praised the residents by saying, “most of the people in there did not accept the Panthers, 
they did not want them. I am pleased that they behaved this way.” On the other hand, he 
intimated that they lacked intelligence by saying, the Panthers “fully exploit the ignorant 
and the poor and use them and unfortunately some of these people buy some of this stuff 
that they put out.” Whether true or not, his rhetoric seemed to represent an attempt to 
discredit the work of the Panthers in the eyes of the city; essentially as a way to “soften” 
the community so that when the police endeavored to totally decimate the Panthers, the 
city residents would welcome or deem appropriate whatever measures used by the 
NOPD.32 
 The Panthers would not be stopped so easily, however. By late October of 1970, 
according to Panther spokesman, Harold Holmes, the remaining Panthers held a 
plebiscite throughout the Desire Project with the residents approving the Panthers’ move 
into an old abandoned Desire apartment. The Panthers continued their work even as 
fourteen members sat in Orleans Parish Prison. Refusing to accept the rent offered by the 
Panthers, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) claimed that the Panthers were 
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trespassing, even though other, mostly white, organizations were allowed to occupy 
several apartments rent-free. 33  
On the one hand, Thomas J. Heier, chairman of HANO, took a cautious approach 
towards the situation with the Panthers, stating, “The board is aware that there is 
unauthorized presence of the NCCF in one of the Desire Project apartment units, but 
we're not going to go in off the top of our heads and unnecessarily inflame the situation." 
On the other hand, James R. Sutterfield, the only Republican in the Louisiana State 
Legislature at the time, vehemently demanded that the Panthers be ousted from the Desire 
Housing Project immediately. “I…feel that history has proven that appeasement is not the 
answer when dealing with radical racist, subversive groups such as the NCCF,” 
Sutterfield said to newspaper reporters. 34  
Even though the crime of trespassing carried only a fifty-dollar fine, the Panthers 
knew the Sutterfield attitude would win out. Consequently, the Panthers prepared 
themselves for another fight. They would not be moved; they had no intentions on 
moving out of Apartment A at 3315 Desire Parkway, the apartment “rightfully” given 
them by the community whom they served. The Panthers would not be intimidated by the 
“pigs” and the “fascist power structure” looking to extract them from the Desire Housing 
Project. In preparation, the Panthers distributed a flyer that informed the community of 
the possibility that the police department would be coming to “make an example of the 
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NCCF members in order to prove to those Niggers everywhere that they will not permit 
any individual, committee, or group to organize and fight for what they call freedom.”35 
 In an attempt to resolve the issue without flying bullets and bloodshed, Police 
Chief Clarence Giarrusso and Mayor “Moon” Landrieu sent two members of the city’s 
clergy, Jerome LeDoux and Reverend William Barnwell, to negotiate with the Panthers 
and get them to leave the apartment peacefully. The Panthers stuck to their guns and 
resolved to battle it out. 
 The next morning, November 19, 250 police officers in riot gear, helmeted and 
bandoliered, and a tank-like machine called a “war wagon” descended upon the Desire 
Projects to rid the city once and for all of the Panthers. But as community residents 
caught wind of the developing situation, they poured from their homes feeling that the 
NOPD’s plan to kill the young brothers and sisters of the Panthers over a fifty-dollar 
trespass law represented the height of hypocrisy and demonstrated the lengths the 
authorities would go to stop a perceived threat to “democracy,” especially when white 
organizations stayed in the Desire rent-free. If the Panthers were indeed bad for the 
community as stated by Giarrusso and Landrieu, then the community would have helped 
the police get rid of them. In the community’s eyes; however, the Panthers brought new 
hope and new strength. They feed breakfast to the 128 children of poor mothers, thus 
saving if only a little money. They even feed poor white children. At that moment, the 
NOPD represented the bad guys who were, in fact, the community troublemakers 
trespassing on their ground. According to some sources, 3,000 residents put their lives on 
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the line for the young people who would give their lives for them. Journalists claimed 
that only three-hundred resident were there.36 
Chants of “off the pigs” and “all power to the people” and rock throwing met the 
NOPD counsel Charles Foti’s call for the Panthers to come out and for the crowd to 
disperse. As minutes turned into an hour with no police success, Superintendent of Police 
Giarrusso sent officers to man adjacent buildings to the Panther headquarters to occupy 
second floor apartments in anticipation of the confrontation with the Panthers. They were 
ready if violence broke out below. Desire residents were literally forced from their homes 
to make room for NOPD officers armed with shotguns and rifles.37 
 Inside the Panther headquarters, the mood swayed back and forth between sadness 
at the possibility of impending doom and elation at the fact that the people were outside 
protecting them. The Panthers cut slits in the windows to shoot through as one priest, 
Father Lonon, a part of the a team of ministers and community leaders attempting to 
negotiate a peaceful resolution between the BPP and the NOPD, brought news to 
Superintendent Giarrusso, that “the Desire residents have taken a vote and unanimously 
decided to back NCCF (National Committee to Combat Fascism) holdouts as long as 
police stayed on the scene.”38 In addition, one Panther, after being told by a priest that the 
police were intent on storming their stronghold and killing them, said, "It ain't no 
different from any other time. They're always coming in here and shooting up everything. 
The only difference is, this time, they are going to have to kill a whole lot of us. And for 
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every one of us they kill, there'll be ten more right from this project to take his place." 
Practicing what they preached, the Panthers found strength in dying for their cause to 
liberate Black people from the oppression heaped upon their backs by this American 
republic and to develop a socialist nation. The Panthers continued to repeat their ten 
demands and refused to be moved.39 
 As the calls for the Panthers to surrender went unheeded, the crowd gained more 
and more confidence in their ability to stand in the face of overwhelming odds and be 
victorious. As night began to fall after a five-hour standoff, Supt. Giarrusso signaled to 
his men that it was time to leave, time to withdraw, time to retreat on the pretense that he 
would await a federal court ruling on the eviction. As the police officers began to re-
board their white and blue NOPD buses in file, they cursed Supt. Giarrusso for not letting 
them storm the headquarters and get the “troublemakers” out and received verbal abuse 
from some Desire residents. Some residents stood in a daze as they witnessed this 
remarkable and dramatic scene. But after the initial shock worn off, the people of Desire 
began to cheer. Later, the residents brought out the beer and food and partied through the 
night, even carrying the Panthers on their shoulders throughout the community. For the 
psyche of the Black community of Desire, the retreat of the NOPD represented an 
immense victory. For a brief moment, they would not be moved.40 
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Aftermath 
In the aftermath of the community’s stand, various opinions surfaced about the 
Panthers and the way the police and HANO should respond after their defeat. One letter 
came to the offices of HANO from South Bend, Indiana, for a citizen known only as “Old 
Pro.” The strongly worded letter demanded decisive, no nonsense action. In part, it said, 
“what are you sick people doing—sitting there like a bunch of screwballs and letting a 
bunch of punks run your city…Issue an ultimatum to that NCCF bunch of ‘gooks’—
Then, if they don’t scram—let them have it.” This letter signified an unwillingness to 
negotiate with “radical elements.” Others, however, came to the aid of the embattled 
Panther group. The student government organization at Louisiana State University of 
New Orleans registered their support of the Panthers and their right to keep their 
headquarters within the Desire Housing Project. They argued, “if white Tulane 
University and other white interest groups have been granted by HANO the right to use 
Desire facilities to work with Desire residents, then certainly the NCCF, a black group, 
also has that right. If you persist in your resolve to remove the NCCF from their present 
residence by force we charge you with heinous and brutal racism.” Though it is easy to 
dismiss college students as naïve and overly idealistic, their argument in this case 
certainly holds up to hard scrutiny and is logical. However, the city of New Orleans, 
HANO, and the NOPD failed to be guided by logic. At Tulane University, a group called 
The Tulane Ad Hoc Committee to Prevent Disaster urged students to “bring pressure 
upon Mayor Landrieu to postpone any confrontation” between the NOPD and the 
Panthers. Instead of looking at the positive things the Panthers provided for their 
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community, the authorities could only understand them as an angry and as a dangerous 
element needing to be erased. Some residents of the housing project “filed suit in federal 
court charging violation of the third amendment to the bill of Rights on Quartering of 
Soldiers.” During the standoff, NOPD officers entered the homes of various residents 
around the Panther headquarters. Residents claimed the police officers came in with guns 
drawn and forced them out and “enjoyed the facilities in their five-hour stay.”41  
In the early hours of Thanksgiving morning after the mighty standoff, a special 
NOPD force costumed as priests, mailmen, and “grannies,” endeavored to gain entry into 
the Panther Desire apartment. In response to their knock on the door, a Panther named 
Betty Powell opened and immediately closed the door as she figured out the deception. 
However, the NOPD special unit, led by Sergeant Robert Frey, fired through the door 
hitting Powell in the chest, claiming later that she fired first. She would not die, but six 
Panthers were arrested—including chapter leader Harold Holmes—and charged with 
criminal anarchy, attempted murder, and criminal trespassing. Supt. Giarrusso expressed 
gratitude that the Panther “danger” was over. He commended his officers on fine police 
work. When asked, were all the men in squad African Americans, he replied, “They were 
Americans.”42 Surely, a group of white men walking through the courtyard of the Desire 
Project would bring undo attention to the unit and spoil the devious plot. Indeed, Black 
officers made up the special unit sent to purge the remaining Panthers from their 
stronghold—another case of whites in power using Blacks to do their dirty work. 
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As the officers attempted to leave the projects after the surprise raid, they grabbed 
three Desire community members and used them as human shields to secure a “safe 
getaway.” The police charged the hostages they held with “interfering with police and 
resisting arrest” and then released them on their own recognizance. Johnny Jackson, Jr., 
the director of the Desire Community Center, SOUL member, and soon-to-be elected to 
the Louisiana House of Representatives, was one of the captives. “I belong to all these 
orginizations (sic) and have these titles,” Jackson said, “but when you get down to it with 
the police—I’m just another nigger.” Jackson echoed a sentiment long-held in Black 
communities that position and success does not erase your ethic background. It was a call 
to other Blacks to stay grounded. Continuing to vent about his ordeal with the police, 
Jackson contended, “It is not the NCCF, Black Panthers, leftist militants or any other 
group of people or organization that white folk feel undesirable, that are on trial, but all 
Black people-Everywhere.”43 
In the aftermath of the raid, two things immediately happened. First, the Desire 
community demonstrated their solidarity with the N.C.C.F.. Seventeen residents of the 
project sold 325 copies of the Black Panther newspaper on Canal Street. Second, the 
NOPD came under fire for its use of clerical grab to gain entry into the Panther 
headquarters. The Human Relations Committee condemned the use of the disguises that 
felt it comprised the ability of the clergy to act as “mediators or bearers of mercy in a 
conflict situation.”44 
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The Panthers’ new fight was relegated to the courts. In August 1971, twelve of the 
fourteen NCCF members involved in the first shootout on September 15, 1970, found 
themselves in a New Orleans courtroom facing serious prison time.  After two members 
were dropped from the case before the trial, Leroy Jones, 23; Catherine Bourne, 20; Leah 
Bernadette Hodges, 19; Ronald Ailsworth, 21; Donald Guyton, 22; Charles Scott, 20; 
William Cloud, 18; Isaac Edwards, III, 28; Milton O. Martin, 27; Elaine Young, 22; 
Tyrone Edwards, 19; and Alton Edwards, 21, became known as the Panther Twelve. The 
Panthers were defended by lawyer Lolis Elie—a Black lawyer with a long history of 
defending Blacks who chose to challenge white oppression. Born in 1930, Elie 
experienced the harsh environment of segregated New Orleans. In high school, he 
attended the Gilbert Academy, a school that produced many of the city’s Black leaders. 
Encouraged by a friend to be an attorney while in the military, Elie went on to receive his 
law degree from Loyola University of New Orleans in 1959. After finishing school, Elie 
made a career by defending members of CORE and Deacons for Defense and Justice of 
Bogalusa, Louisiana. In 1979, Elie would call himself a Black nationalist and believed 
that the “collective white man is an evil person.” The Panther Twelve case was a logical 
extension of his previous work.45  
The Panther Twelve of New Orleans, however, walked into a courtroom that 
differed distinctly in composition from the courtrooms Black Panther members and 
general members of the Black community faced across the country. To be sure, they 
made local “judicial history.” The first Black Criminal District Court Judge in New 
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Orleans, Israel M. Augustine, Jr., presided over the trial and ten Blacks and two whites 
sat in the jury box. A Black man was even the alternate juror.46  
The trial lasted six days with many NOPD officers taking the stand as witnesses 
and the Panther defense team presenting their arguments. The central question of the trial 
revolved around whether or not the Panthers fired first. One of the police captains’ of the 
NOPD testified “that some of the men under his command…began firing before he gave 
the order to do so.” Certainly, this is not a far-fetched possibility as the FBI’s 
counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) and the local police propaganda 
demonizing the “revolutionaries” surely influenced many of the police officers’ attitudes 
about the Panthers and conceivably caused them to jump the gun, figuratively and 
literally. In addition, one of the Panther attorneys, Lolis Elie, argued that the Panthers 
fired in self-defense because they honestly assumed that the police were there to murder 
them as they did Fred Hampton in Chicago in 1969 and numerous other Panthers across 
the country.47 
Nevertheless, the highlight of the court proceedings occurred when Louisiana 
Governor John McKeithan’s voice filled the air of the courtroom. McKeithan’s voice 
came from a subpoenaed tape-recording. The tape contained a conversation between 
Gov. McKeithan and Police Supt. Giarrusso that captured McKeithan’s attitude towards 
the Panthers. He said, “I feel like it’s absolutely imperative that we will not let the 
Panthers get any kind of foothold in our state…I think we should hit them right between 
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the eyes right now.”48 This established that the police were likely to use every measure 
possible to rid the city of the Panthers, which would include shooting first at the 
September 15 shootout. 
On August 13, 1971, after twenty-four days of jury selection and six days in the 
courtroom, the jury brought in a verdict after only thirty minutes of deliberation. Kenneth 
Weaver, one of two whites on the jury, prefaced the unanimous verdict of not guilty by 
saying, “In the spirit of Martin Luther King,” as he passed the verdict to the bailiff. The 
jury passed down a not guilty judgment because the prosecution could not prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the Panthers fired first from their headquarters. Many in the 
majority Black galley “shouted for joy” after the verdict was read.49  
After the trial, the Panthers of New Orleans faded away from the headlines. In an 
attempt to consolidate power in Oakland, the Oakland chapter closed other branches and 
ordered them to deploy to Oakland. The remaining Panthers in New Orleans packed their 
bags. This strategy was controversial and ended in 1974 as the Houston comrades were 
called to the Bay Area to help Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown in mayoral and city council 
campaigns. Whereas the Houston Panthers exhibited excitement at the news of transfer, 
other members across the country expressed reservations about the change. Ollie 
Johnson, a political scientist, argued that “when the membership received the new 
directive from the Central Committee, many members refused to uproot their lives and 
move thousands of miles from home. These Panthers simply left the party.” The New 
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Orleans comrades experienced “shock and a disappointment.” The female Panthers from 
New Orleans found the ideals of the party regarding women different from the party’s 
daily reality. Marion Brown of the New Orleans chapter remembered their branch being 
more egalitarian. “Everybody was expected to pull their weight, male or female. It was 
not a sexist thing. We were ahead of our time.”50 
As the last of the Panthers relocated, the city seemingly succeeded in effectively 
silencing their dissenting voices until Mark Essex, not a Panther member, in January of 
1973, roared through the barrel of his gun on the rooftop of a downtown hotel that the 
revolutionary anger and vigor continued to simmer in the bosom of many Black women 
and men despite the possibility of severe police repression. Though the Panthers in New 
Orleans ceased to engage in highly publicized armed confrontations with the police, their 
sentiment still represented the mood of thousands of New Orleanians struggling against 
state sanctioned oppression. 
Conclusion 
 With the civil rights movement and the economic infrastructure that kept Black 
people poor, it should be rather easy for the reader to see that even though New Orleans 
was spared the costly race riots prevalent in other cities of the 1960s, the unacceptable 
conditions and the overall political economy of New Orleans led many New Orleanians, 
especially the Desire residents, to connect with the Panthers in profound ways that they 
were willing to put their lives on the line for them. In New Orleans, as in other urban 
centers across the nation, the contradictions appeared in every sector and institution of 
                                                
50 Jones, “Arm Yourself or Harm Yourself,” 33-34; Arend and Jeffries, “The Big Easy,” 
265-266. 
 142 
society. The school system kept Black people mis-educated and culturally mis-oriented; 
the healthcare system kept Black people sick; the economic system kept Black people 
well below the poverty level; and the criminal justice system constantly doled out 
injustice, which included the Panther victory in court. In a slick way, officials absorbed 
militants in court battles as a strategy to keep them from doing “subversive” work in the 
community.  
Some still might contend that indeed justice was served for the Panthers who were 
all acquitted for their alleged crimes, but one must take into consideration that one small 
“victory” in court did not alleviate the suffering of the New Orleanians languishing at the 
bottom of the political and economic system. Nonetheless, the Black Panther Party, for 
many Black New Orleanians, symbolized their taking back their womanhood and 
manhood; their standing up instead of lying down; their strength instead of weakness. 
Even though the Panthers’ stay in New Orleans was short lived, late 1969 to 1971, and 
not many concrete changes can be said to have emanated from their presence, these 
strong brothers and sisters gave hope to the hopeless; so much hope that they faced the 




“By the Grace of Malcolm, I Am a New African:” 
Mark Essex, Black Power and the Politics of Racial Violence 
 
Introduction 
On the chilly afternoon of January 7, 1973, Mark Robert James Essex found 
himself in a fight for his life, his freedom, and his manhood. After climbing eighteen 
flights of stairs, Essex let loud booms from a .44 magnum carbine announce his presence 
and deadly intent to the world. “No one dared walk on the streets near the hotel, which is 
about five blocks from the city’s famous French Quarter,” said a New Orleans Times-
Picayune writer. “Hundreds of police cars, fire trucks and ambulances were parked at 
nearby intersections, serving as cordons for crowds, refuges for victims and cover for 
policemen.”1 Television cameras rolled and brave reporters risked life and limb to report 
a story more sensational than hosting the Super Bowl and more terrifying than the 
monster, Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Hundreds of police and self-appointed vigilantes 
converged on downtown New Orleans to stop the “terrible thunder” reigning death upon 
the “Big Easy,” while some Black residents cheered the unknown gunman every time he 
took a shot at whites or policemen.   
 As smoke bellowed from several rooms of the 18-floor Howard Johnson Motor 
Lodge and a Vietnam plane circled the top of the motel awaiting a sight of the sniper or 
snipers, New Orleans came to a stand still. The sight of a combat plane hovering in the 
cold night sky made New Orleans look more like a war-zone than a growing metropolitan 
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city readying to welcome the Louisiana Superdome. Even though New Orleans failed to 
have a major confrontation with the police outside the Black Panther shootout in 
September of 1970 or have a large violent rebellion that was characteristic of other urban 
cities across the nation during the black power era, Mark Essex’s one-man rebellion, 
which carried forth the legacy of Black violence in response to Black oppression, merits 
attention, and gives insight into the overall unorganized and ad-hoc character of Black 
Power in New Orleans.  
Legacy of Armed Resistance 
 In order to understand Mark Essex, we must understand the historical antecedents 
and the context, which molded Essex. History demonstrates that Essex was not an 
anomaly, but a part of a long tradition of armed resistance present within Black 
communities since Africans were brought to America. In Louisiana, particularly, many of 
the enslaved Africans brought from West Africa to work on plantations came from the 
Bambara ethnic group. This group, which possessed a great warrior tradition, frequently 
challenged the plantation system and developed rebel maroon societies in the 
swamplands of Louisiana.2   
 Insurrections and resistance upon plantations proved frequent. Enslaved Africans 
like Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner represent only a fraction of those 
who plotted, planned, strategized, or carried out rebellions during the period of 
enslavement. More than “250 insurrections were planned on North American soil from 
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the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century.” Though these numbers represent a lower 
frequency compared to other enslaved Africans within the Western Hemisphere, the 
insurrections that did occur speaks to the continued tradition of armed resistance to 
oppression and counters the faulty notion the enslaved Africans were simply too 
demoralized to fight back.3  
 During the Civil War between the North and South, armed Black soldiers took the 
opportunity to exact retribution on former masters who committed untold acts of brutality 
on their plantations. In one case, a regiment of Black Union soldiers on a mission for 
food and provisions in 1864, seized a plantation and captured the slaver responsible for 
the severe beatings of Black women on his plantation. The soldiers “stripped the slaver of 
his clothing, tied him to a tree, and administered twenty lashes.” When done, the soldiers 
turned over the whip to the women who continued to lash the slaver and reveled in their 
new freedom. The regiment demonstrated the power to protect these women because they 
were armed. Though they did not kill the owner, they certainly sent a message to white 
southerners that no longer would Black people take abuse without constant and periodic 
armed resistance.4 
To be sure, self-defense and retaliatory violence complimented the non-violent 
approach taken by Civil Rights organizations throughout the south. The history of the 
Deacons for Defense in Bogalusa, Louisiana provides a great example of a fairly typical 
response to oppression. Indeed, some would argue that “armed resistance is a human 
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response to oppression,” not an anomaly. Someone once said, “it is the fool who 
constantly gets beaten and pushed, but does not find within himself no impulse of 
retaliation.” In the post-World War II climate, Blacks throughout the United States found 
themselves resisting in a variety of ways in order to achieve social change. Armed 
resistance was never far from the surface even when the face of the movement promoted 
non-violence.  
Violence, rhetorical and real, permeated the Black Power Movement. From “bad-
taking” speeches to gun-toting Panthers, violent imagery dominated media depictions of 
Black Power advocates as a way to strike fear into the white public. Scholar Curtis Austin 
contends that this violent reputation had two major effects upon the movement, in 
general, and the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, in particular. One, the aggressive 
posturing of Black Power leaders intrigued thousands of Black men and women and 
moved them to join the struggle. In addition, “it served as a magnet for disaffected youth 
in America’s ghettos.” Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, founders of the Black Panther 
Party, deemed police brutality and excessive force against Black people as one of their 
top issues. In response, they armed themselves to protect their community and recruited 
those who experienced police harassment. Second, the hostile and antagonistic rhetoric 
placed a brighter spotlight on various organizations, which led to an increase in the police 
repression they experienced. Furthermore, with the rhetoric of revolution came 
surveillance and oppression from the federal government in the form of the FBI and its 
Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO). The assassinations of Black Panthers 
Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in 1969 along with the provoked murders of “Bunchy” 
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Carter and John Huggins represent only a small number of violent deaths suffered by the 
Black Panther Party that were in some way orchestrated by COINTELPRO policies and 
operatives. Though repression saturated the world of Black Power advocates, the violent 
talk and willingness to employ violence in the service of Black liberation was, according 
to Algerian psychiatrist and writer, Frantz Fanon, a “cleansing force. It frees the native 
from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and 
restores his self-respect.”5 
Though they are numerous, one of the best examples of self-defense and the 
employment of violence came from the Republic of New Africa (RNA)—a group whose 
main goal in 1968 was the establishment of an independent Black nation within America. 
In order to achieve that overarching goal, the RNA employed a three-ponged strategy: (1) 
they would hold a plebiscite or vote among African Americans to decide the “national 
status” of Blacks in America; (2) they would purchase five states in the South (Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina) to form the new country; (3) they 
would demand and receive reparations from the United States for it treatment of Blacks 
during the period of enslavement. The RNA’s plans sent alarm to government officials 
and local police throughout the country, who engaged the group violently several times. 
On March 29, 1969, the RNA found itself in a shootout and standoff with the Detroit 
Police Department. This resulted in the arrest of approximately 100-200 RNA members 
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for conspiracy to commit murder. Another shootout took place on August 18, 1971, at an 
RNA residence in Jackson, Mississippi. In its aftermath, one police lay dead and eleven 
RNA members were arrested on charges of murder and assault with a deadly weapon. To 
be sure, these overt efforts by authorities to repress political challenges and, in turn, the 
RNA commitment to self-defense encouraged some and terrified others.6   
Essex brought this legacy of armed resistance, retaliatory violence, self-defense, 
and the legacy of Robert Charles with him to the roof of the Howard Johnson. Mark 
Essex, tired of reading about whites and police killing Blacks with impunity and tired of 
only hearing the rhetoric of revolution, refused to remain quiet in the face of the Black 
genocide seemingly in vogue throughout the country. His identity as a new Afrikan 
required him to fight.7 
Essex Before the Rooftop 
 Mark Robert James Essex, known as “Jimmy” among friends was born on August 
12, 1949 in Emporia, Kansas. Emporia had a small population of twenty-eight thousand 
and an even smaller Black population, which only made up two percent of the population. 
Scarce professional opportunities pushed young Blacks into nearby cities to find work. 
Essex was the second child of Nellie and Mark Henry O’Dell Essex. The two had five 
children with all but one leaving Emporia for greener pastures. Mark Essex’s brother, 
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Benjamin, remained in Emporia, while another brother, Timothy, moved to Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa. His sisters Joyce and Penny married and relocated to Los Angeles and 
Waterloo, Iowa respectively. Reverend Chambers, pastor of the St. James Missionary 
Baptist Church, explains why young Blacks leave Emporia in this way. “They go to 
Kansas City, Topeka, or Colorado to find work. You can’t blame them. There are few 
jobs for them in Emporia and those that are available don’t pay much. There is a lot of 
unspoken prejudice here, and if you look you can see it in jobs, in housing, in education. 
The discrimination may be quiet, but it’s very real.”8 
Essex did not fit the profile of a would-be revolutionary in the town of Emporia. 
In fact, he was well liked around town and in school. According to his high school 
counselor, Robert Lodie, “[Essex] was an average student—just like millions who go 
through and one whom you’d never dream could get involved in something like this.”9 
The counselor even insinuated the Essex came from good family stock.  “The boy comes 
from a hard-working family. His mother who works with the local Head Start program 
and his father who is employed with a local packing establishment are good solid 
citizens.”10  
After graduating from high school in 1967, Essex enrolled at Kansas State 
University in Pittsburgh, Kansas, for the fall semester. During that semester, Essex signed 
up for mostly business and education classes; however, he only remained at that 
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university for one semester. The spring semester of 1968 found him at Labette 
Community Junior College in Parsons, Kansas where he pursued a similar curriculum 
that he started at Kansas State. On summer break in 1968, Essex enrolled at Kansas State 
Teacher’s College in his hometown of Emporia and returned to Labette in the fall, but 
never graduated from college. While at these different schools, Essex failed to take part 
in any radical student movement or join any Black organizations politicizing their college 
campus. In 1968, Black Power activity on college campuses dominated headlines. The 
fact that Mark Essex did not participate demonstrates that his level of awareness or 
consciousness of things was still pretty low. His naval experience would change that.11   
 Upon entering the United States Navy, Essex planned to become a dentist. Racism 
and discrimination, however, derailed his plan and revealed to him a side of American 
society he seldom witnessed or failed to comprehend in his small hometown. Enlisting on 
January 13, 1969, in Emporia on the advice of his father who served in the Army during 
World War II, Essex signed up for a four-year tour and arrived in San Diego in February. 
By April, he finished boot camp with an outstanding performance rating. Soon after, 
Essex enrolled in classes in “X-ray procedures, oral surgery, endodontics (root-canal 
work), perodontics (tooth decay), and prosthetics (tooth replacement) and quickly 
graduated from Dentist Technician School in July 15, 1969.12  
 Upon graduation, Essex was assigned to the Dental Clinic at the Naval Air Station 
at Imperial Beach, San Diego. Lieutenant Robert Hatcher, a young dentist who Essex 
worked under, recalled that Essex was “a good team man, sort of an all-American boy. In 
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those days he was just the nicest person in the world. He was concerned about everybody 
around him, concerned about learning his job…He was the kind of person I liked to have 
around, a happy-go-lucky kid who was very hard to get rattled.”13 
Even though Essex, an amateur mechanic, found himself constantly harassed as 
he traveled on and off the Naval base in his refurbished 1963 Chevrolet, his problems 
really began when he fought a white non-commissioned officer. “From that day on the 
name passed like a hot coal from one noncommissioned officer to the next. Essex. He 
became a marked man, a black who had struck an NCO, a white NCO.”14 Others 
suggested that he simply endure the discrimination in order to move up in rank and be in 
a position to terminate the plague of racial discrimination.15 In other words, other Black 
enlistees, family, and friends counseled Essex to bottle his feelings and attempt to change 
the system from within. However, during his stay at Imperial Beach, the young Essex 
began reading about the Black Power movement raging across the country and closely 
traced the activities of the Black Panther Party in the media.16 His new reading interest, 
the naked masculinity of the Black Panther Party, and a new friendship with Robert 
Frank, a militant from New Orleans who enlisted in 1969 as well, moved Essex toward a 
different consciousness and change in attitude.17 His sister, 22 year-old Penny Fox, said 
“After that (Navy), if he saw a starving black child on TV, he identified with it. If he saw 
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a black being harassed, he identified with him. His main goal was to change society, to 
give all people an equal chance.”18  
Likewise his religious views underwent modification. Reverend W. A. Chambers 
of St. James Baptist Church in Emporia “baptized [Essex] in religion when he was quite 
young,” but noticed a drastic change in Essex after his Naval experience. “When he came 
back [from the Navy],” Chambers said, “he was denouncing all this as a white man’s 
religion.” Essex’s views about religion were typical of the views held by young Blacks 
coming into a new political, cultural, and spiritual awareness in the 1960s.19  
The harassment pushed Essex to seek more firearms training while in the Navy. 
The firearms instructor who taught Essex said that, Essex “wanted to qualify as an expert 
but that after spending one afternoon firing forty rounds with a .45-caliber automatic, he 
left, never to return.”20 Maybe Essex received the basics that he needed for the purposes 
he harbored in his mind or maybe the harassment became too much before he could 
continue. Weeks later, in October of 1970, Essex went AWOL (Absent Without Leave) 
from the Imperial Beach Naval base and returned home to “think about what a black man 
has to do to survive.”21 He traveled by Greyhound back to Emporia with new questions 
on his mind. His parents and friends saw a change in the smiling, careless boy who left 
Emporia and returned a conscientious, serious man searching for an elusive Black 
manhood.  
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Essex returned to the Imperial Beach Naval base after a twenty-eight day 
unauthorized leave of absence on the sixteenth of November. Upon returning, Essex 
revealed to Dr. Hatcher his new thought process. He revealed his lack of hope that white 
attitudes would change. He saw that no matter what he and other Black Naval officers 
did, they kept “coming out on the bottom.” Essex ended the meeting with Dr. Hatcher by 
saying, “I don’t want to have anything more to do with the Navy.”22  
Court-martialed two months later on the fifteenth of January 1971, Mark Essex’s 
testimony divulged information about his motives to go AWOL. “I had to talk to some 
black people because I had begun to hate all white people,” he said. “I was tired of going 
to white people and telling them my problems and not getting anything done about it.”23 
The military judge sentenced Essex to “forfeit $90.00 pay per month for a period of two 
months,” reduced his pay to the grade of E-2, and limited his movement to the Naval Air 
Station for 30 days.24 In the end, the judge apparently sympathized with the emotional 
Essex. He recommended that the reduction in pay be suspended for a period of time and 
added that, “I feel that the prejudice issues that were raised by the defense, while not 
excusing your offense, do materially explain your actions.”25 
A month later, Essex found himself free from the discrimination he faced daily 
while in the Navy. After signing a document that conceded that he was looking for “an 
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administrative discharge for reason of unsuitability due to a character behavior disorder,” 
Essex was granted an early discharge on the eleventh of February.26  
Essex moved back to Emporia, Kansas. Outside of the fact that he purchased a .44 
caliber-magmum Ruger Deerslayer carbine from a local Montgomery Ward Outlet in 
April of 1972, not much is known about Essex’s movements or experiences between the 
time he was discharged from the Navy and his change of address to New Orleans in 
August of 1972. His sister, Penny, however, gave reporters a glimpse into the mind of the 
changed Essex. “It would really hurt Jimmy to see and hear on the news about little black 
kids starving. He didn’t want to see kids grow up to be oppressed by the white man,” she 
said. “He wanted to make the world better for them. He really believed in the black 
revolution…he wanted to change it himself, not wait another 500 years.” She painted the 
picture of an impatient Essex, ready to die for Black children and those unborn.27  
After returning from a four-to-six week trip to New York to visit an old Navy 
friend and shortly before his twenty-third birthday on August 12, the former sailor loaded 
his “old Chevrolet with clothes, cooking utensils, and books, he drove onto the Kansas 
Toll Road and headed south.”28 Essex met with another Naval friend, Robert Frank, on 
the west bank of New Orleans. Experiencing difficulties in the Navy like his friend, 
Essex, Robert Frank was given a general discharge “under honorable conditions” in April 
of 1971, and shortly thereafter returned to New Orleans.29 
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In the month of December, Essex continued to provide different faces to different 
people. He wore the mask for some and disclosed his true mindset to others. On the one 
hand, in a letter to his mother in December, Essex explicitly divulged that he had made a 
decision that could end his young life. Nevertheless, he did not seem the least bit phased 
by the decision, but seemed a warrior destined to fight and die for the abstract idea of 
Black manhood. “Africa, this is it mom,” Essex started. “It’s bigger than you and I, even 
bigger than god. I have now decided that the white man is my enemy. I will fight to gain 
my manhood or die trying.” He signed off, “Love Jimmy.”30 On the other hand, Essex 
enjoyed Christmas dinner with a fellow student and friend Irvin Eggerson, but revealed 
none of his plans. Eggerson later described Essex as “being mild-mannered and that to 
his knowledge Essex did not believe in any revolutionary cause and that he did not 
belong to any militant or subversive organizations.”31 Essex certainly understood that he 
could not reveal his true self to anyone who he deemed untrustworthy, as they would 
probably disclose his plan to authorities. However, if he did tell anyone of his intent, they 
did not inform the police in advance. Instead, Essex attempted to put the city on notice 
that something would happen on December 31st, 1972. They failed to listen.  
Essex sent a letter to the local news station WWL spelling out his intentions for 
that day. The letter, however, would remain unopened until the sixth of January 1973. 
“Africa greets you,” Essex began the letter. “On Dec. 31, 1972 appt 11 the Downtown 
New Orleans Police Dept. will be attack…Reason—many. But the deaths of two innocent 
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brothers will be avenged. And many others…P.S. Tell Pig Gurrusso (sic) the felony 
action squad ain’t shit.” The letter was signed, Mata, a Swahili word for weapon.32 In the 
letter, Essex reveals his target, the police, and gives a glimpse into one of the main 
motivational factors for his actions, police brutality and the unjust killing of Black men 
and women.  
In addition to the countless names of Blacks harassed and killed by police bullets 
or clubs each year, the murder of Denver Smith and Leonard Brown at Southern 
University in Baton Rouge in November of 1972 could be called the proverbial stick that 
“broke the camel’s back.” These were the two innocent brothers he mentioned in his 
letter to the news station.  
Manhood or Death 
On December 31, 1972, lying in bushes outside the New Orleans Central Lockup 
located on the corner of Tulane and Broad, Mark Essex began his one-man rebellion. 
Though Essex clearly harbored an intense love of Black people, his first victim was a 
Black man like himself. Essex shot Alfred Harrell, a nineteen year-old cadet for less than 
a year, through the chest. The bullet then traveled and hit Lieutenant Horace Perez in the 
ankle. One of the few Blacks “enrolled in the work-study program that led to the Police 
Academy and a patrolman’s shield,” newly-married Harrell found himself in the wrong 
place at the wrong time and died that cold night at Central Lock-up. He left behind a 
young wife and a nine-month old son, but his family was not eligible for the pension plan 
because he failed to reach commission status before his untimely death. Commission 
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starts when a Cadet reaches twenty years of age. “Both the federal and Louisiana 
governments offer sizeable payments to widows and children of officers killed in the line 
of duty,” but Harrell’s family would not receive such benefits.33  
After the first shootings at the central lockup, the New Orleans Police Department 
began to investigate several organizations in the city known for militant rhetoric and/or 
nationalistic leanings. The police identified four groups who expressed revolutionary 
views: the Republic of New Afrika, New Orleans Urban Guerrilla Group, the Black 
Panther Party, and the Maitreyan Temple. The Urban Guerrilla Group, the U.S. Secret 
Service office in New Orleans claimed, had been stockpiling weapons. It also contended 
that the Maitreyan Temple had “access to 200 pounds of C-4 (plastic) explosives.” 
Unable to definitively link Essex to any of these groups, the police and Secret Service 
dropped their investigation of these organizations for the moment.34  
Essex found himself on the run. He took cover in a church located at 1208 South 
Lopez Street. On January 1, 1973, at about 12:30 a.m., Reverend Sylvester Williams 
locked the doors to the First New St. Mark Baptist Church and headed home for the 
night. He returned to the sanctuary at 6:30 p.m. on the same day. Upon turning on the 
lights, Reverend Williams “saw a young negro male standing just inside one of the doors 
leading to the rear area of the church.” Their eyes met, but the mysterious man did not 
move towards Williams. Not sure of the young man’s motives, Williams quickly backed 
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out of the church and went to a neighbor’s house and called the police. Essex forced open 
a door at the back of the church and made his escape.35 
The next day, Essex walked into Joe’s Grocery at 4200 Erato Street. Essex, 
wearing an “Army fatigue-type uniform,” browsed around the store for about a minute 
before purchasing a razor and blades. He paid with a twenty-dollar bill and walked out of 
the store. Joe Perniciaro, however, noticed that Essex kept his left hand, which was 
wrapped in bloodstained bandage in his left jacket pocket the whole time he browsed and 
paid for the goods. Fearful that the man would return to rob him, Perniciaro contacted his 
friend Charles Willis who advised that they go to the police and report the incident in 
case the young man did return. Perniciaro obliged. NOPD Detective Emmett Dupas, 
made arrangements to meet with store-owner Joe Perniciaro, Charles Willis, and Darryl 
Davis, a fourteen year-old employee of Joe’s. Forty-five minutes after Essex left the 
store, Perniciaro, Willis, and Davis entered the Criminal Investigation Office and fielded 
questions from Detective Dupas about what they witnessed.36  
Perniciaro, understanding the tenuous relationship between police officers and his 
predominantly Black clientele, refused to give a written statement about the incident. It 
had scarcely been two and half years since the police attempted to eliminate the Black 
Panthers who were respected in the Desire area and police brutality continued to bash the 
heads of innocent and guilty Blacks alike. Following the interview, the three went home 
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praying that the incident was behind them and the mysterious young man would not come 
back.37 
Their prayers would go unanswered, because Essex returned to the church on 
South Lopez Street on Wednesday, January 3, 1973 to pray. Complaint Operator William 
Carstins in the Central Complaint Bureau took a call from an elderly Black woman 
claiming that the “subject the police were seeking for the shooting of police officers on 
New Year’s Eve was hiding in [the] church.”38  
After eluding the police for several days and hearing that Superintendent 
Giarrusso announced a $10,500 reward for “information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of the sniper or snipers,” Essex took the faithful steps that would eventually 
end his life. First, he returned to Joe’s Grocery. Not to rob the place, but to get revenge. It 
is not known how Essex obtained the information that Perniciaro went to the police 
station, but he paid another visit to Perniciaro’s store.39  
Determined to settle the score, Essex walked into Joe’s Grocery at about 10:30 
a.m., spotted Perniciaro and shot him in the shoulder before disappearing out of the door 
onto South Gayoso Street. At gunpoint, Essex stole the car of Marvin Albert and began 
driving toward the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge located on Loyola Avenue. Albert 
immediately phoned the police and reported his stolen 1968 Chevelle. Police Officer 
Philip Dominick responded to the scene, took Marvin Albert, the auto-theft victim, into 
his car and drove around the area in search of Essex. They spotted the vehicle at Broad 
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and Melpomene, but immediately lost it. Fifteen minutes after shooting Joe Perniciaro, 
Essex entered the parking garage at the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge traveling at a high 
rate of speed. He failed to take a ticket from the attendant who gave chase, but could not 
catch Essex in the stolen car. Essex abandoned the car on the fourth-level and re-
commenced his search to be heard. Indeed, the city and nation would listen, for a 
moment, to the rage a young Black man.40  
Essex entered the stairwell and raced up the stairs. He attempted to gain entry on 
the eighth and ninth floors, but maids rebuffed each attempt. They refused to answer his 
pleas for admission. He continued up the stairs and entered at the eighteenth floor. 
Spotted by employees and guests, Essex quickly made his intentions known to a Black 
housekeeper. “Don’t worry. I won’t hurt you,” he said. “I only want the whites.” He went 
on to shoot and kill Robert and Betty Steagall, a white couple on their honeymoon. He 
quickly moved into their room and set a phonebook on fire under the draperies. Essex 
started at least eight fires in this manner throughout the hotel. The fires spread from the 
drapes to the walls and furniture. This tactic also created the impression of more than one 
sniper in the building. Essex re-entered the stairwell and headed to the eleventh floor. 
Shooting the lock off, he entered. Meanwhile, fire engines were dispatched to deal with 
the fire blazing on the eighteenth floor.41 
After learning of a gunman on one of the floors upstairs, motel employees, Frank 
Schneider and Don Roberts, headed to the elevator. Exiting on the eleventh floor, 
Schneider and Roberts witnessed Essex attempting to ignite a fire. Their eyes met with 
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Essex’s and they began to flee. Essex fired several shots upon them. Roberts escaped, but 
one of Essex’s bullets struck Schneider in the back of the head. Essex moved to the tenth 
floor where he met Motel Manager Walter Collins. He shot Collins in the back and 
proceeded to the rooftop of the meeting rooms overlooking the motel’s swimming pool 
and then jumped down to the swimming pool patio itself. At this point, he shot motel 
guest Robert Beamish and entered room 826 and set a fire. Standing upon the balcony of 
room 826, Essex aimed and fired at Fire Lieutenant Tim Ursin, hitting him as he 
ascended a fire ladder to reach persons needing rescue in the upper floors.42  
As the shooting continued Superintendent Giarrusso, one of the targets Essex 
mentioned in his letter to WWL-TV, arrived on the scene and established a Command 
Post on the bottom floor of Howard Johnson Motor Lodge. Immediately after his arrival, 
Giarrusso received a report that officers located Essex’s stolen car on the fourth level and 
held it under surveillance. Essex, in an attempt to escape, made his way down the Gravier 
Street stairwell to find the stolen 1968 Chevelle closely guarded by police officers. He 
fired a desperate shot through the glass window at the police and retreated back up the 
stairs.  
Born on March 28, 1921, Giarrusso joined the force in 1949 after a stint in the 
Marine Corps. He came from a law-enforcement family, his “brother was a policeman, 
one of his daughters is married to a policeman and his nephew is a policeman.” Rising 
through the motorcycle division, Giarrusso moved to the narcotics bureau in 1954 and 
became a sergeant, then a lieutenant, and finally a captain in command of the narcotics 
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squad in 1968. All the while, he was studying at night to earn three degrees: a law degree 
from Loyola University and degrees in criminology and public business administration 
from Tulane.43  
An educated man, Giarrusso’s tenure as superintendent had been beset by crisis 
after crisis. Essex represented another. As he arrived on the scene the police had already 
blocked off streets around the hotel: Loyola to the west, Rampart to the east, Gravier to 
the north, and Perdido to the south. Giarrusso would not have a shortage of men willing 
to help defeat the sniper or snipers. An estimated 600 police would eventually be on the 
scene. They included state troopers, deputies from surrounding parishes, FBI agents and 
other federal officers. In addition, hundreds of citizens from across the south descended 
upon the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge to help stop the reign of thunder. Not all of them 
were trained marksmen. According to Major Thomas Drake, “It was unbelievable. Some 
of them were actually trying to load the bullets in the wrong places. If they had had to 
start shooting suddenly, they would have killed one another.”44  
Later, Mayor “Moon” Landrieu arrived at the Howard Johnson. The mayor, after 
learning of the shootings, “drove across the twenty-four-mile-long Lake Pontchartrain 
Causeway from Covington, Louisiana, where he was conducting a staff meeting at a 
Catholic retreat home.” Landrieu desired to go directly to the hotel as soon as he reached 
the city, but Supt. Giarrusso cautioned against that. Nevertheless, when the firing 
subsided for a moment, Mayor Landrieu and two members of his staff jumped into a car 
and headed for the motor lodge. Once there, Landrieu and staff immediately found the 
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command post and offered their services to the superintendent. Landrieu proffered many 
suggestions, but never countermanded the orders of Giarrusso. When Richard Kernion, a 
councilman who rode with Landrieu, asked how he could help, Giarrusso quickly 
expressed that he needed the blueprints for the Howard Johnson, because he did not know 
the building or where the snipers could hide. After a brief search of the eighth floor 
workroom produced no blueprints, Mayor Landrieu arranged for City Hall to be opened 
where an extra copy of the blueprints were held in the Building and Permits office. 
Giarrusso finally had the blueprints.45 
While Giarrusso and Landrieu brainstormed in the command post on the bottom 
floor, Essex continued to rain bullets from various locations on the upper floors of the 
motor lodge and then entered the Perdido Street stairwell in order to gain access to the 
roof, but failed because the door was secured with a chain. As he descended down the 
stairs, Deputy Superintendent Louis Sirgo led a group of officers up the same stairwell in 
an attempt to rescue a fellow officer.46 
Months before leading officers into the stairwell to find snipers and rescue fallen 
officers, Sirgo made an address to a national honor society, within which he called the 
treatment of Blacks, “the greatest sin of American society.” He posed a practical question 
to his listeners and refreshed their memories about the two police standoffs with the 
Black Panthers in the fall of 1970, “…how successful would a Black Panther breakfast 
program be in Metairie, or any of the other exclusive suburbs of New Orleans? What I 
am trying to say is that if there were no ‘Desires’ there would be no Panthers. We must 
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face up to our responsibility…we must also be prepared to deal with the greatest sin of 
American society, and that is the status of the American Negro.” He also warned his 
fellow citizens and office holders around the city that “we can no longer hide our 
problems in prison cages, or in federally subsidized low-rent housing developments…I 
suggest that we begin to think about doing something about the responsibilities of the 
office which we hold, and if we don’t, then the problem, like a contagious malady, will 
destroy us.”47 
That rage or problem Sirgo attempted to warn New Orleans about appeared in the 
person of Mark Essex, who would indeed destroy Sirgo and many others. Essex shot 
Sirgo as he and the officers reached the sixteenth floor landing. With one gunshot wound 
to the back, fellow officers carried Sirgo back down the stairs. He would later die at 
Charity Hospital, only blocks away from the motor lodge. The bullet torn through his 
“left lung, liver, right kidney, and broke the vertebral column.”48 
When the officers vacated the sixteenth floor landing, Essex quickly descended 
the stairs, entered the sixteenth floor accommodations area, ran down the hallway to the 
Gravier Street stairway, ascended the stairs and entered the roof. After firing on and 
wounding a police officer who entered the rooftop, Essex ran to the Gravier Street 
cubicle while returning fire to deputies who opened fire without permission. It is reported 
that Essex could be heard screaming from the roof, “Free Africa! Come on up pigs.” 
Others heard him say, “It’s a revolution.”49  
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Through screaming revolutionary slogans, Essex continued to fire, terrifying 
some and exhilarating others. A crowd of Black people gathered at different places along 
the police barricades. Some actually sat on the tops of their cars to get a better view. With 
each boom from Essex’s .44-magnum rifle, there were cheers of “Right on” and chants of 
“Kill the pigs. Kill the pigs.” When the gunfire increased, the crowd grew louder. Some 
yelled, “Hang on, baby. When it gets dark, we gonna help you.”50  
Certainly, Mark Essex endeavored to spark a massive revolt among Black people 
in New Orleans and throughout the country, but his rage failed to spark a collective 
movement. Despite the fact that most Blacks failed to respond to Essex’s call in a 
revolutionary way, Joseph Murphy, Jr., seemed to heed the call and attempted to help, but 
he did not succeed. Murphy entered the parking garage of the motor lodge about five 
o’clock pm wearing a jacket similar to those wore by police officers, but without the 
police shoulder insignia. However, Murphy, who according to a police report looked 
suspicious, was stopped by two Jefferson Parish Deputies and questioned. When asked 
why he was at the motor lodge, Murphy responded, “to get the sniper.” He later told 
police that he had been a member of the Republic of New Afrika, a revolutionary 
provisional government, and that he knew the sniper on the roof. This writer believes that 
Murphy was there to help Essex carry out his mission and not to aid the police. The 
officers arrested Murphy on the spot after he refused to cooperate any further. They, too, 
doubted Murphy’s story, while they allowed hundreds of whites to find positions in order 
to get a shot at the sniper. Subsequent investigations failed to establish a link between 
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Murphy and Essex and revealed that Murphy had been arrested six times prior for, among 
other charges, vagrancy, DWI, and a concealed weapon.51 
As the afternoon raced into evening, Giarrusso, like the whites seventy-three 
years earlier, searched for a way to end the standoff with the sniper or snipers. By this 
time, Essex made his way into one of the concrete “cubicles” upon the roof near the 
Gravier Street stairwell. The cubicle, eight feet high and eight feet wide, provided the 
cover that Essex needed. From this position, Essex would run out of the cubicle fire a 
couple of rounds and dart back into his hiding place. Once Giarrusso received a radio 
report that the sniper was hiding in a “cubbyhole” on the roof, he ordered that the police 
attempt to “put a hole in that thing” with their bullets. Immediately, hundreds of bullets 
pelted the cubicle, but that did not deter Mark Essex. Officers, still holed up in the 
stairwell, reported hearing Essex continue to scream, “Africa! Africa!”52 
Giarrusso, tired of getting conflicting reports about how many snipers were on the 
roof and their positioning, ordered a helicopter from the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office 
and the Coast Guard. He just wanted to “get somebody up in the air to find out what’s 
going on, on that roof.” Later, Giarrusso learned that the Coast Guard helicopter was 
unable to fly because of the “low ceiling and poor visibility.” Giarrusso thought the 
helicopter furnished by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office would provide the needed 
intelligence. With a deputy with a deer rifle aboard, the two-seat “bubble” helicopter took 
off and headed towards downtown. Upon seeing the helicopter, Essex ran from the 
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cubicle and fired several shots at the metal bird. Giarrusso immediately ordered the 
helicopter grounded because the “bulging plexiglass cockpit was too inviting a target.”53  
Though the Coast Guard helicopter was unable to fly and the Jefferson Parish 
Sheriff’s office helicopter provided an easy target, Giarrusso refused to give up hope of 
having a helicopter help to end the violent standoff. A Vietnam-scarred helicopter piloted 
by thirty-seven year old Lieutenant Colonel Charles Pitman arrived from the Marine Air 
Reserve flight hangar at Calendar Field to render the desired services. After landing in a 
parking lot near the Superdome, Pitman slowly made his way, on foot, to the Howard 
Johnson to receive instructions. Once there, he met Chief of Police Giarrusso and Mayor 
“Moon” Landrieu. After brief introductions, Giarrusso said, “What I would like you to do 
is to take that armored helicopter of yours up and go up and shoot it out with them.” 
Colonel Pitman quickly informed Giarrusso that his helicopter was outfitted with 
armored plates over the two engines and the flight-control closet only. In addition, 
Pitman made Giarrusso aware of the fact that he could only “provide an observation 
platform for your men, I can’t shoot, except in defense of the helicopter.” Following a 
short discussion, Giarrusso said, “What I would like you to do then is to take a team of 
policemen up and look around up there. If my men get a chance to shoot at him, they 
will.” Pitman agreed to the plan.54  
With four policemen aboard and Colonel Pitman in the cockpit, the army-green 
Vietnam helicopter with white writing on the side took off in the rain, fog, and cold and 
headed to the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge. The time was 5:30 p.m. Grey clouds 
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blocked the sun already low on the horizon. The helicopter meandered through the fog-
covered sky until the roof of the motor lodge became visible. On his first pass, Pitman 
adjusted the spotlight mounted under the helicopter and light flooded the cubicle on the 
roof. The police aboard saw nothing; however, Essex fired upon the helicopter as it flew 
away from the motor lodge in preparation for another pass. The helicopter would make a 
total of forty-two passes before it completed its mission.  
Mark Essex survived the barrage of bullets from the mounted officers in the 
helicopter that bombarded the cubicle and blasted holes in its walls for two hours. In the 
meantime, Giarrusso and others discussed a myriad of tactics to bring a resolution to the 
stalemate. They discussed using “hand grenades, rifle grenades, concussion grenades…, 
[a] .50-caliber machine guns on the helicopter and a…flame-thrower.” The flame-thrower 
arrived the next morning, but malfunctioned and the other tactics did not materialize for 
fear of collapsing the entire building.  Nonetheless, ideas kept flowing. Giarrusso even 
sent a Black police officer to talk the snipers into surrendering. “You, up there. I’m a 
police officer. We don’t want to kill you. We’d like to talk to you,” the cop said into a 
bullhorn at the top of the Gravier Street stairwell. “What do you say, brother? Why not 
save yourself? Give up before it’s too late…If you’re wounded, we can get you medical 
help.” Essex refused to move. Indeed, he yelled, “Fuck you. Power to the people.”55 
Pitman, who grounded the aircraft several times throughout the night to refuel and 
strategize, made lift off for his fourth flight of the night. As Pitman adjusted the spotlight 
and steered the helicopter near the roof, Essex ran out and fired upon the helicopter, 
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hitting it right above the cockpit before running back to the cubicle. The police 
immediately began to shoot once Pitman maneuvered the aircraft into shooting position. 
Pitman said, “Somebody may have hit him in the back as he was trying to climb up that 
pipe.” Whatever the case, Essex made his last stand and opted for “revolutionary 
suicide.” After crouching in the cubicle for a few seconds, Essex sprinted from the 
cubicle with his Black fist up in revolutionary salute and fired his rifle from his waist 
with one hand. “He took two or three steps before we opened up. I hit him a whole clip 
from the thighs to the neck,” said Sergeant Saacks, one of the officers aboard the 
helicopter. “The bullets caught him and held him up, sort of like when you shoot at a pie 
plate and keep it rolling.” Needless to say, Essex dropped his .44 caliber-magmum Ruger 
Deerslayer carbine as bullets ripped through his small frame. 56 
While he lay dying upon the frigid roof, many, shooting from the surrounding 
buildings, pumped more lead into Essex’s now lifeless body. Another similarity to the 
Robert Charles shootout. After a nine-hour ordeal where several police officers were 
slain, the “volunteer guns” finally beheld their “chance to do something, to fight back.” 
Those who traveled from as far as Alabama and Texas wanted some action. Some even 
cheered as Essex fell, “Yeah, now we got you, you sonofabitch. Die, you goddamn 
bastard. Die!” Others had to be restrained after they emptied their clip and started to 
reload. “He’s dead, man. He’s dead,” others shouted to their overzealous friends. Their 
wanton firing showed up later as the autopsy received that Essex’s body housed more 
than 200 bullets.   
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More Snipers? 
Even though the official police report, released in August of 1973, surmised that 
Mark Essex acted alone, Giarrusso and others, at the time of the standoff, believed firmly 
that two or three persons helped Essex carry out his mission. Giarrusso, working from 
that assumption, ordered Essex’s rifle “broken to pieces” so that no other sniper on the 
roof could use it. Many criticized his decision claiming that the rifle could be used as 
bait. Others said that destroying the rifle destroyed valuable evidence. Because he 
received numerous reports that officers could hear other snipers, Giarrusso stood firmly 
behind the decision.57  
Giarrusso and his men were not alone in thinking that there were more snipers. A 
news reporter reported hearing a man on the roof shout, “I’m still here!” at four a.m. 
Monday morning, long after bullets riddled Essex’s body. Also, sniper victim Robert 
Blemish refused to believe that the man police killed on the roof was indeed the man that 
shot him in the stomach. “I was more interested on the rifle actually,” Blemish said, “but 
they’ll never convince me that the guy that shot me was the guy they shot on the roof.” 
According to Blemish, his attacker wore a goatee, stood four inches taller than Mark 
Essex, and shot him with a smaller caliber bullet.58  
The police finally assaulted the roof early Monday morning. Standing shoulder to 
shoulder in front of the boiler room, the cops, in plain sight of several news cameras, 
trained their guns towards the doors thinking another sniper hid there. After hearing a 
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phantom gunshot, someone yelled, “He’s shooting.” Immediately, they unloaded their 
guns at the doors, but when the smoke cleared, nine policemen were injured from their 
own ricocheting bullets. After this embarrassment, weary policemen in very cold weather 
made worst by twenty-mile-per-hour-winds searched the motor lodge and the air-
conditioning ducts thoroughly, but their search revealed no snipers.59  
Popular myth among Black New Orleanians maintains that Mark Essex had help. 
The Black Panther Party, however, praised Essex for his ability to stand-alone with only a 
rifle and determination. In the January 20, 1973 edition of the Black Panther newspaper, 
a Black Panther writer commented that, “the arrogant police and city officials did not 
believe that one Black man could immobilize 700 heavily armed police and bring the 
metropolis of New Orleans to a standstill.” Whether or not Mark Essex acted alone or in 
concert with others will probably remain a mystery that historians and other will continue 
to discuss. To be sure, Essex’s memory brings to the surface intense feelings both 
negative and positive. In the end, he killed nine and wounded several others.60  
Essex’s Apartment 
A thorough search of Essex’s apartment and interviews with his mother provided 
a rare glimpse into the mind of the man who, as it said on one of his apartment walls, 
“dare[d] to struggle. Dare[d] to win.” It also revealed a secluded man, with a lone-wolf 
mentality. Essex clearly held Malcolm X, the patron-saint of the Black Power Movement, 
in high esteem. Officials discovered a patch, red, black, and green in color, embroidered 
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with the words, “By the grace of Malcolm, I am a new African.”61 For many Black youth 
of the sixties and seventies, Malcolm represented the virulent Black masculinity that they 
yearned to express and embody, but was denied. The Black Panther Party for Self-
Defense, the US Organization, the Republic of New Afrika, the Revolutionary Action 
Movement, and countless other groups cited Malcolm as one of their main influences.  
While it is not known whether or not Essex had Cultural Nationalist leanings62, 
several elements around his apartment demonstrated his affinity for his African ancestry. 
On one wall was the one word, Africa, written very largely. “The quest for freedom is 
death—then by death I shall escape to freedom” was written within the giant C of the 
word Africa. In addition, throughout the apartment, words from a variety of African 
languages appeared on the walls. For example, Mata, in Swahili, is a plural noun meaning 
a native shooting weapon, bow and arrow. Pangolin is an animal living in the Congo and 
has a sacred symbolic meaning to the people of that country. Obaluba-luba refers to an 
ethnic group in the Eastern Congo. The word Baluba would mean “people of the Luba 
tribe” and Baba means father.63  
It is obvious that Essex read many books as he waited for the right time to 
explode. One of the books that officials found was Black Rage, which was published in 
1968 by two Black psychiatrists, William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, and tells of the 
“desperation, the conflicts and the anger of the Black man’s life in America today.” In a 
shocking case of irony, the fourth chapter called, “Acquiring Manhood” was torn out of 
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the book when officials found it and if that is not enough, it begins with a story about a 
boy named, Jimmy. The authors told the Mark Essex story years before Essex climbed to 
the top of the Howard Johnson and on the last page of the book, penned a telling warning 
to America.  
For there are no more psychological tricks blacks can play upon themselves to 
make it possible to exist in dreadful circumstances. No more lies can they tell 
themselves. No more dreams to fix on. No more opiates to dull the pain. No more 
patience. No more thought. No more reason. Only a welling tide risen out of all 
those terrible years of grief, now a tidal wave of fury and rage, and all black, 
black as night.64 
For Essex, the lies were exposed, the dream found to be a nightmare, and the patience, he 
realized, only prolonged death. His battle for freedom and manhood ended as he shouted 
his message from a rooftop. 
Aftermath 
Essex’s search for manhood ended upon the Howard Johnson roof on a cold and 
rainy January night in 1973. For some, his death brought sadness and a quiet admiration 
much like the case of Robert Charles. For others, his death brought relief and anxiety. In 
this way, Essex represents the quintessential American historical figure, applauded in 
some circles, despised in others.  
Officials flew Essex’s bullet riddled body to Wichita, Kansas, and drove it to 
Emporia, Kansas for the funeral rites. Covered with red carnations with a ribbon that 
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read, Jimmy, the coffin also bared the red, black, and green flag symbolizing Black 
freedom from oppression. More than two-hundred people filled the St. James Church and 
gave Essex a hero’s burial according to some spectators. Indeed, Essex came to embody a 
hero and a strong symbol of revolutionary courage for many Black militants and citizens 
of New Orleans. One pallbearer raised his Black high in the sky and said, “Up go our 
arms, for today we have found freedom from our bonds.” Stokely Carmichael, later 
known as Kwame Ture, said that Essex had taken the struggle to a new level, the level of 
science. “The slavery and oppression that we face in this country gave rise to the Black 
liberation struggle. Our struggle has won many victories and suffered some setbacks,” 
said the Black Panther newspaper. “Is has been hindered and divided and has come under 
many forms of attack from white America, but it cannot be stopped.” One Black leader in 
New Orleans said, “I’m not going to condone or condemn what happened. There’s a little 
of Mark Essex in all of us.” Larry Jones, a community organizer in New Orleans, refused 
to label Essex crazy or extremist. Instead he argued that many residents in the St. Bernard 
housing projects viewed Essex as a hero because “he attacked a repressive system.” In 
the words of two white journalists, “Essex is a heroic figure for jobless young blacks in 
New Orleans.” In truth, several Black leaders felt Black “resentment has been building up 
and may explode into violence and civil disorder, if the fuse is lighted by an appropriate 
incident.” They waited uneasily to see if Essex lit a fire under the usually passive 
masses.65 
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Whites, however, held a different view of the man. While some Blacks found 
strength in the resolve of Essex, Mayor “Moon” Landrieu contended that the shootout 
was “perhaps the most tragic criminal act in the history of this city.” Senator Eastland of 
Mississippi declared, “Congress must act immediately to make attacks on law 
enforcement officers a federal crime and restore the death penalty for killing lawmen.” 
He was not alone in demanding stronger penalties for such crimes. In fact, letters poured 
into Mayor Landrieu’s office from all over the country with advice on how to handle 
such situations. One letter suggested that New Orleans residents demand the right to have 
a “helicopter corps” to aid the police and fire departments in emergence circumstances. 
Another letter came from a disgruntled New Yorker on January 8, 1973. In the letter, the 
writer divulged that white New Yorkers experienced “more and more abuse from these 
Niggers up here” and then continued on to give Landrieu a strong recommendation to 
solve he present problem, “I say, build concentration camps like Nazi Germany and put 
these Niggers in it and keep them there.” The unnamed writer pointed his anger at all 
Blacks, not just the ones fighting oppression. Letters like this one and several other 
similar letters sent to Landrieu in the days following Essex’s rebellion demonstrate the 
underlying hostilities many whites harbored covertly about all Blacks in America, 
revolutionary or not.66  
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Yet, Council President James A. Moreau proffered the theory that the Essex 
incident was “just typical of the unrest that militants, regardless of creed or color, are 
trying to stir up in this country. Until people realize that when they violate the law they 
are going to pay the penalty it will continue.” Unlike Moreau, Superintendent Giarrusso 
announced to reporters that he never thought about Black people rising up as a response 
to the Essex stimulant. “At no time did I think that,” he said. “This is a racially 
sophisticated city…No, I wasn’t concerned about a revolution, not at all. I was just 
interested in getting whoever was up on that roof.” Nevertheless, a moment with Black 
school-children would unsettle the confident Giarrusso and demonstrated that no matter 
how “sophisticated” the city was, there would be some who would fight against the 
sophisticated oppression. Reportedly, a young Black child told the superintendent “I 
think I could do what the sniper did. But I don’t hate enough yet.” “That scared the hell 
out of me,” Giarrusso said. “It still does.”67 
Giarrusso’s comments about not being “concerned about a revolution, not at all,” 
reveals a great deal about the personality of the city. To be sure, great alienation existed 
in New Orleans, but the Black people, living in mostly “salt and pepper” neighborhoods 
with whites, never struck out against whites as a group. In fact, the opening of the 
political system and the emergence of neighborhood political organizations like SOUL, 
COUP, and BOLD muted the call for systemic changes. 
Conclusion 
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In conclusion, the Essex episode, little-known to most outside the city of New 
Orleans and misinterpreted by television crime shows, epitomized the ad-hoc nature of 
the Black struggle in New Orleans. In addition, the fact that Essex essentially acted alone 
pays tribute to the fact that the police succeeded by engaging and ultimately lessening the 
influence of Black organizations like the Black Panther Party in the Black community. 
The Party’s organizational apparatus collapsed with the help of COINTELPRO (Counter 
Intelligence Program) relegating potential revolutionaries to their own thoughts and plans 
without the input of others. It could be argued that if Essex was a part of a revolutionary 
organization, his rage may have manifested itself in a less lethal way. The Panthers in 
New Orleans offered several beneficial survival programs to the Black community, but 
none involved directly attacking the system as Essex did.  Yet, after examining the 
rhetoric and actions of several revolutionary sects, Essex could have easily found that 
their philosophies or lack of direct confrontation disappointing. He endeavored to provide 
a spark that alighted others and fueled a serious revolutionary effort.  
Essex teaches us what extreme alienation mixed with a political consciousness 
produces within this society. Instead of directing his rage towards Blacks like so many 
alienated Black women and men across the country, Essex identified the source that 
denied him a sense of manhood and attempted to force them to recognize it through the 





“To Build An Alternative Institution:” 




In the late 1960s and early 70s, independent Black institutions sprang from the 
energy of the Freedom Schools connected to the Civil Rights Movement, the burgeoning 
Black independent school movement, the memory of independent institutions, which 
proliferated after the Civil War, and the cultural nationalism that pointed toward cultural 
affirmation and away from integration. At its base, Ahidiana was a Black cultural 
nationalist organization in New Orleans similar to and informed by the US Organization 
started by Maulana Ron Karenga in Los Angeles after the Watts Rebellion in 1965. 
Historian Scot Brown and others define Black cultural nationalism as “the view that 
African Americans possess a distinct aesthetic, sense of values, and communal ethos 
emerging from either, or both, their contemporary folkways and continental African 
heritage.” Though not the only organization to espouse cultural nationalism as its 
prominent ideology in the radical explosion during the 1960s and 70s, Karenga and US 
positioned itself at the forefront of the movement by explicitly articulating its brand of 
Black cultural nationalist politics and culture. It developed the Kawaida Philosophy 
(US’s revolutionary ideology of social change), Kwanzaa (a seven-day holiday observed 
from December 26 until January 1), and the Nguzo Saba (seven principles). The last two 
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have become widely known and celebrated throughout the world. Indeed, Kwanzaa, in 
some eyes, have become too commercialized.1  
Born in 1941 in Parsonsburg, Maryland, Ronald Everett, later known as Maulana 
Karenga, migrated to Los Angeles after high school in 1958. He honed his leadership 
skills at Los Angeles City College and became the school’s first Black student-body 
president. Through intensive study of African culture and history, Karenga realized the 
importance of African Americans developing an identity connected to their culture as 
opposed to an outside culture or the culture of their oppressor. According to Karenga, 
“the reason why the Black man is such a weak-minded person, why he is so easily led by 
the White man is because he has no standards, no culture. He doesn’t understand love of 
Black people because he’s a slave-minded person. He can only love his master, and as 
much attempts as he makes, unless he is imbued with cultural values…he will never be 
able to do that.” Ahidiana members connected with these ideas and incorporated them 
into their organization and its school.2 
Historically, cultural nationalist currents that emphasized independent education 
as a way to unshackle the mind of false and detrimental concepts have flowed throughout 
communities of Black people for decades. Formerly enslaved Africans developed 
educational systems “singularly appropriate to defend and extend their emancipation.” 
The founders of these institutions intended to control their lives through these affirmative 
structures that subverted the political subordination desired by white Southerners. This 
context of oppression did not deter Black communities from engaging in a self-help 
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philosophy that put them in charge of whether or not their communities triumphed 
educationally. Indeed, African-descended people were the first to call for universal public 
education while most whites in the postbellum South found the idea despicable. The 
struggle, however, for universal education demonstrates that Black people placed a 
premium value on education’s liberating properties. One formerly enslaved African 
commented, “there is one sin that slavery committed against me, which I will never 
forgive. It robbed me of my education.” This sentiment reigned far and wide throughout 
the South. As a consequence, independent schools sprang up around the south to atone 
for that grave sin.3  
As government officials went south after the Civil War to “help” formerly 
enslaved Africans adjust to their new founded freedom, they were greeted by the fact that 
ex-slaves were already building institutions that took them far away from the 
plantation—mentally and physically. Nevertheless, in order to control the Black 
population and continue to furnish a steady labor supply for economically-strapped 
planters, the Freedmen’s Bureau, under the precept of helping freedmen, intervened to 
steer Black education towards subordination and Black thought away from land control. 
For without land or a nation-building component, the basis of economic freedom and 
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autonomy, and Black-controlled education, formerly enslaved Africans knew their 
emancipation would be meaningless.  
Summoning the spirit of their ancestors who built schools in the years following 
the Civil War and understanding the link between education, liberation, and democracy, a 
new batch of educational pioneers came forth. Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) members began formally educating Black southerners during the 
Freedom Summer of 1964. With the Freedom School idea, SNCC endeavored to create 
and educational experience that prompted students to question the “myths of our society, 
to perceive more clearly its realities, and to find alternatives.” In addition, the Freedom 
Schools provided supplementary education, which addressed the insufficiencies in the 
Mississippi public schools and concentrated heavily developing student critical thinking 
skills. In short, the Freedom Schools challenged the educational process of Mississippi, 
with its intention to keep Black people socially and economically subordinated, by 
educating their students that “liberation and transcendence [was] likely and possible.” 
Without textbooks or curriculum guides, SNCC members taught Black children to accept 
their self-worth while being responsible holders of power. Like educators to come, 
teachers within the Freedom Schools educated students to question and find ways to 
fundamentally change the oppressive circumstances in America.4 
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Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and the Process of Community Education, 1960-
1966, (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2000), 97-98, 100-101. Also see, Jon N. 
Hale, “A History of the Mississippi Freedom Schools, 1954-1965,” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, 2009). 
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Whereas the Freedom Schools used the tradition of emancipatory education to 
eventually integrate Black people more firmly within America society, by the late 1960s, 
the drive for integration completely lost its luster for another segment of the Black 
community. This crop of educators were willing to give their human, monetary, and 
physical resources to the educational empowerment of their children and the generations 
to come. Independent Black institutions materialized around the country as Blacks began 
to question the need for integration into white public schools and white society in 
general. The Council of Independent Black Institutions (C.I.B.I) officially formed in 
South Carolina in 1972 to provide “liberatory (sic) or transformative curricula and 
pedagogies for Africans in America and around the world.”5 This independent education 
would prepare Black children to build for their communities and not simply groom them 
to get a job in white businesses. This education would decolonize the Black child’s mind 
and expose the contradictions in American society and not sugarcoat the atrocities 
America committed all over the globe. This education would be an education for 
liberation and not subordination. 
It is within this context that Ahidiana found its legs. As is made clear above, 
Ahidiana grew out of the fertile soil of Black Nationalist fervor sweeping throughout 
pockets of cities with large Black populations. While Mark Essex used a rifle to call the 
nation’s attention to American discrimination towards Black people and the Black 
Panthers of New Orleans stood toe-to-toe with the New Orleans Police Department in a 
                                                
5 Uhuru Hotep, “Dedicated to Excellence: An Afrocentric Oral History of the Council of 
Independent Black Institutions, 1970-2000,” (PhD dissertation, Duquesne University, 
2001), 6. See this unpublished dissertation for an in-depth study of the origins and 
evolution of the Council of Independent Black Institutions. 
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fight for liberation, a small group of committed and concerned revolutionaries formed an 
organization that built an institution that gave some Black youth an affirmative education 
steeped in African history and culture. Though Ahidiana existed as much more than a 
school, this chapter highlights the educational efforts and significance of the Ahidiana 
organization in order to illuminate how a cultural and Pan-African revolutionary 
organization managed to build an institution, which achieved a measure of educational 
self-reliance in a city known more for partying than progress. In short, this is a case study 
of cultural nationalism and Black independent education in the south. 
The Birth of Ahidiana 
The founding of Ahidiana came about because of the collective effort put forth by 
the early members in 1972. Kenneth Ferdinand, brother of Kalamu ya Salaam, spent time 
working with an independent school in New York led by Father Lawrence Lucas. That 
experience inspired Ferdinand to find a way to bring independent African-centered 
education to New Orleans. Upon returning home to New Orleans, he met Tayari Salaam, 
then known as Cicely St. Julien, and began discussing the possibilities of bringing an 
education focused on liberation. In Tayari, he found a woman who had a deep love and 
interest in educating Black children holistically. Shortly after their meeting, Kenneth and 
Tayari decided to connect with dissatisfied parents and activists to start a school. This 
school was called Dokpwe Work/Study. The era of independent Black education had 
begun in New Orleans.  
During the first year of Dokpwe’s development, 1971, there emerged a deep 
chasm between members of the organization. On one side of the split were those 
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members who desired to continue only as a school. This group was led by Kenneth 
Ferdinand. On the other side, group members desired to expand into a full-fledged Pan-
African revolutionary organization with a school as one of its functions. Pan-Africanism 
acknowledges the cultural, social, and philosophical connectedness of continental 
Africans and Africans in the diaspora. Edward Wilmot Blyden, Marcus Garvey, and 
Malcolm X (El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz) are some of the many proponents of Pan-
Africanism. Following in their footsteps, the opposing group argued that not only should 
the minds of Black children be liberated, but that the world should be liberated as well. 
“Our children needed more than a school,” Tayari said. “Dokpwe was a school. Ahidiana 
was a lifestyle,” Nilima Mwendo, secretary of Ahidiana, added. The organizers of 
Ahidiana knew that an educational institution must be accompanied and superseded by a 
healthy Black community with all its benefits. They attempted to develop this 
community, for without it the establishment of the institution would remain tentative and 
provisional.6 
In the end, those who wanted more left Dokpwe Work/Study and established 
Ahidiana in 1972 as a revolutionary organization with a school attached. With this 
change, Ahidiana expanded its role in the community, but it resisted the temptation of 
becoming a mass-based organization. Ahidiana linked themselves tightly to the Kawaida 
Philosophy proffered by Maulana Karenga. Like the US organization in California led by 
Karenga, it existed as a cadre organization: a small group of highly organized persons 
                                                
6 Tayari Salaam, Author interview, January 15, 2011; Nilima Mwendo, Author interview, 
February 12, 2011; Brown, Fighting for Us, 74. 
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committed to the goal of liberation. “US leaders saw no need for a large membership. 
Their goal was to ideologically influence other organizations with its united-front 
approach, and thus direct the course of the coming ‘cultural revolution.’” In the Ahidiana 
context, Kalamu ya Salaam contended that, “with size comes complications.” “Plus,” he 
continued, “our lifestyle was so demanding that people simply could not handle it and 
dropped off.” Ahidiana members met every Sunday to exercise, discuss business, clean 
the school, prepare food, and study revolutionary thinkers. In short, being a member 
required great effort, sacrifice, and commitment.  
Theory 
It is the purpose of an organization that gives it a direction and a vision that move 
it along a chosen path toward the fulfillment of a dream. Ahidiana’s well-thought out 
theory and purpose embodied a vision and evoked the pillars of the Black cultural 
movement of the 1960s and 70s, which gave the organization a national and international 
essence. They concluded that without a worldwide revolution a local or national 
revolution would fail to bring lasting change. According to its operating principles, the 
purpose of Ahidiana was to “strive for and maintain the national liberation of Afrikan-
American people by working unceasingly for the unification, liberation and independence 
of: (1) Afrikan-American people; (2) all people of Afrikan descent; and (3) the continent 
of Afrika as a whole.” In the purpose, Ahidiana used the term Afrikan-American because 
Afrikan-American people sprang from Afrikan ancestors making them historically and 
genetically Afrikan. Nonetheless, their unique history and contemporary conditions made 
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them environmentally American. Several groups of the era simply said that they were 
Afrikan without a hyphen.7 
Within the purpose, the group emphasized unification because “if we do not learn 
to unify we will contribute to our own destruction.” Unification certainly concerned the 
group as they were familiar with the timeless divide-and-conquer tactics of 
COINTELPRO8, which devastated Black organizations across the country. Additionally, 
Ahidiana included liberation in its purpose, but viewed the concept differently from many 
groups of the time. Instead of only highlighting the external enemies they faced, Ahidiana 
understood that the “decisive step of liberation is to free ourselves from our own internal 
enemies.”9 This concept required the organization to take more responsibility for their 
state of affairs and focus on what they could do for themselves rather than wait on outside 
forces to change. Naturally, this orientation led to a drive to achieve the “highest form of 
independence” which they called self-reliance—“the ability to do for self while 
simultaneously willing to help others and to accept assistance.” The Ahidiana 
Work/Study Center was a manifestation of the group’s purpose and drive toward a 
different world.10  
In order to achieve its purpose, the members of Ahidiana devised methods and 
techniques to bring into being the unification, liberation, and independence its purpose 
                                                
7 Mtumishi St. Julien, Upon the Shoulders of Elephants We Reach the Sky: A Parent's 
Farewell to a Collegian, (Runagate Press, 1995), 3-4. 
8 Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBI’s Secret War 
Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement, (Cambridge: South 
End Press, 2002), 63. 
9 St. Julien, Upon the Shoulders, 3. 
10 St. Julien, Upon the Shoulders, 3. 
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called for. Ahidiana determined that the only way to secure liberation was their ability to 
gain and retain power. In their estimation, “power is the capability (i.e. both ability and 
will) to self-determine, self-defend and self-respect ourselves.” For Ahidiana members, 
power equaled being self-governing and economically independent as well as 
“acknowledging…and appreciating what [Black people] have to offer to each other and 
the world.” Furthermore, the members committed themselves to the “process of 
protecting [them]selves from physical, mental and moral attacks, and aiding each other in 
time of need.” While Ahidiana certainly expressed the benefits of achieving an Afrikan-
centered view of the world, the self-defense portion reminds students of revolutionary 
nationalists like the Black Panther Party and the Republic of New Afrika.11 To be sure, 
Ahidiana’s recognition of the necessity of self-defense departs from the traditional notion 
that cultural nationalist outfits simply believed that wearing Afrikan grab, speaking an 
Afrikan language, and gaining knowledge about Afrikan history would get Black people 
free. In fact, once a month cadre members took to the woods to learn how to shoot. 
Though you will not discover any pictures of Ahidiana members brandishing firearms, 
their attention to defense calls into question the narrow categories created for Black 
Power movement organizations and compels scholars of the period to engage in a more 
nuanced study of this period. Karenga, a great influence on the cultural nationalism of the 
time said, “What we should concentrate on is not the weapons but the people. How can 
we win the people? It is not a question of how can we kill the enemy, for the people must 
                                                
11 For more information, see: Jones, ed, Black Panther Party Reconsidered; Lazerow and 
Williams, eds, In Search of the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a 
Revolutionary Movement; Cleaver, ed, Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther 
Party; Austin, Up Against the Wall. 
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decide that that is necessary themselves, or the vanguard will vanish and the 
revolutionary party which has placed itself in a front position will fall flat on its face and 
history will hide all of them.” As expected, Ahidiana placed a great deal more effort into 
grooming themselves and their students to use the mental weapons of revolution.12 
Maulana Karenga’s Kawaida philosophy of cultural nationalism anchored 
Ahidiana’s social, educational, political, and religious practices. Karenga envisioned this 
body of ideas as an “emancipatory philosophy dedicated to cultural revolution, radical 
social change, and bringing good into the world.” The Kawaida philosophy exalted 
culture and community as the “basis and building blocks for any real movement for 
liberation.” Indeed, the Kawaida was a “total way of life” for those who adhered to its 
tenets.13  
Ahidiana Work/Study 
In the early 1970s, Ahidiana deduced that the most effective technique to gain and 
maintain power was by building “alternative and affirmative Black institutions.” For 
Ahidiana, alternative meant that the institution existed as more dynamic and more 
progressive than the institutions serving the Black community in New Orleans. 
Affirmative meant that the institutions promoted interests and ideals of the group. 
Ahidiana viewed these institutions as solid social structures developed within the Black 
community to assure the transgenerational transmission of knowledge, skills, and morals 
                                                
12 St. Julien, Upon the Shoulders, 4; Brown, Fighting for Us, 89. 
13 Brown, Fighting for Us, 34. 
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to generations to come while they also served as agents to maintain and continue Black 
culture.14  
Similar to other organizations of the era, Ahidiana did not take the word Black to 
simply mean one’s skin tone. Their conception treaded far beyond a person’s outside 
appearance though one’s genotype represented one of the criterion. The operating 
principles outlined three criteria for Blackness: “color, culture and consciousness.” The 
color was necessary; however, the person or institution had to be culturally Black, which 
meant that it “constantly and consistently struggled for the unification, liberation, and 
independence of [Black] people.” Lastly, only conscious Black people who “possess[ed] 
self-awareness which is the emotional commitment to our Afrikan-American identity and 
self-control which is the discipline necessary to struggle for [Black] people” could have 
the honor of being called Black. This barometer of Blackness certainly eliminated most 
Black people and institutions from consideration, but provided for the community a 
principled vision of the kind of people and institutions Ahidiana felt they needed in order 
to achieve the noble goals and purposes described above. The organization deemed one 
particular institution as most important.15 
Ahidiana judged that the beginning battles in their war for liberation would 
transpire in the field of education. Ahidiana and its members contended that education 
was not a neutral enterprise. Indeed, they felt that education not only helped students gain 
culture, skills, and knowledge, it more importantly “shapes our attitudes and gives us 
values.” Additionally, members in Ahidiana felt that public schools culturally 
                                                
14 St. Julien, Upon the Shoulders, 5. 
15 St. Julien, Upon the Shoulders, 6. 
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misoriented Black youth and Black people at large. Like Amilcar Cabral, the African 
nationalist from Guinea-Bissau, Ahidiana deemed culture as a major site of resistance. In 
fact, the first resistance, they believed, was the cultural resistance. Consequently, sending 
Black children to white educational institutions invested those institutions with the power 
to shape culture, attitudes, values, desires, and needs. Mtumishi St. Julien spells out 
Ahidiana’s position clearly in Upon the Shoulders of Elephants that “not controlling our 
own educational system is a contradiction to our efforts toward self-determination and 
thus a blockage to power.” In controlling their own school, Ahidiana opened the way to 
developing the minds of Black children who were unapologetically Black in color, 
culture, and consciousness. In short, Ahidiana believed that they needed schools “capable 
of raising revolutionaries, leaders and workers for our people.” White institutions and 
Black, only in color, institutions did not have that as a goal and thus failed to produce 
Black children who were emotionally committed to the liberation of Black people. To go 
further, Ahidiana imagined their educational institution as a place where the teachers and 
staff confronted and broke the hold of the oppressor on the minds of Black people. “The 
battle we wage now and continuously is for the hearts and minds of our people and if we 
lose this battle, we can’t hope to win any other,” Karenga said.16  
Yet, despite casting white institutions as detrimental to Afrikan-Americans 
acquiring self-determination and power, circumstance and strategy moved Ahidiana to 
see value in those foreign institutions as they built their own. These strategic institutions 
were controlled by others but could be used to “gain technological knowledge and skills 
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 191 
necessary for our defense and development.” It is not specified in the operating principles 
what level of white schools could be seen as strategic—elementary, middle school, high 
school, or college and professional schools. It seems that colleges could serve the 
purpose, because by that time, Black students could have a foundational education in 
alternative and affirmative institutions. In fact, Kalamu ya Salaam quipped in 1974,  
We must teach our own leaders and once educated they can walk through hell in 
gasoline underwear and snatch bananas out of gorillas’ hands without being 
turned around! Or even attend Black colleges without turning out Greeks and 
attend white colleges without become (sic) Black militant integrationists. They 
will be able to do this because they will be clear on who they are, what they are 
doing there and where to go once they leave.”17  
Only through controlling their own school would this illustration even be possible. But 
their school only went to the fourth grade. After leaving Ahidiana, the students were 
thrust into an educational system that bombarded them with things anti-Afrikan until they 
graduated nine years later. 
 According to Nilima Mwendo, secretary for Ahidiana, initially the group desired 
a school that serviced students until the twelfth grade, but “reality prevented that dream.” 
Instead, Tayari led Ahidiana’s research into various schools in New Orleans to find a 
suitable one to funnel Ahidiana students to once they finished the third grade. The 
academic record of the school figured prominently in Ahidiana’s search. Eventually, they 
settled on an elementary school called Jean Gordon near the University of New Orleans, 
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ours Alone!,” Council of Independent Black Institutions Newsletter Vol. I. No. 2 1972, 5. 
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which was very close to Lake Pontchatrain. The group quickly developed a working 
relationship with the school and its principal who was more than delighted to receive the 
stellar students from Ahidiana. Meanwhile, the parents of the students vowed to continue 
to impart to their children now attending public schools the history and culture that they 
surely missed in the new environment.18 
 In order to support their educational institutions, Ahidiana adopted a people-
oriented rather than a profit-oriented economic philosophy, which emphasized Ujamaa, 
the Kwanzaa principle meaning Cooperative Economics: to build and maintain our own 
stores, shops and other businesses and to profit from them together.  Indeed, the focus on 
cooperatives demonstrated the group’s aversion to capitalism or “Black capitalism” 
emerging in the early 1970s. President Richard Nixon even co-opted the term. But, 
Ahidiana clearly stated in its operating principles that they “believe[d] that cooperatives 
[were] our best hope in the transition from capitalism to socialism.” To some, the 
reference to socialism might indicate a contradiction in the philosophy of Ahidiana since 
the most famous proponent of socialism was Karl Marx, a European. On the contrary, 
however, this reference actually establishes that members in Ahidiana understood that 
socialistic ideas began on the continent of Africa as collectivistic principles were 
practiced in various regions since time immemorial.19  
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 In the spirit of Ujamaa, Ahidiana founded several enterprises. New Afrika Books 
provided the community with essential books from the top Pan-African thinkers of the 
time and Ahidiana’s own books, which were published from their own printing press, 
called Ahidiana Enterprises. As an outgrowth of their Sunday study group, through the 
bookstore, Ahidiana shared the books, knowledge, and ideology that influenced their 
thinking with the Black community at large. Though a small organization, the members 
did not hoard the intellectual resources they discovered on their journey. To spread the 
messages wider, Ahidiana purchased a pressing press. Ahidiana member, Kuumba Kazi 
Ferrioullet, who had experience with a printing press, began printing Kalamu ya Salaam’s 
work, as he was already a prolific author, the children’s books produced by members of 
the Ahidiana family, and the work of other African-descended artists who preferred a 
Black publisher.  
Additionally, Ahidiana members started a collective food-buying program that 
would buy goods in bulk for the benefit of the group and the school. It not only saved the 
money for the group, it also fostered the camaraderie needed to sustain the group in 
trying times. It was born of theory and principle as well as economic necessity. Ahidiana 
Work/Study fed its students hot, healthy, vegetarian meals daily. In order to meet that 
need, Ahidiana began buying in bulk from the nascent Whole Foods company. That food-
buying naturally continued in the personal lives of the members. The programs and 
enterprises established by Ahidiana demonstrate the ways in which the organization 
attempted to experience a lifestyle, which utilized the theory of the Kawaida and put it 
into practice. The concept of Kujichagulia or self-determination represented more than 
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mere words to the members. Their beliefs became behaviors, which became habits and 
ended as their actual lived experience. If nothing more, Ahidiana’s commitment to their 
ideals is worthy of praise.20 
 In line with the cooperative nature of Ahidiana’s purported economic philosophy, 
Ahidiana’s teaching philosophy endeavored to develop the whole student: “body 
(physical), mind (mental), soul (social), and consciousness (political).” Their education 
goal focused on molding politically progressive, socially advanced, academically 
excellent, and physically sound students. By politically progressive, Ahidiana educated 
their students to have a sense of purpose, to be committed to the well-being of their 
people, and to be capable of being a “revolutionary, worker, and leader for their people’s 
benefit.” Secondly, the socially advanced students from Ahidiana would advocate moral 
development over the material and act as stewards of the earth rather than destructive 
members of society. Thirdly, Ahidiana demanded academic excellence from its young 
students. They were groomed to love “theoretical knowledge, especially the sciences” 
and exhibit great skill in communicating through writing, speaking, and the arts. Lastly, 
students learned about holistic nutrition and health based on the foundational principle 
that humans should eat physiologically and not psychologically. These guiding concepts 
formed the essence of what Ahidiana offered educationally. Their holistic approach 
differed greatly from the linear approach of the public school of yesterday and today in 
that it attempted to reach the whole child just as their cooperative enterprises attempted to 
                                                
20 For more information about how another organization used several enterprises to 
support and solidify their cultural practices, see: Kwasi Konadu, A View from the East: 
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holistically nurture the mind, body, and soul of a member. Ahidiana’s approach pre-dated 
the new trend to impact the entire student.21  
Teaching Method and Curriculum 
 Ahidiana strived to bring theory into reality with a teaching method called 
Dasara/Kazi or Work/Study, hence the name of the institution. Dasara means class in 
Kiswahili and represented the time in which the teacher or instructor directly taught 
students in structured lessons.  Kazi, meaning work in Kiswahili, was the time the 
students had to work through a series of “tasks that [were] self-corrective, self-instructive 
and self-reinforcing.” While students worked, teachers observed the “depth of their 
teaching,” monitored the concepts and values that were learned, and surveyed the areas, 
academic and social, in need of reinforcement.  
 The Ahidiana Work/Study Center worked from an academic foundation of five 
curriculum areas: communications, culture, math, science, and taburu (physical 
education). Even at their young ages, Ahidiana students learned to express and exchange 
ideas via language and symbols in Communications dasara (class). The staff desired the 
students to use those skills in communications to receive and pass on valuable knowledge 
that was useful in the struggle for the freedom of Black people. Students, however, could 
not use those skills for those ends without a proper perspective of their culture. At 
Ahidiana, culture dasara (class) consisted of studying the “material and social conditions 
and practices of our people and the world.” In addition, culture class helped to develop 
and reinforce the children’s identity, purpose, and direction. The Herufi: a Cultural 
                                                
21 “Ahidiana Teaching Strategies Pamphlet,” in possession of author. 
 196 
Alphabet for Afrikan Youth fortified the concepts in their minds. The cultural alphabet 
started with A is for Afrika: land where our ancestors are from; B is for Build: step by 
step, one by one; C is for Create: to make things better; D is for Dialectics: life goes on 
forever. Spanning the entire English alphabet, the Herufi taught students about struggle 
and values; unity and focus among other ideas crucial for a liberating education 
according to Ahidiana members. The daily repetition of these images implanted with the 
subconscious of the students positive self-concepts and a commitment to their 
community.22 
Math class aimed to go beyond the simple teaching of numbers and its various 
operations, but endeavored to enable students to “plan, build and analyze with precision.” 
Continuing in the same vein was Science class. Here, students studied the laws and order 
of the universe. In Science class, students were expected to study and apply scientific 
principles for the “defense and development” of Black people and the “improvement and 
beautification of the world.” To be sure, students learned the Ancient Kemetic (Egypt) 
origins of science and mathematics. However, this knowledge was not simply relegated 
to the past, but analyzed to uncover how that wisdom could be modified for effective use 
in the present and future. In this way, Ahidiana sought to dismiss the notion that cultural 
nationalists were precise and intentional only about African culture, clothes, names, and 
rituals. It also demonstrates the understanding that the “struggle” could not be won by 
those who took shortcuts and relied on estimation instead of science when figuring out 
how best to move the movement forward. Lastly, as the protracted struggle demanded 
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strong people—mentally and physically, Ahidiana promoted Taburu or physical 
education. These morning workouts prepared the bodies of students as rigorously as the 
other classes prepared their minds. Theoretically, this curriculum would produce a well-
balanced African student with a propensity to fight for the liberation of African people 
locally and globally. That is exactly what Ahidiana wanted.23 
Teaching Technique 
Teachers at Ahidiana transferred the cultural and ideological principles of the 
school to its students through a four-step technique: introduce, state, drill, and test. To 
introduce a concept, the instructor would use the students’ bodies and five senses, their 
environment and experiences, and “an experience chart in which key words are listed as 
well as the students’ words so as to summarize the experience.” Next, the instructor 
would explain the concept to the students using a myriad of bulletin boards, charts, 
manipulatives, definition cards, and other visual aids. In order to deepen the students’ 
understanding of the concept, Ahidiana instructors drilled students using “rote, rhythm, 
repetition, rhyme and review.” Along with those essential elements that promoted student 
understanding, drilling also involved numerous activities, which allowed students to 
practice new concepts. Here is a brief list: 
1.) projects which involve cutting, tracing, pasting threading, coloring; 2.) 
fingerplays, songs poems, chants; 3.) collective games/activities using real 
objects, activity boards and the like; 4.) manipulatives made of different color 
cardstock in which thinking and application are required; 5.) seatwork such as 
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worksheets, wipe-offs, workbooks; 6.) writing activities: listing words, 
copying phrases or a basic definition. 
Finally, after students were introduced to a concept, stated the concept, and drilled the 
concept for better understanding, a test measured how well students mastered the 
concept. Since Ahidiana understood the different learning styles of students and the 
different ways in which students could express their knowledge about a subject, paper 
and pen test were available, but not at all the only option. The test could be oral, 
manipulative, written, or an independent project. The emphasis rested not on how the 
student expressed their understanding, but that they indeed understood the concept or had 
the ability to correctly use the skill abstractly and practically. Nevertheless, the learning 
did not stop there. Ahidiana viewed homework as an important activity, because through 
homework the school came home and the home came to school. Homework allowed the 
parents to participate in their child’s education in a direct way.24 
Criticism  
Though the effort was noble, many did not see the merits. Critics fired shots at 
Ahidiana Work/Study claiming it was elitist and failed to teach the majority of Black 
children who languished in public schools. In turn, Kalamu ya Salaam argued that Black 
people sent their children to public school to get a “miseducation” by “force of 
circumstance” and not by choice. The people desired an alternative, Salaam asserted, but 
had none available. Ahidiana knew that their school did not have the capacity to educate 
the majority of students in New Orleans; however, they saw their school as the 
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“beginning thrusts,” which by necessity, had to be small and low-level. The point was to 
begin and grow eventually into a whole school system. Ahidiana Work/Study, in their 
view, was just one step “in our march forward to nationhood and true Black educational 
systems. In reality what we are doing is struggling with our oppressors for the minds of 
our children.” Yet, other activists in the city deemed increasing dialogue, protesting, 
putting pressure on City Hall as the way forward in the fight for better education for 
Black children. Ahidiana countered that public demonstrations achieved very little and 
did no more raise a small fuss. “Picketing the school board and city hall is fine,” ya 
Salaam cautioned, “but building schools [is] infinitely better.”25 
Ahidiana’s example forced the community to ask: what are we having our 
children educated for? Whereas Ahidiana Work/Study and other African-centered 
schools around the country emphatically answered by educating Black children based on 
needs and objectives of Black people, the majority of Blacks in New Orleans still desired 
their children be trained to meet the needs of white economic interests. Ahidiana’s 
education stood on the principle that the purpose of education, as Black psychologist, 
Amos N. Wilson said, “is to secure the survival of a people.” Hannibal Afrik, a long-time 
proponent of African-centered education, posited that Black people’s educational 
progress “is measured in terms of human well-being, not prestige builders, cars or other 
such things…Our education must therefore inculcate a sense of commitment to the total 
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community, and help the pupils to accept the values appropriate to our kind of future, not 
those appropriate to our colonial past.”26 
Additionally, local politicians called them too militant. The rise of Black political 
power in New Orleans also brought with it a silencing of calls for concrete systemic 
change and an increased focus on prestige and position within the establishment. 
Mtumishi St. Julien, an Ahidiana member who finished law school while apart of the 
organization, felt that his law career suffered because of his connection to Ahidiana and 
its values. Some thought he should run for office, but he declined. While he 
acknowledged that he could have been more successful had he not been strong with his 
African values, St. Julien does not regret his choice to stand firm in the Kawaida 
principles. At the time of the interview, St. Julien had not loss his fire for Black 
communal progress.27 
Black Women’s Conference 
 Ahidiana’s gender relations differed greatly from the perceived norm in Black 
power organizations. Stories abound about the treatment of Black women during the 
Black Power movement. It is argued that the masculine energy of the movement 
attempted to highlight Black men as strong warriors leading the charge for freedom while 
pushing Black women to the periphery of the struggle and away from the front lines. In 
truth, though many organizations and personalities of the Black Power movement 
practiced sexism in some way, the whole story is decidedly less one-sided. For example, 
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critics often mention the Black Panther Party as a sexist caldron, but the organization was 
one of the only groups to have a Black woman as its leader, Elaine Brown, by 1973. 
Ahidiana represents another example. Although the women of Ahidiana ran the school, 
which may at first seem like they were relegated to “women’s work,” the women of 
Ahidiana existed as equal partners in the organization. In contrast to power struggles and 
masculine posturing in other groups, the dynamics present in Ahidiana attest to a strong 
mutual respect among members. Tayari kwa Salaam traveled extensively as the face of 
Ahidiana to various conferences and meetings across the country. Indeed, she spoke at 
the National Black Political Convention in 1972 about the role and importance of women 
in leadership positions in Pan-African nationalist organizations.28  
 After reviewing the plight of the Black women with revolutionary organizations, 
Ahidiana established the Black Woman’s Conference held annually on the campus of 
Southern University of New Orleans. The purpose of the conference, among other things, 
was for Black women to develop themselves to the fullest extent as well as “gain, 
maintain, and use power…[which] must be organizationally and systematically taken.” 
The focus on power came in response to the disturbing trends affecting Black women in 
that period and continues today. At the time, Black women were the leading victims of 
rape; sexual abuse; unemployment; and low pay. The conference arose to challenge these 
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notions and endeavored to heal the Black woman by helping her develop physically, 
mentally, socially, and politically.29  
The Black Woman’s Conference was an all-day affair filled with workshops, 
thought-provoking keynote speakers, and entertainment. Though Ahidiana pinpointed its 
attention towards Black women in this conference, they wholeheartedly welcomed the 
participation and attendance of Black men. The conference sought to “unite everyone in 
the Black community who can be united around the goal of helping Black women to 
advance. The defense and development of Black women must be, in practice, a key 
concern of everyone active in our struggle.” The revolutionary could not prosper while 
the oppression of one-half of the race continued.  
A typical conference had four workshops, a keynote address from a leading 
woman in the Black liberation struggle, a film relevant to Black women, and a concert. 
The conference lasted from eight in the morning to eight in the evening. At the 1978 
Black Woman’s Conference, the workshops led by Ahidiana members were as follows: 
Sexism and the Black Woman led by Kalamu ya Salaam, Develop the New Black 
Woman led by Nefertiti Munira and Tayari Kwa Salaam, Health and the Black Woman 
led by Daphne and Keith Ferdindand a registered nurse and medical doctor respectively, 
and Organizing Black Woman led by panelists from various community organizations. 
The internationally known poet, Mari Evans, provided the keynote address followed by a 
question and answer period. In other years, Ahidiana welcomed culturally-conscious 
artists like Sweet Honey and the Rock to contribute conscious-raising entertainment. 
                                                
29 Ahidiana Papers in the possession Tayari Kwa Salaam. 
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Because of the great success of the conference, Ahidiana entertained thoughts of 
expanding it into a national event. They decided against it as the realities of the school 
and other obligations would not allow them to take on such a large project. Indeed, the 
Black Woman’s Conference remained local and powerful to the women and men who 
experienced it.  
Demise 
 In the mid-1980s, as the political and cultural climate changed in New Orleans 
and the nation at-large, some of Ahidiana’s members began to move in different 
directions, while others simply were burnt out. As members began to have children and 
take on more responsibility outside the organization, they did not have the same amount 
of time to devote. “In the beginning, it was more single people. Then those folks began to 
have families. Decisions had to be made,” Tayari said. Eventually, members moved away 
from the lower ninth ward where most of the people in the organization lived. In fact, 
most lived within walking distance from each other. Whereas the organization 
commenced as a working-class outfit, with the passage of time, some members with 
different levels of education, such as Keith Ferdinand became a doctor and Mtumishi St. 
Julien became a lawyer, “wanted a better life. The way you define better life was on you. 
There was no judgment from me,” Salaam asserted. Other members were simply tired of 
“being the exception and not the rule.” Ahidiana’s level of struggle for fifteen years took 
its toll on the minds and bodies of its cadre members. Kalamu ya Salaam summed it up 
this way, “Most people can’t work a job for fifteen years. We struggled at a major level 
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day-in and day-out; day-in and day-out…Why didn’t we continue? Because it was 
hard.”30  
 Ahidiana Work/Study also suffered as the state began to exert its power to 
regulate the independent school-an effort very similar to what the Freedmen’s Bureau 
attempted in the years after the Civil War. The Louisiana Department of Education 
handed down regulations about the necessary equipment to run a school and demanded 
that teachers have certain certifications to teach in a school. Ahidiana cared little about 
teacher certifications. What certified an individual to teach at the Ahidiana Work/Study 
center was a revolutionary mentality and a thorough knowledge of the subject matter. In 
their estimation, the teacher certified by the state rarely possessed the Pan-African 
mindset desired by the organizers of Ahidiana and certainly were more than likely 
consumed with a eurocentric understanding of the core subjects.  
In addition, the school shunned government funding and the tuition failed to 
support the school and its staff. Ahidiana rejected funds from the government not only 
because the government would want to direct the ways in which the money was used and 
thus undermine their self-determination and autonomy, but also because the group was 
anti-government and anti-establishment. Nilima Mwendo said, “at that time we were 
against the government.” Ahidiana envisioned the government being overthrown and 
being replaced by a more revolutionary and humane system. Members understood the 
African proverb, “he who butters your bread has an effect on your stomach.” 
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Independence was the only road for Ahidiana, but they failed to find viable avenues to 
support themselves and the school for very long even with their other enterprises.  
Tuition did not answer the question as Ahidiana struggled for sustainability in its 
final years. “The tuition was already low because we knew what our people could afford 
and that didn’t include salary for the staff.” Basically, as the women taught in the school, 
the men “went out to meet the man.” The men of Ahidiana took it upon themselves to 
find employment to provide for their families. However, as families grew and New 
Orleans experienced a major depression in the 1980s during the Reagan years, one 
income proved too little to support a family. Both mother and father had to find 
employment to handle the changing circumstances.31  
Additionally, the move from protest to politics pushed the Pan-African 
revolutionaries further to the fringes of the political landscape. Instead of continuing to 
push for autonomy and independence, a renewed wave towards access and inclusion 
engulfed New Orleans as well as other cities around the nation. Whereas Karenga and the 
US organization deemed electoral politics as an important realm in the struggle for 
community control and self-determination, Ahidiana protested against the city 
government, and desired to steer clear of supporting candidates or focusing any energy in 
the political sphere. However, with the elections of Blacks to high public offices, the 
collective consciousness of African-Americans in New Orleans held these victories as 
examples of the progress they battled for so vigorously since the early 1950s. So many 
viewed the continuation of separate and independent institutions as shortsighted, 
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backwards, and unprogressive. “We were fish and the water was changing,” Kalamu said. 
In other words, the context within which Ahidiana attempted to make their changes 
evolved into conditions favorable to passive political participation and rhetoric, but 
unfavorable to the revolutionary work demanded for lasting change. The opening of the 
political realm closed the vision of many New Orleanians for a different future highly 
informed by Afrikan culture.32 
Conclusion 
 The story of Ahidiana helps students of the Black Power Movement and Cultural 
Nationalism understand the challenges and possibilities of independent Black education 
informed by Pan-African values and Karenga’s Kawaida philosophy while being situated 
within an anti-African environment. Ahidiana demonstrated the dedication and sacrifice 
necessary to bring an organization and institution to life in a context, which constantly 
forced them to sail against the wind. Ahidiana had a goal to build a nation. They looked 
at the circumstances and decided to that in order to build a people they needed to teach 
the children. The public schools failed to produce the kind of children the nation needed, 
so the only option and way forward was to build their own. In this way, the spirit of 
Ahidiana reminds us of the educational effort of Blacks during and after the Civil War 
and Reconstruction periods of this nation’s history. Ahidiana Work/Study center’s 
fifteen-year existence instructs present and future educators with their curriculum and 
teaching strategies which focused of the holistic education of Black children. And 
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presents a different face on gender relations in a time of sexism with the establishment of 
the Black Women’s Conference. 
 Nevertheless, Ahidiana was unable to answer all the questions and resolve all 
contradictions. Though it lasted fifteen years, the problem of sustainability always 
plagued the organization. They failed to find appropriate ways to continue the strenuous 
work of revolutionary change without burning out, to welcome new members into the 
organization without compromising the integrity of their values, and to make enough 
money to preserve a healthy standard of living while battling against the status quo. 
Ahidiana is not unlike other organizations and schools, which flowered during the 1970s 
only to slowly wither in the tumultuous environment of the 1980s. 
Ahidiana imbued with its cultural nationalism, like many other organizations of 
the period, certainly had great room for improvement, but their legacies are not tarnished 
because of their shortcomings. Ahidiana brought Kwanzaa to New Orleans and it is still 
celebrated throughout the city at the end of December. This is may seem small, but in a 
city that goes from party to party, from Mardi Gras to Super Bowls, pausing for a Black 
cultural holiday is a big deal. In addition, Ahidiana Work/Study center provides an 
excellent example of an independent institution committed to the physical and intellectual 
advancement of Black children. Those endeavoring to build a similar institution would do 
well to study Ahidiana’s model.  
Furthermore, Tayari kwa Salaam, Nilima Mwendo, Kalamu ya Salaam, Mtumishi 
St. Julien, Vera Warren and others continue to empower the African-descended 
community of New Orleans in various ways. Tayari finished her Doctoral of Philosophy 
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in Education at Louisiana State University and continues to teach children holistically in 
her position at New Orleans’s main public library. Nilima Mwendo uses her business 
savvy to assist Black small-business owners in making their self-determination dreams 
come true. Kalamu ya Salaam, the most famous of Ahidiana members, continues to write 
prose and poetry while helping students in several area high schools sharpen their writing 
skills and find their voices. Vera Warren continues the legacy of New Afrika Books with 
Community Book Center—a cultural beacon in the New Orleans Black community. 
Even though the Ahidiana organization and work/study center are now defunct, 
former students and members sustain the Ahidiana’s memory through their community 
work. Ahidiana has left an indelible mark on the city of New Orleans, which will 








“Traitors to Your Own Women and Children:”  




As the focus upon protest as the central tactic to effect social change weaned, 
Black leaders, following one tenet of Malcolm X’s philosophy, redirected their energy 
towards the ballot box and politics. Malcolm X articulated Black Nationalism as the 
ability of Black people to “control the politics and the politicians of our community.”1 In 
New Orleans before 1965, Black leaders could only hope to influence the white 
politicians dominating local government—a practice rarely bringing positive results. A 
new crop of college-educated and middle class leaders springing from disparate 
communities around the city and disparate backgrounds began to rise to charter the 
course for Black political power in New Orleans. In order to prepare for the proper 
handling of power, these individuals organized new community organizations that 
corralled the Black vote and channeled it into the directions they desired. These 
organizations would eventually indirectly help New Orleans elect its first Black mayor in 
Ernest “Dutch” Morial. Morial’s election would come ten years after Carl B. Stokes 
became the first Black mayor to run a major urban city. The ten year delay demonstrates 
the conservative pace of change in New Orleans—a trend that would continue during 
Morial’s eight years in office. While the country’s progression made Black political 
power in New Orleans inevitable, it certainly did not answer all the problems that Blacks 
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in New Orleans endured. As Blacks came to wield considerable political power and 
influence, the Black community failed to largely benefit as politicians and political 
organizations opted to share in the spoils of an insular system and the first Black mayor 
failed to systemically change the everyday lives of the average Black citizen in New 
Orleans.  
Before the Voting Rights Act 
In Louisiana during the 1940s and 1950s, Black residents experienced the good, 
the bad, and the ugly of Louisiana’s political climate, while Black leaders served as 
intermediaries to the white power structure. In the DeLesseps “Chep” Morrison and 
Governor Earl Long years, the relationships fostered by Black leaders with white 
politicians did little to stop other white politicians and leaders of the state from furthering 
their agenda to keep Black people in a place of servitude. Morrison, who was born in 
New Roads, Louisiana, in January of 1912, became mayor of New Orleans in 1946 and 
stayed in office until 1961. Nurturing gubernatorial dreams throughout his time as mayor 
(he ran unsuccessfully in 1956, 1959, and 1960), Morrison carefully supported 
improvements within the system of Jim Crow. He helped to develop “Shakespeare Park 
for his black constituency, and had backed the construction of Ponchartrain Park, a 
housing development for middle-class blacks.” These efforts, however, were not enough 
for Black leaders and went too far in the eyes of segregationists. As the old saying goes, 
“he who sits on the fence gets shot on both sides.” His “fence-riding” continued 
throughout his tenure. Tragically, Morrison took a hands-off approach as the school 
desegregation crisis of 1960 gain national attention. Whereas he did not regulate the 
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hostile crowds that met the four young Black girls entering William Frantz School and 
McDonogh 19 elementary, Morrison “banned all picketing and sit-ins” because members 
of New Orleans CORE and the NAACP Youth Council fought to desegregate stores on 
Canal Street. Morrison’s response to the school crisis and his fence-straddling policies 
ended his political career. In 1961, he became ambassador to the Organization of 
American States—a position President John F. Kennedy appointed him to. Victor Schiro 
would follow him into city hall.2 
In the early 1960s, power relations developed by Black leaders and the white 
establishment represented a tenuous bond and did not deliver the changes and power the 
Black leaders sought. Their lack of effective power forced the Black leaders to rely on the 
goodwill of the white politicians and merchants for promised changed, but white 
merchants were slow in delivering on their promises. For example, after Black groups 
protested downtown stores for jobs and access in 1963, white merchants reneged on their 
word. Hence, picketing began with Ernest “Dutch” Morial threatening Mayor Victor 
Schiro that “Negro citizens of New Orleans will no longer tolerate the spoon feeding of 
their rights. We want all our rights now… This city is not immune to the new temper and 
tensions that are being manifested everywhere.” Morial continued, “Perhaps 
demonstrations against racial inequality in this community would be the spark to free this 
city of its inertia and complacency in the area of human relations."3  
Ernest N. Morial was born in New Orleans to a working class family on October 
9, 1929. After graduating from Xavier University, a Catholic school, Morial received his 
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law degree from Louisiana State University Law School. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, 
he played a prominent role in the African American struggle for equal rights and dignity. 
The politically-minded young Morial got involved with the NAACP and became its 
president in 1962. As a political moderate, he was careful about the kinds of protest and 
activism Blacks should partake in. Indeed, like other Black Catholic Creoles, Morial 
“favored negotiation over confrontation.” In an interview with Kim Lacy Rogers, he 
confided, “in the society at that time, to vent your hostility against the system of 
apartheid, would cause to happen to you what has happened to Mandela and others [in 
South Africa].”4  
Schiro predictably resisted the demands of Morial and other Black leaders. In 
response, Black leaders staged a massive march on city hall in September of 1963, a 
month after the famous March on Washington. The “white elite, who believed it to be an 
intelligent safety valve and a means of releasing emotional heat,” approved the city hall 
march, but little changed. A month later, Black leaders delivered a petition to city hall 
which called for the desegregation of New Orleans, but the incident ended with Rev. 
Avery Alexander being dragged, by his feet, out of city hall. The scene made national 
news. Alexander, however, was a staple in the movement for civil rights. He took part in 
numerous sit-ins, marches, including both marches on Washington, and boycotts. Born in 
Terrebone Parish, Louisiana, Alexander and his family moved to New Orleans in 1927. 
He would eventually be elected to the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1975—a 
position he would hold until his death in 1999. But after the march, after the sit-in, and 
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after the image of police dragging him out of City Hall, the move from protest to politics 
gained momentum.5 
After the Voting Rights Act 
Nevertheless, after 1965, Blacks began to wield a considerable amount influence 
in city politics. In 1961, Black voter registration sat powerless at 36,000, however, by 
1969 it ballooned and nearly doubled to 66,000, a thirteen percent jump from “17 percent 
to 30 percent of the city’s registered voters.”6 Black New Orleanians certainly felt the 
open ballot box represented power long denied and a right that must be exercised. Of the 
thirty-five Black people who qualified for races in 1966, three of them won. Morial won 
his bid for a seat in the Louisiana House of Representatives and Earl Amedee and Avery 
Alexander took seats on the Orleans Parish Democratic Committee.”7  
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 not only swelled the voting rolls, but also 
spawned a host of new Black political organizations who assembled and delivered the 
Black vote in elections. SOUL (Southern Organization of Unified Leadership), COUP 
(Community Organization of Urban Politics), and BOLD (Black Organization for 
Leadership Development) would play the prominent role on the political landscape in 
New Orleans. These groups understood that within the political realm organization 
reigned supreme and determined political wins and losses. Through effective planning 
and appropriate resources the acronyms delivered thousands of Black voters to the polls 
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in primaries and general elections. To some, SOUL, COUP, and BOLD had a “higher 
purpose—to free an oppressed minority, to give a quarter million people the direct voice 
in government they’ve never had.” These fresh organizations certainly introduced new 
voices into the political cacophony, but those voices represented the voices of the 
organizations that offered them, usually, and the masses, rarely. Bourg, a political 
commentator in New Orleans, wrote in 1973 that, “the fuel that drives any of America’s 
successful political movements today is the reach for individual power.” In terms of the 
Black political organizations, his assessment proved true.8 
One group commanded the most influence on the changing political scene. SOUL 
(Southern Organization of Unified Leadership) coalesced out of CORE (Congress of 
Racial Equality) attorney Nils Douglas’s second run for state legislature in 1966. Even 
though Douglas lost the race, SOUL became a force on the political scene in New 
Orleans in 1968. More than a simple area organization, SOUL represented an 
amalgamation of different Ninth Ward community groups.  Its twenty-five member board 
consisted of representatives from five different neighborhoods within the Ninth Ward: 
Lower Ninth Ward, Gentilly, Desire, Florida, and Pontchartrain Park. SOUL organized 
voters systematically through steady advertising, employing corps of paid workers to 
canvas neighborhoods, and by transporting voters to the polls and holding rallies. On a 
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basic level, SOUL attempted to “squeeze concessions out of the system” through a strong 
racial identity and marshaling votes for favored candidates. However, its strong racial 
identity did not prevent SOUL from endorsing candidates who were non-Black when a 
Black was in the race. Their endorsement of white candidates against Blacks muddied the 
group’s reputation in some neighborhoods. SOUL supported Gillis Long for governor 
over SOUL member Sam Bell and supported white Louisiana Supreme Court candidate 
Pascal Calogero against Black lawyer Revius Ortique in September of 1972.9   
A group from the Seventh Ward also battled for supremacy on the newly-opened 
political terrain. In covering the Sixth and Seventh Wards, COUP controlled an area 
capable of delivering close to 12,000 votes to candidates they decided to support. Like 
SOUL, COUP employed about 200 workers in the sixth and seventh wards to gather 
voters, transport voters to the polls and hand out literature, but COUP was established 
three years later than SOUL. Initially, COUP organized around Charles Elloie’s 1969 
unsuccessful bid for Seventh Ward state representative and increased its activity with the 
mayoral election of the same year. In the realm of education and income, COUP stood 
alone atop the hierarchy of Black organizations. Though COUP’s eight-person board 
controlled the organization, COUP had general membership meetings each month where 
officers gave reports to the rank-and-file members, which made the organization 
democratic in nature. Armed with “solid university backgrounds and definite middle-
class attitudes,” the men and women who ran COUP did not carry militancy in their 
arsenal. COUP’s members and key leaders such as, Sidney Barthelemy, Robert Tucker 
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Jr., Robert Collins, and Henry Braden IV represented an assimilationist and conservative 
stance on Black issues and focused on cultivating white contacts.10 COUP also dropped 
their support of Sam Bell in favor of Gillis Long, but this raised little concern from its 
membership because COUP never made claims to being a Black Power organization. 
COUP endeavored to “play the game” and not rock the boat. Similarly, the Louisiana 
Weekly asserted, “we know that in order to rise within the system you must use the 
system to your advantage.” The only question remained was whether or not using the 
system would benefit those historically outside it purview?11  
A third organization failed to gain much of the same notoriety of SOUL and 
COUP, but exerted influence as well. BOLD germinated during the blossoming voter 
registration drives of the mid-1960s in New Orleans and remained the most issue-
oriented of the Black political organizations. In its infancy, BOLD represented the heart 
of Ernest Morial’s run for State House of Representatives in Wards one and two. Yet, 
BOLD faced a problem other organizations did not have to deal with. In Central City, the 
base of its operations, BOLD contended with a various leaders who already had strong 
factions maneuvering and managing the political activities of the area. Some of those 
leaders included, Representative Dorothy Mae Taylor, Reverends Avery Alexander and 
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A. L. Davis, and City Councilman Eddie L. Sapir. Nevertheless, BOLD made its mark 
with its introduction of the Black Primary.12  
In 1969, BOLD looked to stop intrablack divisions with a Black Primary. The 
primary purpose was to “encourage Black interest and unity and also certainly hoped to 
improve the chances of one of its own leaders, Jim Singleton, in the District B race.”13 
Fifteen percent of eligible black voters turned out for the Black Primary and choose 
William Jefferson for the City Council seat and A. L. Davis for tax assessor. 
Unfortunately, the candidates who lost to Jefferson and Davis refused to dropout of the 
race. Hence, spoiling the sense of unity the Black Primary attempted to foster. The Plain 
Truth castigated those “small-minded…politicians” who only cared about their personal 
advantage and legacy to the detriment of overall community cohesion.  Nevertheless, the 
newspaper refused to accept the Black Primary debacle to blemish their hope for 
operational unity in New Orleans. “The Black Primary is not a dead concept. Black unity 
is tomorrow’s dream…A dream that will not die.”14 
Instead of representing the concrete change the Blacks residents of New Orleans 
craved, SOUL, COUP, and BOLD, sought patronage and shared in the spoils of the 
corrupt political system. Tom Dent mentioned this phenomenon in 1979 article in 
Southern Exposure. “Once the black community elects someone,” Dent said, “it is 
difficult to hold that representative faithful after she or he is exposed to the lure of greater 
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amounts of money from competing mainstream economic interests, whether in plain ole 
dollar payoffs or jobs which offer huge increases in salary.”15  SOUL and COUP 
benefited themselves and some of their top leaders handsomely as they negotiated with 
politicians for patronage and campaign expenses. In 1969, SOUL received $19,000 to 
work on Moon Landrieu’s bid for mayor and both SOUL and COUP gained political 
positions under Landrieu’s leadership of the city. One political commentator said that, “It 
is Landrieu’s patronage that has made them the coat and tie men of black power.”  
Maurice “Moon” Landrieu was born on July 23, 1930 in the uptown area of New 
Orleans. After receiving his law degree from Loyola University of New Orleans in 1954, 
he served three years in the United States Army. Landrieu started his political career in 
1960 when he was elected to the Louisiana State House of Representatives. While there, 
he made a name for himself by being one of the few white legislators who voted against 
the “hate bills” of segregationists that attempted to thwart desegregation of New Orleans’ 
public facilities and public schools. Leading Blacks certainly used his liberal record as a 
justification of support. After a six-year stint in the House of Representatives, Landrieu 
was elected Councilman-at-large of the New Orleans City Council. His next political step 
was City Hall.16 
In addition to Landrieu’s patronage, SOUL received $50,000 for Gillis Long’s 
1971 first gubernatorial primary and $60,000 from Edwin Edwards in his second primary 
bid for the governorship. COUP received $40,000 from Long in the first primary and 
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$33,000 in the second primary from Bennett Johnston. This sample represents but a small 
portion of the monies that flowed into the coffers of SOUL and COUP, but it 
demonstrates the economic nature of the work these organizations attempted to do. Since 
the political endorsements basically provided candidates with a boost in public relations, 
organizations spent the money in different ways but focused their efforts on 
advertisements. They disbursed money for printing costs, radio and newspaper 
advertisement, food and drink at rallies, sample ballots and brochures, and paying the 
neighborhood and headquarters workers.17  
The Black political organizations also received patronage through antipoverty 
programs and President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, which served three 
purposes: (1) to provide jobs for civil rights activists; (2) to give those same activists a 
training ground for leadership; and (3) to nourish and sustain black political 
organizations. Since SOUL, COUP, and BOLD supported Landrieu in his bid for mayor, 
after his election, he appointed several acronym leaders to the board of directors of Total 
Community Action (TCA)—a federal poverty program organized in 1965. TCA 
established neighborhood centers, child development centers, leadership training 
programs, and job and recreational programs throughout the city. Edwin Lombard 
(SOUL), Sidney Barthelemy (COUP), Jim Singleton (BOLD), Sherman Copelin (SOUL), 
Don Hubbard (SOUL), Dorothy Mae Taylor, Robert Tucker (COUP), and Terrence 
Duvernay all were either on the board of directors or employees of TCA. Poverty 
programs essentially became a rites of passage of sorts for young, emerging Black 
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leaders. Daniel Patrick Moyinhan predicted, “Very possibly, the most important long run 
impact of the community action programs of the 1960s will prove to have been the 
formation of an urban Negro leadership echelon at just the time when the Negro masses 
and other minorities were verging toward extensive commitments to urban politics. 
Tammany at its best (or worse) would have envied the political apprenticeship provided 
the neighborhood coordinators of the anti-poverty program.”18 
In seeking and accepting patronage, the Black political organizations like SOUL, 
COUP, and BOLD inserted themselves into the political system not as change-agents, but 
as maintainers of the status quo. Whereas many thought that these new Black leaders had 
“a certain perception of and empathy with the special material and psychological needs of 
the black lower strata and, thus, perhaps a capacity to articulate these needs in a manner 
reasonably satisfactory to wide segments of the lower strata,” SOUL, COUP, and BOLD 
proved only a little more connected to the larger Black community than white politicians.  
In fact, instead of speaking for the masses, they clearly marketed themselves as 
middlemen between the Black community and white politicians who appealed to their 
organizations for the Black vote. To echo the sentiments of historian Cedric Johnson, the 
leaders of the Black political organizations in New Orleans were race leaders and not 
revolutionaries.19  
Jack Nelson, a white civil rights lawyer, explained that the endorsement process 
involved money and other elements like the leaders’ motivations. “I’m not saying the 
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leaders don’t feel for their people,” Nelson said. “But decisions are often made on the 
basis of how the leaders themselves can benefit.” Nelson went on to say that the process 
emerged out of white political need to tap into the Black community. “They sought out 
the influential people and sometimes preyed on their feelings of prestige.” In 1971, 
Ernest Morial, who would be the first Black mayor of New Orleans, set the record 
straight about Black organizations and politicians’ motives. “People illogically expect 
black politicians to have much higher moral standards than white politicians. But the 
same rules apply in both camps.” Morial’s warning would haunt the Black residents of 
New Orleans for more than three decades.20  
Certain members of these organizations did not endorse the patronage and money 
grabbing of some of their compatriots. Several argued that getting politicians elected was 
only half the job; it is the follow-through and oversight of the elected officials that 
mattered most. James R. Chubbuck, director of the Institute of Politics at Loyola 
University, and Johnny Jackson, Jr., a Black state legislator, argued that the Black 
organizations failed to effectively monitor and lobby the officials they helped elect. 
Jackson said, “In the legislature we seldom see members of black political organizations, 
even on a limited basis, checking out how the legislators are voting.” State 
Representative and SOUL member, Theodore Marchand, said Black needs “transcend 
any election. We need traffic lights. We need jobs. If the organizations are so strong, they 
should be able to use their influence to get these thing for us.” In short, Marchand called 
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for the organizations to develop a more grassroots approach to the political and practical 
needs of Black residents.  
SOUL and COUP failed to answer. Albert Malveaux, president of COUP, agreed 
that the organization lacked a grassroots, community involvement component, but said 
the group was “moving into that area now.” Reynard Rochon, a SOUL board member, 
admitted that “it’s only been in the last couple of years that SOUL has learned to deal 
with the issues again…SOUL has deemed it necessary to focus its attention primarily on 
politics.” These concerns for “high” politics and the lack of follow-through on the part of 
the Black political organizations make a convincing case that their organizations paid lip-
service to change and embraced patronage and spoils; and they welcomed the spotlights 
of electoral victories and shunned the thankless and patient work of community change.21  
Many in the Black community; however, refused to allow the Black politicians 
and organizations free reign. The Plain Truth, a newspaper published by the Free 
Southern Theater, became the platform to attack, judge, and vilify Black community 
leaders who put rank and prestige before the well-being of the community. James 
Singleton, himself an aspiring politician, challenged other leaders to see past the 
immediate rewards of the election game into the effects the game would have on their 
communities in the long run. “Blacks who use elections only to make money should try 
to look ahead and consider what is going to happen in the next four years,” Singleton 
warned. “The man who prostitutes his vote to a political candidate has received his 
reward when he is paid off. He can expect little else in the future.” Singleton’s statements 
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challenged the acronyms sole focus on winning particular elections and leaving the future 
in the hands of others. Bob Tucker, a COUP broad member, stated that “winning is the 
only way to assist the people…blacks in high places help the people.” In a scathing 
article in The Plain Truth, activist Oretha Castle Haley registered her vehement 
displeasure with the way Black politicians operated within the political system. “The 
historical role of ‘tom’ is not applicable today’s situation. To say you are toms would be 
to pervert an already overly perverted word. You are traitors—traitors to your own 
women and children!” Born in Oakland, Tennessee, Oretha Castle and family moved to 
New Orleans when she was seven. As a student at Southern University of New Orleans, 
Haley involved herself in the Dryades Street boycotts and established herself as a force in 
the “direct-action” movement. Haley leveled the strong statements above not simply to 
berate but to inspire. “Stop operating as puppets,” she continued, “enabling the 
exploitation of us as a people. Be men!...If you do not dare to become men NOW!!! We 
[women] must assume the responsibility.” Haley dared Black organizations and 
politicians to relinquish their love of influence and trinkets and adopt a stance that led to 
true power for the Black community.22  
Even though the acronyms exerted a considerable amount of influence on the 
political scene, Ernest “Dutch” Morial actively rebuffed their support and still became the 
first Black mayor of New Orleans. Outside of BOLD’s help in his run for State House of 
Representatives, Morial stood clear of political organization entanglements and, in fact, 
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became one of their staunchest opponents. Though he always identified as Black, Morial 
steered clear and moved in “splendid isolation.” He accused the groups of repeatedly 
“putting money ahead of principle—that is, of being too willing to endorse whatever 
white candidate paid them the largest sum of money.” Because of his apprehensions 
about the acronyms and probably his own vanity, Morial lay outside SOUL and COUP 
and kept a low profile during the “Moon” Landrieu years, 1969-1976, then threw his hat 
in the ring for mayor.23  
Morial understood that in order to capture the highest office, he must groom 
himself in lower, but important, positions, which poised him for bigger, better challenges. 
After his unsuccessful councilman-at-large bid in 1969, Morial returned to his state 
legislative seat, where he was first Black elected to the state legislator since 
Reconstruction, until Governor McKeithen promoted him to the Orleans Parish Juvenile 
Court where he was also the state’s first Black to hold that position. In 1972, Morial 
completed a successful run for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals where he stayed until 
his 1977 run for city hall.24  
Even though they grew out of the same communal base—the seventh ward—
COUP was reluctant to endorse Morial. They also feared being labeled racist by whites 
since they supported two Black men at the top of the ticket—Morial for mayor and 
Sidney Barthelemy for councilman-at-large. After hours of debate and taking five ballots, 
COUP gave Morial its endorsement. Monk Dupre, president of COUP at the time, said, 
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"we didn't want to be considered racist…and we wouldn't have endorsed Dutch just 
because he is Black. But he is qualified." SOUL’s strategy, on the other hand, revolved 
around supporting someone who they thought could actually win. Consequently, SOUL 
gave its endorsement to one of Morial’s opponents, Nat Keifer. COUP’s reluctant 
endorsement and SOUL’s outright endorsement of Keifer represented only a continuation 
of the bickering between Morial and the Black political organizations. Moon Landrieu 
said of Morial and his 1969 unsuccessful campaign for the city’s councilman-at-large, 
“he never played with these guys…[and]…there was no personal affection between 
them.”25 
 Outside of the personal animus between Morial, COUP and SOUL, the 
demographics of New Orleans’ Black voting electorate posed a problem for Morial’s run 
for mayor. When Morial decided to run for mayor, registered white voters outnumbered 
Black voters 58 percent to 42 percent. To combat this circumstance, Morial’s strategy in 
the primary was to appeal to the Black vote and gain enough of their votes to push him 
into the runoff while taking the Black votes away from Democratic opponents Nat Keifer 
and Toni Morrison. Morial’s strategy worked effectively. In the 1977 open, nonpartisan 
primary, Morial received 58 percent of the Black vote and 5 percent of the white vote. 
DiRosa received 39 percent of the white vote and 4 percent of the Black vote. Kiefer 
received 18 percent of the Black vote and 28 percent of the white vote. Morrison received 
16 percent of the Black vote and 25 percent of the white vote. After the primary, Morial 
was helped by the fact that "Black voter registration increased by 5 percent during the 
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months between the primary election and the runoff election while white voter 
registration increased by 3.5 percent…[In the runoff,] the Black turnout rate was 76 
percent as compared to the 78 percent turnout rate for whites." This demonstrates that 
when the Black voters believed a Black candidate had a viable chance to win, Black 
voters turned out to the polls and showed their support. In the runoff election, Morial 
appealed to white voters and received 19 percent of their votes. He also received 95 
percent of the Black vote. Morial won the election by a small majority receiving 51.57 
percent while DiRosa received 48.43.26 
 “Dutch” Morial inherited a city that, according to the 1970 census, had thirty-
eight percent of its black families subsisting on incomes below the poverty level and an 
additional eighteen percent had incomes, which fell into the working poor category. 
Overall, fifty-six percent of Black families in New Orleans found themselves at the 
bottom of the social and economic latter. Unemployment ranged from nineteen to fifty 
percent in those low-income communities. Educationally, only 42.3% of the population 
across the city were high school graduates, which was well below the 53.7% average of 
the nation’s 50 largest cities. Within the Black community, the situation was worse. 
25.7% of the city’s Black population were high graduates as compared to 52.7 % in the 
white community. A 1969 community survey revealed other issues as well. One 
respondent remarked, “job opportunities and advancements exist for perhaps the top 10% 
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of well qualified Negroes. Self-help programs were said to concentrate on the top 10% of 
high school students, while ignoring the remainder.”27  
While in office, Morial attempted to deliver results for certain sectors of Black 
people in New Orleans. Continuing in the same vein as “Moon” Landrieu, Morial opened 
the doors of city government to the Black middle class of New Orleans and provided 
numerous employment opportunities. In his first term, “the number of blacks in 
municipal jobs increased by 11% despite budget tightening that cut 1,500 positions.” In 
addition, Black executives headed five of city hall’s twelve departments. In this way, 
Morial, like other Black mayors across the country, helped to advance the middle class 
through access to city jobs and contract set-aside programs. Several Black leaders 
challenged Morial’s economic plan by claiming his system benefited whites more than 
more than Blacks. One opponent said, “The city skyline changed but there’s nothing in it 
for us in terms of ownership. The principal beneficiaries of his economic development 
programs were in the white—as opposed to the Black—business community.” This was 
not simply a problem in New Orleans but everywhere Black people began to seriously 
enter America’s economic system. The focus on jobs within city hall or white 
corporations blinded many to the reality that the power pours from ownership, not just 
access. Tom Dent, famous for his work with the Free Southern Theater, commented that, 
“in the American political system, independence stems from economic power,” not 
simply having Black politicians in office and jobs downtown. Morial, however, continued 
to concentrate on access. Through an executive order in his second term, Morial 
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developed a Jobs Equity Plan “which required all construction workforces to be 50 
percent residents, 25 percent minorities, and 10 percent women.” Furthermore, in an 
attempt to assist Black business, Dutch “ordered all publicly funded construction projects 
to award 20 percent of all subcontracts to minorities.” Though he is to be commended for 
his efforts, these programs only helped a small number Blacks and left most languishing 
at the bottom of the social and economic ladder in New Orleans.28  
The Black underclass in many ways failed to reap anything close to the small 
rewards of the Black middle class. To be sure, their greatest needs: employment and 
police protection, were not dealt with. Political scientist James Button discovered that 
Black mayors running urban cities successfully brought about changes in “capital-
intensive services like streets, parks, and water and sewage,” but failed in “improving 
human resource services like employment, housing, and police protection.” In short, the 
political system allowed Black mayors to provide cosmetic changes to the communities 
of its constituents, but left more to the imagination in the economic realm.29  
Morial desired to change the system and erase racial preferences for whites as 
well as Blacks. In fact, the way Morial acted in office, underscored “the meaninglessness 
of any substantial gains for the black community.” In a figurative dagger to those who 
gave him the vast majority of their votes, Morial maintained that he owed “nothing 
particularly to the black community.” In a speech before the Metropolitan Area 
Committee addressing the race issue shortly after his election, Morial outlined the ways 
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he planned to appoint new personnel in city hall. According to Arnold Hirsch, “Morial 
promised that 'we shall do so by the yardstick of intellect and public dedication, 
regardless of race, creed, or national origin. I have no intention of politicalizing the 
incoming administration on the narrow grounds of reverse prejudice.'" In his early 
appointments, Morial surely based his decisions on merit. He appointed both Blacks and 
whites, but purposefully chose those individuals with non-political backgrounds. Morial’s 
NAACP background certainly pushed him to appear more race-neutral as he fought for 
the total assimilation of Black people into the fabric of America. He internalized Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr’s idea that one should be judged by the content of their 
character.30  
Morial’s pick for police chief demonstrated his conservative approach to city 
reform. In February of 1978, Morial introduced an interracial and interdenominational 
search committee to help him select a new leader for the New Orleans Police 
Department. Xavier University President Norman Francis and prominent businessman 
Harry England co-chaired the important committee. As the search proceeded, many 
grassroots activists weighed-in on the topic. Kalamu ya Salaam wanted a thorough 
investigation of the NOPD to precede the appointment of a new Police Chief. He felt a 
new chief would simply cover-up the problems running rampage throughout the police 
department. Others simply labeled the committee “bourgeois” in origin and outlook and 
contended that it did not know how to “relate to the problems of poor people.”31 
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Morial heard these complaints and continued with his plan. Even though he 
received only 10 percent of the white vote, Morial wanted Blacks and whites of New 
Orleans to know that he would not “select black people for the sake of appeasing the 
black community. He sought to appoint people on the basis of merit.” This stand sent a 
message to the citizens that a Black Power government did not occupy city hall. Instead, 
the Black government in city hall would attempt to appease the whites, even though he 
only received 10 percent of the white vote in the election. The vote statistics 
notwithstanding, Morial chose James Parsons, a white from Alabama, as the new Police 
Chief. Parsons gained notoriety for turning around the Birmingham Police Department 
after Bull Connor’s career ended. This appointment surprised many in the Black 
community and represented the continued lack of power and influence over a candidate 
they gave 97 percent of their votes to. A letter, dated June 11, 1978, from a local resident 
explicitly expressed to Morial that “I think you were wrong for picking an outsider for 
police chief; you should have pick a man who has lived, in New Orleans.” When it came 
to the Black community in New Orleans, the traditional political formula that said, give 
me your vote and I will meet your needs, did not apply.32  
In short, the majority of the Black citizens on New Orleans had to become content 
with merely having a Black face in a high place. Studies show that the election of Black 
mayors represent little more than a symbolic token, but Black mayors’ most tangible 
benefits went to the Black middle class. Joan Crockett, a community worker in the Fisher 
Housing Project, explained Morial’s appeal in the Black community. “The edge Morial 
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has with low-income blacks is that he knows how to be a grass-roots person. He says it 
like it is; he sounds like he's one of us.... The black community does not believe that 
Morial has done much for it, but he does care. He is very limited in what he can do; no 
one could do much more to help the black poor.”33 
Critics of Morial’s policy, however, did not stand silently in the shadows. 
Morial’s personnel decisions “led Black activist Carl Galmon to resign his own seat on 
the City Welfare Board and blast Morial for maintaining ‘six whites in the most 
important department heads in city government when [he] only received 12,000 white 
votes.” Galmon maintained that the votes which pushed Morial into office came from the 
Black community and, as such, the Black community deserved to be placed in the power 
positions in local government. “Other Black critics charged that Morial adhere to a 
‘Superblack’ theory that granted consideration only to ‘overqualified’ Blacks.”34 Tom 
Dent, an area activist and leader within the Free Southern Theater, criticized Morial for 
being a “Black mayor who did not act like a Black man,” while white columnist Iris 
Kelso said that “Dutch Morial’s problem is that he’s too white for the Blacks, and too 
Black for the whites.”35 
Morial’s ascension to the mayor’s office failed to tap the root of Black problems 
in the city. In fact, while Morial fumbled with branch issues, the roots of the community 
continued to decay held together only by a unique New Orleans culture. Three years into 
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his first term as mayor, Morial faced the daunting reality that New Orleans’ 26.4% city-
well poverty-rate made it the third poorest large city in the country, a rate that increased 
from sixteen percent in 1970. Furthermore, as his second term winded down, Morial 
headed a city in an educational disaster zone. In 1985, while more Black New Orleanians 
attended college, the high school dropout rate hovered around fifty percent and the 
average Black resident maneuvered throughout society with less than an eighth-grade 
education. In addition, whereas Morial’s tenure in office benefited the Black middle class 
in small ways, still Black business only made up three percent of the business community 
in New Orleans and most were small operations—less than fifteen employed more than 
fifteen employees.36  
To be fair, Morial stepped into a system that inherently could not effectively 
change the lives of the majority of Blacks in the city. Even though Blacks began to hold 
an increasing number of high-profile governmental positions, like African Presidents in 
Neo-Colonial Africa, Blacks could only do so much within a system geared to benefit the 
elite at the expense of the masses. In fact, they were extremely limited what they could do 
legally and economically. In May of 1978, when Morial took office, New Orleans 
depended on federal and state funds for 57 percent of its $214 million annual operating 
budget. When President Ronald Reagan took office, the federal government drastically 
cut the federal funds flowing into New Orleans from $123 million in 1980 to $65 million 
in 1982, which brought state aid to only 30 percent of the city’s budget. It also did not 
help that Black mayors are unable to effect the kind of change their rhetoric calls for 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
 233 
because they are taking over dying cities with the largest amounts of white-flight into the 
suburbs and the oldest housing which leaves them with the “lowest capacity to raise 
revenue from their own taxes.” Yet, Morial continued to grope for solutions to the 
massive problems facing the city. By 1985, in an attempt to appeal to the business world, 
the city saddled its population with a nine-cent sales tax, the highest in the nation at the 
time, without the logical improvements in public services and public schools. Atlanta's 
Mayor Andrew Young explained he “cooperate[d] with business not just in the interest of 
the profitability of business but because poor people are getting jobs.” Certainly, many 
poor people received jobs during Morial’s reign, but with corporate development as a key 
strategy for many Black mayors, corporations still held the power.37 
The coalition that pushed Blacks into office did not help matters much. Arnold 
Hirsch, in a New York Times article, proffered the notion that when a coalition is formed 
between conservative whites and Blacks to elect a Black mayor, “someone is going to be 
disappointed in the next four years.” Indeed, this alliance left the majority of Blacks in 
the city searching for answers within a system that failed to hear, recognize, or value the 
question of Black well-being.38 
 
Conclusion: 
When SOUL, COUP, and BOLD burst onto the political scene, many Black New 
Orleanians thought change was coming. When Morial became the first Black mayor of 
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the “Big Easy,” most thought life would get better. Their expectations for the new Black 
mayor, like the expectations of urban Blacks across the country, were extremely high and 
unrealistic given the nature of America’s political culture. They expected instant help, 
instant jobs, and an instant stoppage of police brutality with new Black faces in high 
places. What they experienced, unfortunately, differed greatly from their dreams as 
political organizations ransomed Black votes to the highest bidder and the mayor catered 
to the few whites who voted for him. 
The dire economic numbers and unchanging reality of Black suffering indicate 
that the wanton pursuit of public office and voting as the primary sources of power by the 
Black community without a parallel focus on the ownership of and control over important 
resources in the community has hindered real progress in the Black community, in New 
Orleans and elsewhere. In a twist of cruel irony, as the numbers of Black elected and 
appointed officials increased, so did Black homelessness, poverty, unemployment, 
criminality and violence, inadequacies in education, and health problems of all types. The 
rise of Black political power did not attend an equal rise in actual power in the Black 
community. Instead of having their needs met, instead of experiencing less police 
brutality, Blacks, with Blacks holding political power, in many ways experienced life in 
New Orleans the same way they did under white mayors. In fact, things simply got 
worse. “The only real political salvation for the black community in New Orleans is self-
help…,” Tom Dent argued, “and the retaining of dedicated people at the level where they 
have to answer primarily to the interests of the community—not the power structure.” 
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Various groups in a place known for parties and parades struggled for Black 
Power in diverse ways. Their diversity limited their ability to make substantial change in 
New Orleans as the groups failed to develop what Maulana Karenga called “Operational 
Unity.” Each group incorporated its philosophy into the gumbo that made the political, 
social, and cultural scene of New Orleans complex and spicy. Ahidiana looked to build 
independence from outside the system, while SOUL, COUP, and BOLD groped for a 
firm place within the status quo. The Black Panthers used their organization to illuminate 
ills in the Black community and foster a people’s revolution, while Mark Essex struck a 
blow for freedom as a one-man army for liberation. Regardless of whether or not these 
groups achieved their goals, this dissertation has partly filled a hole in the literature of 
Black Power. In analyzing how organizations and individuals used the prominent 
movement themes within a particular city, we get a more nuanced view of the 
interworking of Black Power beyond the black berets and student takeovers. Instead of 
only looking at the Panthers, this study allows for a more holistic view of Black Power. 
Local actors and transplants played impactful roles in the drama that unfolded 
between the years of 1964 and 1977. On the one hand, Malik Rahim, Fortier and SUNO 
students, Ahidiana members, and the majority of the members in the political 
organizations highlighted in this dissertation sprang from the city in which they 
challenged. On the other, Mark Essex and the founders of the Free Southern Theater 
brought radical notions of liberation from outside the Crescent City, yet fought just as 
hard for change as those who were homegrown.  
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As Ahidiana battled to provide an academically rigorous and culturally sensitive 
education to Black children in the ninth ward, public schools in New Orleans changed 
quickly. The fight for integration moved at an accelerated pace with some consequences. 
For example, white flight from public schools in the latter part of the 1960s and early 70s 
shifted the economic base and made it “difficult for New Orleans’ formerly racially 
segregated white schools to maintain their facilities and provide for basic education of 
their integrated student populations.” In short, white families took their money with them 
to private schools and schools in the neighboring parishes of Jefferson, St. Bernard, and 
St. Tammany. In integrating the schools, African-Americans ended up once again in 
schools largely by themselves. Nghana Lewis argues that when the public schools of New 
Orleans were completely “desegregated,” the schools “looked financially and 
academically, much like it did prior to Brown v. Board, with the exception of only a 
handful of magnet schools.” Actually, some have contended that public schools are 
indeed more segregated than before the Brown decision in 1954. By the early 1990s, 
twenty-five percent of Black students were enrolled in one of the twenty-seven largest 
urban school systems in the country. In these areas, white enrollment was low or non-
existent.1  
In the years before Hurricane Katrina, more than eighty percent of the students 
attending public schools were African-American. In fact, some schools had enrollment 
populations that were 100 percent African-American. In this time, academic inadequacy, 
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poor oversight, and shady business practices plagued the schools in Orleans Parish. One 
example was an audit released by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the 
Inspector General in August 2004. The audit found that then State Superintendent Cecil J. 
Picard’s failure to monitor and account for $71 million of Title 1 federal funds. However, 
that is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. New Orleans public school corruption and 
neglect would require more space than we have.  
In the years after Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans schools continue to undergo a 
drastic transformation; however, this transformation has not benefited the Black 
community the way the staff of Ahidiana and the students at Fortier and SUNO would 
have liked. In Post-Katrina New Orleans, students have many choices: Orleans Parish 
Public Schools, Recovery School District (RSD)—the state-run district created prior to 
Katrina to take over failing public schools in Orleans, and several independent charter 
schools. Charter schools started in 1991 in Minnesota after legislation approved its 
establishment. Since 1991, “approximately 3,600 charter schools have been established in 
forty states as well as in the District of Columbia.” Charter schools are publicly funded 
schools, which operate independently from the surrounding school district and its 
enrollment is not limited by residential restrictions. Louisiana’s first charter schools came 
after legislation in 1995 approved eight local school districts to “either establish charter 
schools, or grant charters to other entities wishing to establish charter schools under the 
school district’s supervision.” Before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans boasted only eight 
charter schools. By 2011, seventy percent or sixty-one charter schools litter the city’s 
landscape. The for-profit educational companies who run the charter schools look to be 
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the future of New Orleans public schools. Though the jury is out on the effectiveness of 
charter schools, more continue to come online giving New Orleans the title of the most 
“reform friendly” school district. As it relates to our conversation about Ahidiana, 
Fortier, and SUNO, the educational experimentation afoot in New Orleans continues to 
push a eurocentric notion of education though cloaked in a variety of “innovative” 
facades. Either Black educational groups are not applying for charters or the ones who do 
apply fail to have their request granted. Although New Orleans’ school population is 
more than ninety-five percent Black, the corporations that run the charter schools are 
majority white, the curriculum is still eurocentric, and standardizing testing and not 
holistic education remains the focus.2  
On the higher education side of the equation, the state of Louisiana briefly 
considered, in 2011, merging SUNO and UNO (University of New Orleans) in an effort 
to save money, according to Governor Bobby Jindal. The issue proved highly 
controversial as SUNO alumni and black legislators fought to keep SUNO alive. 
Eventually, the topic was tabled. SUNO continues to provide a college education to 
students who may not otherwise have the opportunity. However, SUNO has not become a 
Black university in the mold students desired in the late sixties. State government and 
conservative administrations have limited change.  
If you are reading this in America, you know that a revolution did not take place 
in the 1970s. The national, state, and local governments effectively quieted the roar of the 
                                                
2 Pamela N. Frazier-Anderson, “Public Schooling in Post-Hurricane Katrina New 
Orleans: Are Charter Schools the Solution or Part of the Problem?” The Journal of 
African American History, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer, 2008), 412, 418, 410. 
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Black Panthers across the country. New Orleans was no different, but its legacy in the 
city still lingers. Malik Rahim, former Panther, has run for public office and was very 
instrumental in the aftermath of Katrina. In the more than thirty-five years since the 
dramatic events of 1970, some of the witnesses and participants wonder where that 
strength, that courage, and that fight has gone. They would say that for the Black 
community to be truly liberated in a post-Katrina New Orleans and world, it must 
remember, rediscover, and revive the spirit of Desire. 
Young Black men fighting against themselves replaced the spirit of Desire. By the 
early 1990s, New Orleans came be known as the murder capital of the world. As the 
African proverb says, “A warrior without war wars against self.” In the vacuum left by 
the Black Panthers and their revolutionary vigor, the War on Drugs, violence, and 
hopeless reigned. The gangster rap cultivated in the city chronicled battles between 
different neighborhoods of the city without ever turning its eye towards continued police 
brutality and subjugation. In the 1990s, more than three thousand people were murdered 
in New Orleans. The vast majority of the victims were young, Black men. Rest in peace 
t-shirts became popular in this environment. The businesses that supplied the shirts 
certainly made a small fortune off Black death. 
In the political realm, though Black influence was high, Black economic and 
social advancement has been virtually non-existent. The frustration with the lack of 
change has pushed New Orleans residents to elect its first white mayor since 1970 with 
the election of Mitch Landrieu in 2010. Mitch is the son of Maurice “Moon” Landrieu, 
Mayor of New Orleans from 1970-1977. In the thirty-four years of Black mayoral rule in 
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New Orleans, outside of the era of good feelings following the election of a Black mayor, 
the Black community, as a whole, rarely benefited. In fact, New Orleans’ poverty rate in 
2000 (twenty-eight percent) was higher than it was in 1960 (twenty-five percent). The oil 
bust and federal cutbacks by President Ronald Reagan that greeted Ernest Morial in his 
second term as mayor failed to help the city meet the needs of the Black community.  
Also, entrenched Jim Crow never disappeared despite the façade of diversity. Ironically, 
David Duke, a known Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, won more than sixty percent 
of the white vote in the 1990 Senate race and about fifty-five percent in the 1991 
gubernatorial race. The numbers show that prejudiced racial attitudes were never far from 
the surface.  
As stated in Chapter Six, Black faces in high places did not yield the fundamental 
change hoped for by the city’s Black community. Control of the mayoral office, city 
council, and school board by Black politicians did not improve the lot of Black people 
struggling in this land of abundance. With the political doors wide open, grassroots 
energy and action was redirected towards holding politicians accountable and away from 
building community relationships to bring change from the bottom. The SOUL, COUP, 
and BOLD political organizations all played a role in the political atmosphere following 
the election of Ernest Morial. In large measure, these political actors were not acting on 
the behalf of the neglected population of New Orleans. Instead, they played the game to 
enjoy the spoils themselves. The situation did not improve after Morial. In an unforeseen 
twist, the white minority vote began to control elections. Black candidates split the Black 
vote, so whites held the balance. COUP leader Sidney Barthelemy received eighty-five 
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percent of the white vote in 1985 and swept into the mayor’s office. With whites aligning 
with the more conservative Black candidate, Barthelemy marginalized core Black issues, 
which made him a Black face on white power. 
With the opening of the political apparatus for Black people, most Black 
politicians found their niche in an already corrupt environment. Louisiana, especially 
New Orleans, has long been known for its charismatic and crooked politicians. It started 
in the days of Reconstruction when southern scalawags united with northern 
carpetbaggers to control the city’s political infrastructure. The legacy continued from 
Governor Huey Long to Governor Edwin Edwards, from Congressman William Jefferson 
to Councilman Oliver M. Thomas. In the 1980s, Black political corruption came to the 
fore. During this time, Total Community Action officials and attorneys were indicted for 
stealing, diverting, and misappropriating several thousands of dollars in federal funds. In 
the 1990s, Robert F. Collins, the South’s first Black federal judge and COUP member, 
was convicted of accepting a bribe to reduce the sentence of a drug offender. The years 
immediately before and after Hurricane Katrina witnessed a spike in political corruption 
cases. Between 1997 and 2006, Louisiana, as a whole, was number one in political 
corruption in America with 326 federal corruption convictions.3 
To be sure, corruption persisted and police brutality did not abate while Black 
politicians ran the city and more African-Americans joined the police ranks. The Panthers 
challenged police violence while providing necessary survival programs. Yet, 
COINTELPRO and the NOPD along with Mayor Moon Landrieu went to great lengths to 
                                                
3 “Louisiana Most Corrupt State in the Nation, Mississippi Second, Illinois Sixth, New 
Jersey Ninth” 21 Corporate Crime Reporter 40, October 8, 2007. 
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suppress their movement. As the Panthers faded from view by transferring to Oakland or 
engaging in low-profile community work, various organizations coalesced to fight police 
brutality without much luck. In fact, one of the city’s most egregious acts of police 
brutality happened with the first Black mayor sitting in City Hall. After a white officer 
was found dead in Algiers—a community on the West Bank of New Orleans—a team of 
sixteen white officers converged on area of Algiers. They came to avenge the death of a 
fellow officer. After the dust settled, the police had killed three African American 
residents, all of whom allegedly threatened police. Residents protested the killings, but it 
demonstrated that the NOPD had the right to play “judge, jury, and executioner” when it 
wanted.4 
Police brutality still plagues New Orleans long after Mark Essex shouted from the 
rooftop of the Howard Johnson hoping to end the injustice. The legacy of Mark Essex 
remains divided upon class and racial lines. Some interpret his actions as heroic, while 
others consider him a terrorist. The debate will continue to rage; however, the chapter on 
Essex provides a needed counter-weight to the one-sided demonization of this 
controversial figure. In his mind, Essex thought sure his actions would spark a revolution. 
His barrel screamed for the countless African Americans killed by police yearly across 
the country. This practice continues unabated with the police culprits rarely serving jail 
time.  
Hurricane Katrina, the man-made disaster, demonstrated to the world that New 
Orleans has not “overcome” and that the fight of the Black Power movement was 
                                                
4 Leonard Moore, Black Rage, 164-169. 
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justified and, perhaps, needs to be revived. It demonstrated the continued lack of political 
power and gross abandonment of civil rights even as a C. Ray Nagin, a Black man, ran 
the city. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast. The 
next morning it seemed the city dodged a major hit until reports surfaced that the levees 
were breached in several places in the city. As the water rose, so did America’s 
awareness of the city’s poverty and neglect. In the immediate aftermath, thousands 
suffered in the Superdome and at the Ernest Morial Convention Center while they waited 
to be rescued. The world looked on. President George W. Bush made his way to New 
Orleans four days after the storm. His canned speech at Jackson Square failed to raise 
hopes and made promises he could not keep. New Orleans remains “the city that care 
forgot.”  
On the whole, the city is plagued by many of the same problems it faced three 
centuries ago. If nothing more, the study of the Black Power movement juxtaposed with 
present circumstances confirms that America has a long way to go achieve an equal 
society despite the rhetoric and speech-making to the contrary. This dissertation seeks to 
broaden the historical conversation about New Orleans and inspire more research that 
illuminates and unearths more about the radicalism that emanated from the city during 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
Even though New Orleans is a city that goes from party to party throughout the 
year, in the period between 1964-1977, various groups and individuals stopped dancing, 
put the drinks down, and acted on diverse principles and values in order to change the 
“Big Easy.” Their efforts certainly refashioned a city long on masquerades and short on 
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transformations, but, as always, there is work yet to be done. Those bad brothers and 
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